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Andrew Watkins Profile picture
Andrew Watkins
@and_huh_what
Work on Afghanistan for @USIP. Formerly @CrisisGroup, the UN, humanitarian access. All views shared are personal.
Dec 2, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
1/Today's violence in Kabul may be the most politically-charged acts of terror in AFG since Taliban's takeover, building on 5 Sept Russian embassy attack.

Taliban-Pakistan relations will strain (just 1 day after high-level delegation visited); Kabul diplomats' alarm will grow. 2/No claims yet, but timing of attack on Hekmatyar complicates speculation on attackers' intent.

What is clear:
a) Taliban's protection of Kabul is porous; these were highly sensitive targets, with their own security
b) in spite of Taliban manhunts, attack networks are resilient
May 20, 2022 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
The headlines about SIGAR's interim report on the collapse of Afghan security forces is that US decision to withdraw & agreement with Taliban were biggest factor.

If that is true, why did some large units fight fiercely for months after Biden's April speech on withdrawal? 1/6 If you timeline & map out ANDSF's collapse, one step at a time... WHEN large numbers of troops or whole units began to surrender or collapse, WHERE this took place, WHICH elements of the Afghan security forces all seem to play determinative factors.

Collapse was not uniform. /2
May 17, 2022 • 12 tweets • 5 min read
THREAD: Haqqani CNN Interview
Set aside controversy on media spotlight for Taliban & legitimization for now (see below).

Here Haqqani suggests what Taliban refused to say when issuing hijab decree: it is a step to getting girls back in school.

Almost frames it as a trade-off./1 Haqqani's framing - that women must be covered before stepping into public life - is abhorrent.

But it also contradicts an emphasis of hijab decree, which said best practice is for women to remain home as much as possible.

PR on decree made no hint of return to school./2
May 10, 2022 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
Taliban appear to be responding to the latest wave of resistance attacks in northern Afghanistan, centered in Panjshir, with the same heavy-handed, brutal approach they reportedly took in the valley last fall, and that they've taken against pockets of ISKP in the East. /THREAD There are reports of Taliban abuse and even executions of resistance fighters and others in Panjshir, including noncombatants. This violent overreach is becoming a predictable pattern in the Taliban's response to resistance activity, across regions and different communities. /2
Mar 8, 2022 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
THREAD/Some notable Afghan-authored commentary has been published in recent weeks.

Two in particular are worth highlighting. They represent two distinct schools of thought on grappling with Afghanistan under Taliban. But I think their ultimate value comes in being read together. 2/From @MadadiSaeid, a strong reproach of intl. community's engagement with Taliban since the takeover.

Say the more Taliban consolidate power, more unyielding they become to domestic & foreign pressure. Engagement leads to increasing harm +culpability!
Jul 28, 2021 • 21 tweets • 7 min read
THREAD on Kaldar District, Balkh Province (northern Afghanistan). It is a case study of:
-control of border crossings
-militia mobilization
-what district centres do/don't mean
-how rural areas can become important
-Afghan security forces' battle to defend strategic nodes 2/ By end of June, Taliban moved deep into Balkh, once most prosperous/secure province in post-2001 Afghanistan.

Surrender & retreat of govt forces from districts elsewhere suddenly gave Talibs new avenues of approach, momentum, psychological impact.
(forgive the very basic map)
Jul 13, 2021 • 7 tweets • 4 min read
1/7 Others have already shared, but want to highlight a few pieces that address aspects of this (vital) question:

@franzjmarty's analysis of the Taliban's recent gains, in which he goes over developments with a fine-tooth analytical comb:
globalaffairs.ch/2021/07/08/wha… 2/7 Don't miss @FrudBezhan's 2016 piece on the Taliban's expansion of their ethnic base via recruitment, which has only increased since then (I noticed he has promised to update this reportage!):
foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/15/eth…
Feb 1, 2021 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
THREAD/ Taliban's messaging/ approach to Biden admin's policy review:
-high-level meetings with top US adversaries
-insists foreign troops will be targeted if not gone by 1 May
-repeats accusations of US non-compliance with deal (and insists a delay in withdrawal would be same). Taliban repeating their view of Doha deal: smoothed the way for US to leave after "unsuccessful" 20-year intervention. A "safe passage" deal.

The more Taliban insist they are meeting deal's conditions, the less need for a "review." Almost as if to pre-argue a US policy shift. /2
Apr 27, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
A false accusation was spread about the non-profit organisation I work for. The subject is serious, but nothing else about the claim is.

Not only does this rumor misrepresent my work, but it badly, alarmingly misunderstands US policy.
1/4 Many in US military circles beg to continue fighting Taliban... forever. But US president wants to leave Afghanistan.

That's all.
There is no secretive pro-Taliban PR campaign.

It would be no use. Lots of Americans equate "Taliban" w/ "terrorist."
2/4
Apr 10, 2020 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
#AFGPanel For much of past 18 months of US-led efforts to kickstart an Afghan peace process, a question --for some, a serious doubt-- has hung over rounds of talks: are the Taliban even cohesive enough to negotiate with?
Is talking to "Doha Taliban" the same as "Quetta Taliban"? #AFGPanel These aren't old questions; been around long before US envoy Khalilzad began directly speaking to Taliban in late 2018.
The idea that Taliban is full of divisions and factions, loosely networked, difficult to control, was a big realization for US/NATO over a decade ago.
Mar 20, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Afghan security forces have been consolidating the past year, collapsing vulnerable remote checkpoints & relocating them to stronger defensive positions along main roads.
But this strategy is only as effective as ANDSF's ability to repel large-scale attacks on these bigger posts. High-casualty clashes like this (or days ago in Balkh) raise question:

If US military did not respond with "defensive airstrikes" as they did on 4 March in Helmand, what does this reveal about the contours of US-Taliban understanding on reducing violence?