THREAD 1/12 The fact that Russia possesses nuclear weapons and delivery systems remains a key limiting factor for continued support to Ukraine. The logic goes: if Ukraine hasn’t won the war in three years, it probably won’t win it at all — and meanwhile, every day carries nuclear risk. 2/12 Nuclear posturing has become a routine tool used by both lower-level and more senior subordinates of Putin. Recently, even Keith Kellogg, from the Trump administration, reacted to it.

"Putin’s Sorry to Azerbaijan: An Apology Without Guilt?" THREAD 1/19 Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev did not let Putin’s apology close the issue. Instead, he responded with sharp criticism. Why? 2/19 It’s all about how the Kremlin framed its apology — it reads like an apology without an admission of guilt.

Thread: Russia's version of multipolarity, tested by the downing of an Azerbaijani plane. 1/9 The incident with the downed Azerbaijani flight is a stark illustration of what "multipolarity" means in the Russian worldview: 2/9 the right of bigger, stronger nations to act with impunity and arrogance toward smaller ones. This is exactly what Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev experienced firsthand when he abruptly turned his plane around en route to St. Petersburg for the informal CIS summit.

THREAD 1/10 It now makes sense why Maria Zakharova was cut off during the briefing and asked not to comment on the ballistic missile strike. 2/10 A statement from “the man himself” (Putin) was expected. Had she spoken, it would’ve preempted the intended gravity of the event, turning it into routine—and perhaps, due to her style, even farce.

THREAD 1/15 Maia #Sandu essentially repeated David Cameron's gamble and has nearly staged #Moldova's Brexit (Moldexit) even before joining the EU. 2/15 Sandu assumed that the pro-European sentiment among voters was stronger than the support for her government. Since she leads the pro-European camp, she expected that backing the European choice would strengthen her mandate and lift her political standing.

THREAD 1/12 The result of #Putin reelection of more than 85% was predictable for many reasons. In the 2012 elections, it was over 60%, in 2018 over 70%, and in 2024 it's expected to be over 80%. More than 90% will be reserved for the very end—towards 2030. 2/12 Many Russian governors have been re-elected with over 80% of the vote after the start of the war. In 2023, there were 8 out of 21, some even with 86%. Putin had to get more.

THREAD 1/5 In the third television appearance within two days on the topic of "#Wagner" and #Prigozhin, Putin spoke about him and his people not as patriots and defenders of the homeland, etc. - as it has been customary before yesterday. 2/5 He spoke about him as a screwed businessman who is trying to have it both ways: he received $ 1 billion for his military company and earned another one billion in a year from food supplies to the Russian military, and probably stole something on the way.

THREAD 1/9 Putin was not present at Erdogan's inauguration, which he would have definitely attended in the past. Me recent piece in @ForeignAffairs explains an important reason foreignaffairs.com/russian-federa… 2/9 The reason is not only the war, but the indictment of the International court Criminal Court against him. For the same reason he is not going to the G-20 in South Africa. foreignaffairs.com/russian-federa…

THREAD 1/6 Why should the West supplying Ukraine with a few dozen tanks make such a difference, when it has already provided so much weaponry? The difference is that weapons and artillery mean a slow war, while tanks mean a fast war. 2/6 New, modern tanks could accelerate the course of the war — at least in theory. After its blitzkrieg failed, Russia adapted its plan, betting instead on a long war, and counting on its bigger population, resources and arms industry to win.

THREAD 1/4 Many Russians approve of the bombardment of Ukraine’s infrastructure because they consider the latter to be a gift to ungrateful Ukrainians, which is not being used for Russia’s benefit. ft.com/content/c24ebf… 2/4 This marks a further break with Soviet identity, which was based on the assumption that factories, bridges and roads throughout the territory were the result of the collective efforts of all the peoples of the Union. ft.com/content/c24ebf…

1/4 "It was obvious that Surovikin's appointment and the praise heaped upon him were at least partly due to the need to create a figure with a mandate for 'shameful' actions that Putin didn't want to take in his own name," said Alexander Baunov 2/4 Surovikin fitted the bill, said Baunov, because his image as a Siberian willing to use brutal tactics to get results appealed to Russian nationalists and he had the authority in their eyes to oversee a retreat without opening up too many dangerous internal divisions.

