Assistant Professor @CEECornell working on energy systems and decision making under uncertainty. Tweeting in a personal capacity.
May 9, 2023 • 21 tweets • 5 min read
There's been a lot of discussion on the interconnection queue logjam. What to do? I try to define the economic issues in a new paper, "Generator Interconnection, Network Expansion, and Energy Transition," in IEEE TEMPR (ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10121…; free: tinyurl.com/yuyk7jna)
This version has benefited from many conversations about these issues over the last couple of years, and I think it's much improved since I posted the original draft.
Oct 21, 2022 • 11 tweets • 2 min read
New working paper on resource adequacy mechanisms for wholesale electricity markets, led by Han Shu: arxiv.org/abs/2210.10858
The resource adequacy debate has been focused on "energy-only" vs "capacity" markets. Energy-only markets have lost their sheen after the disaster in Texas and market suspension in Australia. But it's also recognized that "capacity" is an increasingly poor proxy for adequacy.
Apr 28, 2022 • 13 tweets • 2 min read
A mini-thread on my and @JesseJenkins working paper, Electricity Markets under Deep Decarbonization (papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…).
Hardly a week goes by without someone on #energytwitter speculating that proliferation of zero-marginal-cost variable resources (read: wind and solar) will mean the end of power markets as we know them. After all, how can you base everything on marginal costs when they are zero?
Feb 15, 2021 • 25 tweets • 6 min read
As we root for everyone to make it through the extremely challenging conditions today, there's clearly a temptation in my feed to figure out what the last few days means for ERCOT's market design. Warning: I would have made this thread shorter if I had more time.
I'll preface this with the note that based on the available information, we would currently be seeing rolling blackouts no matter what design choices had been made for resource adequacy. Some more on the current situation from @gilbeaq here:
Sharing a new working paper, "Missing Incentives for Flexibility in Wholesale Electricity Markets," with a brief thread to introduce it: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
Conceptually, it's pretty straightforward that greater flexibility helps systems operators manage the variability and uncertainty that accompany increasing shares of wind and solar. But it's tough to pin down exactly what flexibility is, or how markets should pay for it.
Feb 12, 2020 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Like @TKavulla, my intuition is that clean energy procurement would be better accomplished in a regional market. But I am pretty unconvinced by this flyer from NRG. A few points:
0) As a background point, it is awkward for advocates of competition to defend the PJM capacity market, which is inefficient for reasons unrelated to the MOPR.
Dec 29, 2019 • 16 tweets • 4 min read
Okay, I'll bite. Here's three places where I think @gtpwr and @RdSweeney run afoul of economic theory in their analysis of the PJM MOPR, plus one more general though (thread, 1/).
First, it's at best incomplete to refer to resources as "uneconomic" to mean "unprofitable given the gaping market design flaw that is the lack of carbon pricing." 2/
Jul 16, 2019 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
To make amends for my snark yesterday with some content, here's a few selections from that @ManhattanInst paper and thread that contribute to its being a candidate for retraction:
1) Would you rather have a 25% efficient panel that costs $0.40/W to produce, or a 30% efficient panel that costs $10/W to produce? This physical limit is economically (almost) meaningless.
I bet you all thought Energy Twitter was all out of takes. But I can't help feel that many economists who are less embedded in wholesale electricity are drawing the wrong conclusions, both from the paper and the debate it spurred. (cc'ing some: @samori8@KnittelMIT@noahqk)
To me, the key issue is that the estimates derived from the top-down regression suggest a cost of RPS that is roughly 10x what would be suggested by a bottom-up analysis. Three mechanisms (intermittency, transmission, stranded assets) are suggested to explain this.
Mar 8, 2019 • 14 tweets • 3 min read
Since @chrisnelder has just posted a 90 minute advertisement for my research program, the least I can do is follow through on his request for an "English translation" of my most recent paper (posted here: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…).
As a preface, a spoiler: as long as we have competitive markets, we will have LMP. The L is dictated by the network physics; the M is required if we want competition. I share Pete's intuition that we will continue to want competitive markets going forward.
