Great question by @Wojtowicz_N. I say a wargame needs at least 3 things. 1) to be about organized political violence or the threat thereof. 2) some form of cognitive interaction, whether human v. human, human v. computer, or computer v. computer. 3) rules-not necessarily rigid.
1) If it's not about organized political violence (warfare) or the threat thereof, then it's not a wargame. It could be an amazing game, but it's not about war, so not a wargame. Doesn't mean it's not useful or analytically valid.
Nov 22, 2022 • 17 tweets • 5 min read
Great thread by @KofmanMichael about Steve Biddle's piece in @WarOnTheRocks. I agree with their points about force employment & design, and add 4 more factors worth considering when drawing lessons from this war: terrain, logistics, airpower, & seapower. 1/17
Terrain, including infrastructure like roads, railways, & bridges, is key to the balance between maneuver and defense. The same armies using the same kit can fight a war of maneuver on the plains of northern France and an attritional slog in the Hürtgen Forest. 2/17
Oct 8, 2022 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
Highlighting a key point from @WarintheFuture’s great thread on the Kerch bridge attack. There are other routes, but they’re limited. Ukraine has channeled all road traffic into and out of Crimea onto one major route through Melitopol. What happens to refugee flows? 1/8
Russians or their enablers in Crimea are likely looking for an exit. The easy route is gone (though it’s been closed to civilian traffic since August). If they want to leave and take possessions with them, they’ll go by car and the only way out now is Melitopol. 2/8
Oct 3, 2022 • 23 tweets • 8 min read
My recent 🧵on implications of 🇷🇺 mobilization was more optimistic for 🇺🇦 than my previous statements, which tended to note constraints on 🇺🇦 operations. I thought it might be useful to walk folks through how an analyst changes their mind. 1/23
When assessing possible outcomes of rare events like major wars, analysts often have "priors," or a hypothesis based on their knowledge & assumptions. While based on Bayesian probability, I mean a qualitative hypothesis, so don't @ me mathematicians. 2/23
Oct 2, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Amazing video detailing AFU tactics for seizing a fortified position near Balaklia in their recent offensive. Speaks to AFU advances in C2, ISR, & ops-intel integration within combined-arms maneuver.
The best part? This was just a supporting effort! The main assault was from the left. Speaks to AFU’s ability to coordinate & link engagements to create operational effects greater than the sum of their parts.
Sep 23, 2022 • 26 tweets • 7 min read
Russia's mobilization vs. Ukraine's increasingly Western-equipped force could be the nearest thing to an empirical case study in the long-running dispute between capability/quality and capacity/quantity in defense strategy and force planning. 1/25
Before continuing, I want to note that this is abstract analysis, but there's nothing abstract about the tragedy of this war. I'll describe possible insights, but we must all remember the human price paid for these lessons. 2/25
Sep 21, 2022 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
Good thread by @jeffaedmonds on Russian mobilization. I want to highlight a key point:
As @KofmanMichael and @MassDara have noted, this “partial mobilization” is uncharted territory, so the methods are unclear. But as @jeffaedmonds notes below, 1 method may be individuals augmenting depleted units. But this has drawbacks.
As we’ve discussed @KofmanMichael, there’s a collection and curation bias here. Unlike most platforms, drones provide dramatic videos of their exploits. So we see lots of evidence of their work, and much less for other weapons.
The 1990-91 Gulf War had similar pattern. US smart weapons had cameras, which made great TV footage & contributed to a belief that they played a bigger role than they actually did.
Sep 12, 2022 • 8 tweets • 4 min read
I want to highlight @RALee85's point here that Russia knew about the Ukrainian buildup before the latest Battle of Kharkiv. So this appears less an intel failure than another example of the "ops-intel" failures that have plagued Russian planning & execution. 1/8
I really liked the @NavalInstitute article linked in this tweet, especially the points about designing human and technical information & command systems for chaotic conditions.
