My new latest with @TheStudyofWar. Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting. On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask its weaknesses. The Kremlin’s weaknesses include its inability to rapidly pivot, dependence on others for Russia’s capability to sustain the war, and years of risk accumulation that Putin is yet to reckon with. The Kremlin is vulnerable to an adversary who can generate momentum against Russia and deny the Kremlin opportunities to regroup and adapt. A serious US strategy on Ukraine would prioritize achieving such momentum. 1/isw.pub/RussianWeakness 2/ Russia adapts if given time. Russia does not pivot rapidly, however, in part because of Putin’s risk aversion. Putin has proven to be decisive but not extemporaneous. His boldest moves followed deliberate preparation, which the West often ignored or missed. Putin has demonstrated a calculated and often risk-averse approach in his key military decisions.

1/ Putin didn’t invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO. He invaded because he believed that NATO was weak, that his efforts to regain control of Ukraine by other means had failed, and that installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv would be safe and easy. The primary goal of the Kremlin’s anti-NATO rhetoric has been to justify Putin’s foreign policies that often had little to do with NATO, as my @TheStudyofWar colleagues @KatStepanenko and Dr. Fred Kagan, and I have written: . 🧵understandingwar.org/backgrounder/w… 2/ Putin has long sought to break NATO and Western unity, but not because the Kremlin felt militarily threatened by NATO. Russia’s military posture during Putin’s reign has demonstrated that Putin has never been primarily concerned with the risk of a NATO attack on Russia. Russian military reforms since 2000 have not prioritized creating large mechanized forces on the Russian borders with NATO to defend against invasion. Russia deployed the principal units designed to protect Russia from NATO to Ukraine, which posed no military threat to Russia, in 2021 and 2022. In 2023 - at the height of Russia’s anti-NATO rhetoric - Russia continued to withdraw forces and military equipment from its actual land borders with NATO to support the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin is flooding Western discourse with false and irrelevant narratives, forcing us to expend decision bandwidth on irrelevancies rather than solutions. More in my latest @TheStudyofWar essay’ "Denying Russia’s Only Strategy for Success.’ 1/2 understandingwar.org/backgrounder/d…

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1772941705903313328

2/ It is not an accident that the Western debate often becomes impaled on arguing about basic well-established facts about this war. This is not merely a function of Western knowledge gaps or short memory. It is also a result of the Kremlin’s effort to saturate the Western debate with its assertions.

My latest with @TheStudyofWar. Ukrainian forces have adapted. Now is not the time for Western doubt but for the West to embrace Ukraine’s way of war and commit to sustaining Ukraine on the battlefield. 1/

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1706323272445419873

The US is used to partners that require us to lead — from proxy forces we trained to our allies who rely on us for security. In Ukraine, however, the US has a partner that is leading on the battlefield and knows its operational environment, its enemy, and its own capabilities.2/

My latest with @TheStudyofWar. The West risks handing the Kremlin another opportunity to prolong its war in Ukraine if it fails to resource Ukraine’s sustained counteroffensive. 1/

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1683583425972715522

Momentum is the key dimension of capability in this war. Maintaining the Ukrainian initiative will likely result in compounding damage to Russia’s ability to sustain the war. Any breather for Russia is an opportunity for the Kremlin to reconstitute for future attacks. 2/

Russia is a not just any belligerent — it is a belligerent that has repeatedly and purposefully hijacked the notion of peace as a lifeline for its aggression. 1/

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1651655811213434899

The US thus should not preemptively handicap its policy options by setting the expectation of peace talks that the Kremlin has expressed zero desire to enter in good faith. 2/

My latest with @TheStudyofWar. The debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. The catchall phrase “long war” is skewed by legacy US thinking about wars, Kremlin information operations, and the inherent difficulties in parsing battlefield realities. 1/

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1651655811213434899

2/ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a long war for the US, because the US is not fighting this war. The US is not fighting a proxy war. Ukraine’s choice to defend itself against Russia’s genocidal efforts is exogenous to the West’s decision-making.