THREAD 1/8 No matter how indirect and unintended it may have been, the explosion in Poland looks ominous amid the endless calls by Russian hawks who want to see a “proper war” to strike the territory of a NATO country as a deterrent. carnegieendowment.org/politika/88428 2/8 As Ukraine’s most fervent supporter and the main logistical center for supplies of Western weapons, Poland is frequently named among the primary targets of such threats bit.ly/3E5WlK8

THREAD 1/5 From the start of the invasion, there has been speculation that military failure could lead to the downfall of Vladimir Putin. ft.com/content/01cdcc… 2/5 The lack of clearly defined objectives makes the definition of victory uncertain. But this ambiguity also makes the criteria for defeat unclear. In fact, the Russian president had already survived several serious defeats. on.ft.com/3ElNTI1

THRED 1/8 It turns out that the “difficult decisions” referred to by Russia’s General Surovikin earlier did not involve a tactical nuclear bomb, but giving up the Ukrainian city of #Kherson: the only regional capital Russia has managed to take in this war. 2/8 It was obvious that Surovikin’s appointment and the praise heaped upon him were at least partly due to the need to create a figure with a mandate for «shameful» actions that Putin didn’t want to take in his own name.

THREAD 1/8 Putin was angry that European companies, despite the relaxing of sanctions after the grain deal did not return to business as usual with Russian companies. Lavrov openly complained that obstacles to Russian agro-exporters have not disappeared carnegieendowment.org/politika/88332 2/8 There were also non-public demands: to return relations with the state run «Rosselkhozbank» (previously it was headed by Dmitry Patrushev, the current Minister of Agriculture and the son of the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev).

1/6 Far more crucial to Lukashenko’s past successes was an overarching consensus shared by the Belarusian elites and wider society that the country’s independence benefitted them, both economically and politically. carnegieendowment.org/politika/88317 2/6 That consensus was already strained by the profound political crisis that followed the fraudulent presidential elections in 2020. Now the war has shattered it almost entirely, having transformed many aspects of Belarusian independence from an asset into a liability.

THREAD 1/12 Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin has said that the partial mobilization announced by Putin last month will end early in the nation’s capital. 2/12 On the one hand, this is routine bureaucracy: the region has met its quota for drafting soldiers, and is simply reporting its progress. (Everyone knows that the regions and the state corporations were given quotas to meet.)

THREAD 1/10 The #Nobel Peace Prize Committee has made a very good decision by awarding this year’s Peace Prize to Belarusian human rights advocate Ales’ Bialiatski, the Russian human rights organization Memorial, and the Ukrainian Center for Civil Liberties. 2/10 This is a very accurate decision that stands in opposition to attempts to divide nations into good and bad ones.

THREAD 1/6 Putin’s speech on the occasion of the annexation of four Ukrainian regions by Russia was a rather tedious enumeration of myths and legends about an ancient and imaginary West. But there were three aspects worthy of attention from a practical point of view. 2/6 i) “The Nord Stream gas pipelines were blow up by the USA.” The practical consequences are that Russia is now “entitled” to respond in kind, Russia is not responsible for stopping energy supplies to Europe, & Gazprom may not have to pay for missed deliveries.

1/6 The big picture: Alexander Baunov of the Carnegie Endowment describes Putin's Russia as a "country of fences," where citizens sacrifice political rights for security, but keep a fence around their private lives. axios.com/2022/09/29/put… 2/6 Putin has now breached that fence — and violated his "unwritten contract" — by taking "husbands, sons, brothers into the army," Baunov says.

THREAD 1/9 Today, with no warning, amendments to Russian law were introduced to the Duma & immediately passed in 3 readings. They bring Russia much closer to full mobilization & stipulate harsh penalties for failing to report for military duty, surrendering, or refusal to fight. 2/9 Taken together with demands for “immediate,”—maybe even online—referendums in all parts of occupied Ukrainian territory on becoming part of Russia, the message is clear.