For more on the need to gain “degradation dominance” in a techno-cognitive confrontation with China & Russia, see my @CNASdc paper cnas.org/publications/r….
Aug 19, 2022 • 12 tweets • 4 min read
I've been in these briefings. Heck, I've given some of these briefings and written papers touching on this topic. Here's my best stab at what I/we got wrong. 1/12
1) Assessments of adversary mil capabilities tend to be scenario-specific. US analysts spent 99.9% of our time looking at Russia-NATO fights, not Russia-Ukraine. We usually examined much more geographically and temporally limited conflicts. 2/12
Aug 17, 2022 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
1/6 Totally agree with @MikeBlack114. This article is a must-read for PLA watchers and folks concerned about Indo-Pacific security & specifically Taiwan's security. A couple additional points:
2/6 As mentioned in this @WarOnTheRocks podcast, US defense analysis & wargaming generally assume adversary forces and personnel are competent, motivated, and well-led. warontherocks.com/2022/05/what-t…
Aug 12, 2022 • 22 tweets • 7 min read
1/22 Per my thread last night, here's a final thread on the @CSIS Taiwan wargame focused on takeaways for U.S. defense strategy & force planning.
2/22 We won! Under pessimistic conditions! And so did a bunch of Blue Teams! I guess we can defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, what a relief!
Aug 12, 2022 • 25 tweets • 7 min read
1/25 In an earlier 🧵below, I described the design & scenario of the @CSIS wargame described in @WSJ, @business, and now @BreakingDefense. This 🧵will describe my experience playing the game and our team's strategy and choices.
1/23 Given recent coverage of @CSIS Taiwan wargames featuring my @CNASdc colleagues @becca_wasser & @StaciePettyjohn and erstwhile colleague @ZackCooper, I thought I’d share my experience as a player and how the game relates to other work on the cross-Strait military balance.
2/23 Here's the first article by @WSJ's @wstrobel:
1/22 Last week, I promised a thread on what the US/NATO & western allies can do to support Ukraine at this juncture in the war. I actually promised the thread last week, but better late than never. 🤷♂️
2/22 Per last week's thread, the war is stalemated militarily. Both sides face increasing economic & political pressure to show progress. UKR feels added pressure with the coming of winter, given its reliance on western gas and military aid. nytimes.com/2022/08/02/bus…
Aug 3, 2022 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
Strongly recommend this Ukraine war update. Esp. agree with @KofmanMichael about prospects for offensive and shortfalls in key equipment like APCs. Also loved Col Grabskyi's points about UKR training (all defense, no offense), and timing of offensive. A few quick thoughts. 1/9
Yesterday, I wrote about a possible Ukraine offensive, and I left some things out of the already-long thread. One issue was timing, and how the best window for an offensive might have already passed.
Where does the war in Ukraine go from here? What are the prospects for a Ukrainian counter-offensive? A long-ish Tuesday thread. 1/23
I spoke with @ReidStan of @RFERL about these topics here: rferl.org/a/pentagon-chr… 2/23
Jun 28, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
I want to highlight this comment from a brilliant thread by @KofmanMichael, because it's such an important point about weapons systems and tactical/operational adaptation. It also helps explain why weapons systems like GMLRS are almost never "game-changers" by themselves.
Forces adapt to new technology, tactics, techniques, and procedures in warfare. Weapon X provokes countermeasure Y, which prompts tactic Z, and so on. My favorite piece on this process is by Bryan Clark & John Stillion: csbaonline.org/research/publi…
Jun 7, 2022 • 11 tweets • 6 min read
I was reviewing #ukraine maps by @TheStudyofWar, @JominiW, et al yesterday to prepare for this radio interview with @TheWorld and I wondered why the war in eastern Ukraine is an attritional slugfest and not a battle of sweeping maneuver? 🧵 1/11
theworld.org/media/2022-06-…
Many folks thought that the war would feature more armored maneuver as operations shifted east to Donetsk & Luhansk, (& as the weather changed). This makes sense, as it's more open terrain. washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/… 2/11