I had the pleasure of joining @OnPointRadio to discuss Russia’s war on Ukraine & to challenge the false assumption shaping some policy discussions related to its solution: that Putin’s intent regarding Ukraine will change. 🧵Key points starting at min 13:
wbur.org/onpoint/2023/0… 2/ Putin has in deed and in word made clear that his maximalist intent regarding Ukraine is inflexible. That policy is that Ukraine should not exist as a state.

My latest with @TheStudyofWar. US should recognize that Russia's intent vs. Ukraine is inflexible. We should stop expending resources trying to change a reality we do not control and focus on what we can shape plenty: denying Russia’s ability to wage a war against Ukraine. 1/

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1605274948301619200

Negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. 2/

1/ Putin is consolidating his power projection system around those willing to pursue his maximalist goals in Ukraine, increasingly relying on a smaller cadre of devoted followers and a silent majority who will simply comply. My latest at @TheStudyofWar: understandingwar.org/backgrounder/p… 2/We should not underestimate Putin’s ability to stay in power nor Russia’s ability to normalize a new worse reality. However, Putin is on a path to disappoint all elements of his power projection system, as he is consolidating this system around conflicting objectives.

1/Putin's partial mobilization order is an acknowledgment that Russia is failing to accomplish its objectives in Ukraine, I tell @IamAmnaNawaz. We discussed the impact of Putin's decision on the battlefield, its domestic implications, and the likelihood of escalation.

https://twitter.com/NewsHour/status/1572786514072936448

2/Putin launched a full-scale invasion of #Ukraine in February with an insufficient force that's since been exhausted in pursuit of limited gains, an error in campaign design from which Russia has yet to recover.

1/6 The Kremlin is using African countries in its information operation aimed to drive friction among Ukraine and its supporters globally. I had the pleasure of speaking with @VOANews and @TetianaV
about Lavrov’s Africa tour. voanews.com/a/lavrov-lashe… 2/6 Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s grain export and deliberate targeting of Ukraine’s agricultural production is the key in the Kremlin's info op aimed to falsely link sanctions against Russia and Ukraine’s grain export, and to manipulate the West into weakening its sanctions.

1/10 Russia’s foothold in the southeast would constitute a permanent threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty and even survival. Control over Ukraine remains Putin’s goal, and that goal is not going to change. My latest in the @ForeignPolicy foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/19/rus… 2/10 Russian control of the southeast would subject the people there to perpetual Russian atrocities. Ukrainians trapped behind enemy lines will have limited ability to defend themselves and will be subject to Russian atrocities as observed in Bucha and throughout Ukraine.

1/8 The only way to stop Russian atrocities and prevent future ones is helping Ukraine liberate its people and territories. My latest at @TheStudyofWar understandingwar.org/backgrounder/w…. Thread: 2/8 Bucha is a microcosm of a Russian terror campaign against Ukrainians. Similar atrocities are happening throughout Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine. Russia’s playbook includes several consistently reported efforts.

1/23 Sharing highlights from my EU Parliament Address on Russia's War in Ukraine. The full text is available here understandingwar.org/backgrounder/n… Thread: 2/23 Russia’s war in Ukraine is a global-level event. It has shifted us on a different historical trajectory. We cannot go back to the previous baseline. But we can shape the outcome of this war and the world that follows.

1/18 Ukraine may soon face a new threat in this war—Russia’s ceasefire offer. It seems odd to say that a ceasefire is a threat. The default position in the West is to seize the earliest opportunity to “stop the fighting.” 2/17 But while some ceasefires lead to peace, others lead to more war—as the Russians have repeatedly shown. Those seeking enduring peace must resist any Russian ceasefire offer that sets conditions for renewed conflict on Russia’s terms or gives Russia leverage on Ukraine.

Many of you around the world have asked me how to help Ukraine. Here are at least 7 ways. The list will grow. If you have verified additions, please PM.
1. Join rallies in your city: stopputin.net 2. Support financially - here are my top picks:
- National Bank of Ukraine - assistance to Ukraine's Armed Forces: lnkd.in/dNtpafFf