Russia & executive power, elites, digital authoritarianism | @laenderanalysen, Russian Analytical Digest | @faburkhardt.bsky.social | Own views
May 9, 2023 • 13 tweets • 4 min read
To assess if Prigozhin is dangerous for Putin, it might be helpful to distinguish between "elite factionalism" and "elite defections." Factionalism (competing factions like Prigozhin vs Shoigu/Gerasimov) can be beneficial for Putin due to counterbalancing by divide and rule. But
defections (i.e. to an *alternative* power base) from state bodies to Prigozhin could turn out to become dangerous as personalist rulers must not tolerate any alternative, be it liberal opposition or warlords. Many observers paid attention to "grandfather" and "d***head" in
Oct 2, 2022 • 11 tweets • 4 min read
I have just read the ruling of Russia's Constitutional Court approving the annexation treaties of "DNR"/"LNR", Kherson & Zaporizhzhia. The justification is bonkers, will leave it to lawyers to unpack. But the ruling is interesting because it discloses details of the "treaties."
There are four rulings, they are largely similar. The following will be on "DNR": Art. 1 is crucial because it states Russia acknowledges "DNR" as a Russian federal subject since the treaties were signed, i.e. since Sept 30, i.e. before ratification by Russia's parliament next
Sep 28, 2022 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
The early resignation of Constitutional Court judge Konstantin Aranovskii is one of the most notable elite defections since Feb 24. It has to be seen as a protest against the annexation of further Ukrainian territories that the CC is going to "approve." bbc.com/russian/featur…
Constitutional Court judges never resign early, they serve until retirement due to age restrictions. Aranovskii was the youngest CC judge appointed by Medvedev in 2010. Aranovskii is systemic: he's a law school buddy of Medvedev, and he approved the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
May 16, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
This is an incredibly insightful piece on why Putin started this war against Ukraine written by Roman Anin. The most important insight: It is wrong to assume there are two Putins, a pro-Western Putin before the 2007 Munich speech & an anti-Western after. istories.media/opinions/2022/…
The core characteristic Putin shares with inner circle of "elderly Chekists" (the average age in Russia's Security Council is 65) is a "Versaille syndrome due to the collapse of the Soviet Union." The main conviction they share is not communism (capitalism enabled corruption).
Apr 23, 2022 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
The Kremlin wants to increase control over #Russia's public sector by introducing deputies in ministries, federal executive bodies & state companies directly subordinate to the Presidential Administration's domestic politics department. This neo-Soviet... kommersant.ru/doc/5326305
practice mirrors Soviet party control over the executive. Kirienko has reputation as fan of modern corporate governance as former Rosatom chief (KPIs). But his "Leaders of Russia" competition already had the flavor of the Soviet nomenklatura. Kremlin-controlled deputies in the...
Mar 2, 2022 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Lots of speculations Russia might introduce martial law on Friday Mar 04 as the Federation Council - the upper chamber of parliament - convenes for an emergency session. Some arguments for the sake of discussion why the rationale for introducing martial law remains unclear 👇
Martial law is introduced by presidential decree. Putin has to inform State Duma & Federation Council immediately. The Federation Council must approve martial law within 48 hours to become effective. I.e. we should see the presidential decree before or on Friday. Historically...
Mar 2, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Further evidence that Putin kept most of civilian bureaucracy in Government, Presidential Administration, state companies in the dark: The government made preparations for sanctions after recognition of DNR/LNR, but not for full-scale war against Ukraine. t.me/wwwagentsmedia…
As one interlocutor close to the Kremlin told the journalists: Many are shocked, but officials cannot step down, this would be seen as treason. Resigning from top position now would essentially mean to go straight into prison.
Mar 1, 2022 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
Deep dive into how #Russia's state bureaucracy sees Putin's decision to got to full-scale war with Ukraine by well-connected @faridaily_ :
tl;dr: Only few were in the loop, there's little public outrage now, but sizable despondence or even discontent. faridaily.substack.com/p/-?utm_source…
This largely squares with sources of @kgaaze and Pertsev as summarized in their podcast, i.e. most didn't have a clue or simply didn't want to believe in war beyond the Donbas. A short summary of their latest podcast by @scharap here:
