It is too bad that The Hill removed its comment feature, as it would be the easiest way to reach readers of this error-ridden and misleading op-ed. Some of my objections may be matters of interpretation of complex issues. Let's focus on the more objective, easy-to-check claims that fail when actually checked. Are Virginia and Georgia meeting the needs of fast growing demands compared to restructured states?

Obviously it costs something to build transmission lines, but well done power lines can cut overall consumer costs by connecting to distant cheaper sources of power.

https://twitter.com/joshuabasseches/status/1879009742238200101

But that requires a consumer-oriented transmission planning process. Instead we have a system that prioritizes utility-preferred projects over efficiently serving consumers. utilitydive.com/news/ferc-loca…

Fifteen state Attorneys General have called for a national price gouging ban, arguing that current state-by-state enforcement can't always protect consumers during emergencies. It's weakly argued and ignores contrary views, but let's hear them out. 1/16 The press release is linked and the full text of the letter is available with the press release. 2/6 ag.ny.gov/press-release/…

When you ignore the considered views of scholars in a field, you rarely reach a well-considered view. But experts can be wrong, so let us consider @ZephyrTeachout ‘s Atlantic article.🧵1 I have written on price gouging laws and I am an economist—I may be exactly the sort of expert that our law professor-essayist wants you to ignore. You are warned. 🧵2 theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…

Finally listened to Commissioner remarks on the Winter Storm Elliot report by FERC-NERC staff.
I agree with Commissioner Christie: market design is an important omitted issue, but his concerns are oddly framed given which utilities failed their customers last year. See pink.🧵 In Christie's view, the key issue is whether market designs will support winterization costs. He pointed to ERCOT's energy only market and all the non-utility generators there. "Where's the money going to come from?" he asked.

This article blaming higher electricity prices on deregulation is making a really odd argument, and doing it badly. A🧵. nytimes.com/2023/01/04/bus… The culprits, according to the story, are (1) rising grid costs, (2) uniform clearing price auctions at RTOs, and (3) profits taken by energy suppliers that "more than offset any savings to consumers from greater competition and efficiency."

My guess is most people could attain the median standard of living of 1923 by working no more than four hours a day in 1923, in part due to the work of electricity.

https://twitter.com/paulisci/status/1609597533340454912

But not that it “wasn’t until 1925 that half of American homes were wired for electricity, and even in 1940, a third of U.S. homes still lacked a flush toilet.” apartmenttherapy.com/1920s-real-est…

How to conclude electric regulation is better than consumer choice in two easy steps, courtesy of Ray Gifford and Matthew Larson:
1. Assert regulation works as promised,
2. Badly mischaracterize how markets work. utilitydive.com/news/ptc-itc-p… They say tax benefits from PTCs/ITCs will flow to end consumers because, more or less, that's how the regulatory ratemaking process works. Utilities seek out savings and regulators make utilities pass those savings along to customers. Yay!
Here is how they put it:

Some claim there is not much potential in residential demand response. Here is my personal rejoinder in chart form. I'm on a TOU plan with a peak rate nearly 4x offpeak and also enrolled in a demand response program though my utility. (Some details on chart in 🧵). #energytwitter I was looking at data to see (a) how well my effort to program my smart thermostat worked, and (b) see the effect of utility's DR call on July 11 compared to my own efforts. On (a) the red line shows real savings during the peak, but (b) the blue line shows I could do better.