Some thoughts on why US is taking a muted position on the crisis in Pakistan & especially the massive crackdown on dissent there, which is now starting to target Pakistanis based abroad, including in the US.
It's not just a case of democracy promotion being applied selectively. Pakistan isn't a big priority for the US government. The administration isn't about to allocate the policy space or bandwidth needed to focus on the situation there in a big way. That won't change even with many on Capitol Hill having called on the admin to take a stronger stand.

A note on deforestation in Pakistan. Like other accelerants of climate change impacts there (eg glacial melt), it's not a new story. It's been happening for decades. It lost a full third of its forest cover between 1990-2010. A decade ago, only 2% of Pakistan's area was forested. Back then, Pakistan had the highest annual deforestation rate in Asia.
Notably, there were two key perpetrators of deforestation back then (of course, they weren't the only culprits): wealthy landowners in Sindh, and the Pakistani Taliban in Swat (in what is now KPK province).

A delegation that included several private citizens of Pakistan & Pakistani-Americans recently visited Israel, and it's sparked controversy in Pakistan.
In fact, there are multiple past cases of engagement/links between Pakistanis & Israelis-including gov't officials.
Examples: *Meetings in 3rd-party locations
*Dissemination of informational resources from Pakistan to Israeli missions abroad
*Delegations of leaders of Pakistani religious parties to Israel
More info in PR Kumaraswamy's useful study of Pakistan's links with Israel:
inss.org.il/wp-content/upl…

Imran Khan's allegation of a US plot to oust him is quite similar to an allegation made by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in April 1977.
Violent anti-gov't demonstrations were convulsing Pakistan. In a speech, an embattled Bhutto lambasted them as part of a conspiracy bankrolled by US. Bhutto claimed the US was trying to oust him because of Pakistan's foreign policy choices--specifically, not supporting the US in Vietnam, and supporting the Arab cause re Israel (today, Khan claims US can't tolerate his position on Russia and wants to oust him for that reason).

Some thoughts on India's decision to import Russian oil. One might argue the US shouldn't criticize this move and talk about India "being on wrong side of history," given that Washington's European allies are continuing to import Russian energy, and much more than is India. But, EU states are much more reliant on Russian energy than is India. More than 60% of Indian oil imports came from the Mideast last year. India has also scaled up oil imports from US. Last year, India was the top US export destination for oil. See @haricito: wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/oil-…

There's been a lot of debate in Pakistan around the Khan-Biden call that hasn't happened. Islamabad appears to wants the call, even as the ruling PTI's populist rhetoric continues to feature strong criticism of the US. I see 3 likely reasons why the call hasn't (yet) happened. First, it's a transactional relationship. The Biden administration won't have the call just for the sake of having the call. It'll likely come only if/when there's a new agreement to finalize, or an achievement to mark. No Trump-esque "you're a terrific guy!" kind of calls.

The speed and intensity of the Taliban's ongoing territorial takeovers have surprised many, including the Taliban itself. But their offensives and seizures didn't come out of nowhere. Long before these current assaults, they contested and controlled dozens of districts. 1/5 The Taliban had long ago developed footholds in rural areas and on the outskirts of cities that gave them the capacity to eventually mount assaults on urban spaces. They've also capitalized on the worsening struggles of Afghan forces, many underequipped w/morale problems. 2/5

We're starting to get a better sense of how the democracy promotion plank of Biden's foreign policy will impact close US partners that are experiencing democratic backsliding--and specifically India. Some thoughts. [THREAD] As is clear from this quote from a US official cited by @seemasirohi, the administration is willing to acknowledge that the democracy issue is a concern and could impact the relationship (such messaging was not nearly as strong in the Trump era).

https://twitter.com/seemasirohi/status/1418050147033001990

I've published a new piece for @inkstickmedia on the future of US-Pakistan relations. Thanks to @khansahar1 for the opportunity. The piece argues that the outlook for bilateral relations is grim, but that limited cooperation is possible. Some highlights:
inkstickmedia.com/the-limits-of-… I begin with a review of Pakistani FM Qureshi's visit to the US last month. I argue--based on the differing US and Pakistani perceptions of/reactions to the trip--that it offers the latest example of a growing divergence in the US-Pakistan relationship.

"Taliban fighters have protected western military bases in Afghanistan from attacks by rival, or rogue Islamist groups for over a year under a secret annex to a pact for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces by May 1." From @char_greenfield and colleagues:
reuters.com/world/asia-pac… "The Taliban wanted to demonstrate good faith by meeting a commitment to ensure Afghan soil was not used for attacks on U.S. interests...'They provided a layer of cover, almost like a buffer and ordered their fighters to not injure or kill any foreign soldier in this period.'"

Some thoughts on Islamabad's allegations of Indian involvement in yesterday's BLA attack on PSX. This isn't new; Pakistan routinely blames India for terror attacks in the country (and there haven't been many of them of late). But the allegations are particularly notable now. 1/n India-China relations are tenser now than they've been in decades b/c of the Ladakh crisis. India could well retaliate covertly against Beijing by sponsoring attacks on Chinese interests in Pakistan. Plausible deniability reduces the chances of consequent escalation on LAC. 2/n

Some musings on regional impacts.
Initial takeaway: With aid cut, US (for now) is practically getting along better w/Taliban than w/Ghani govt. It appears to view Kabul as bigger obstacle to peace talks than Taliban. Bad news for Delhi, not necessarily for Islamabad. #AFGPanel Otherwise, too early to gauge regional impact. Depends how the aid cut plays out. Will it help break political stalemate and strengthen prospects for peace talks, or will it poison US-Afg relations and/or hasten US exit from Afg w/o peace or peace talks. #AFGPanel

I'm seeing many folks draw comparisons between the Azadi March in #Pakistan with anti-government movements in Lebanon, Iraq, Chile, and Hong Kong, among other places.
I find that comparison to be wildly off the mark.
We're talking apples and elephants here, in my humble opinion. The Azadi March appears rather opportunistic and short-lived: A political figure's desire to showcase the strength of his constituents and attract some attention before eventually calling it a day. The anti-gov't movements elsewhere appear more genuine, united, and committed.