Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #WeaponizedInterdependence
Most recents (10)
New @Journal_IS piece with @wendyleutert analyzes PRC firms’ ports overseas. We observe that the PLA (especially navy) has already made extensive use of this network to project power at a global scale. (1/4) direct.mit.edu/isec/article/4…
Chinese firms own and operate 96 terminals in 53 countries on every continent (except Antarctica). These holdings are mostly concentrated in only a few state-owned firms. Beijing employs several mechanisms to control these firms’ port assets. (2/4)
Party-state control enables PLA use of PRC firm-operated ports for logistics and intelligence missions—but these commercial terminals in non-allied states are not well-suited for combat operations. (3/4)
1. @ANewman_forward and I have a new piece at @nytopinion on the new age of economic power and the US. nytimes.com/2022/03/16/opi… We've taken a step away from public debate, while we write our forthcoming book, Underground Empire, but the last three weeks have been earthshaking.
2. Our first key point is that this is as much a culmination as a transformation. The speed with which this happened - the US and Europe piling measure upon measure - is unprecedented. But the weapons themselves mostly draw from an arsenal that has been developed over 2 decades.
3. What _is_ new is that a major power has been targeted. As we noted at the beginning of 2020, the US should not target "China [or] Russia" except under ... " extraordinary circumstances," since those countries might respond "with military force." foreignaffairs.com/articles/unite…
1. @ANewman_forward and I have seen our term #WeaponizedInterdependence become a broadly used shorthand for describing the emerging world (article: direct.mit.edu/isec/article/4… , coedited book with @dandrezner amzn.to/2OnGNLO. Two new examples suggest it's going international:
2. One is @StevenErlanger new NYT piece nytimes.com/2021/03/12/wor… , talking about how the US has "weaponized" the dollar, and Europe wants to respond. In @GuntramWolff words, "To be credible you need reciprocity, and retaliation is the only way to do it." But as Guntram elaborates,
3. the problem is that ""the politics are more difficult,’’ ... given the asymmetrical power of the U.S. Treasury and the global role of the dollar. “The reality is that there is no united European power able to project power on that scale.’’"
1. (thread) reuters.com/article/us-chi… This story talks about a report suggesting that China should move away from the SWIFT financial network to reduce its vulnerabilities to US penalties and surveillance. It's _just_ a report. Still, as @RichardMNephew says, "Watch this space."
2. The background to this is the way in which the US has weaponized global economic networks such as SWIFT (which is lynchpin of world financial system) against adversaries, as @ANewman_forward and I describe in our work on #WeaponizedInterdependence mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.116….
3. Systems such as SWIFT used to be disregarded in the same ways as the plumbing of a building is disregarded - so long as it works, who cares? Now, however, the plumbing is becoming political as networks are weaponized. China's problem is that it can't readily retaliate in kind.
Excellent thread. I think a lot of the quick analysis in the US is misreading what happened here - IMHO this isn't a story about the UK hardening on China, it's about the persistent regulatory power of the US in global supply chains 1/
For example this description from the NYT suggests this is about the UK opting to confront China, views it as a threat, etc. 2/ 
But the UK gov'ts own explanation for the move doesn't suggest anything like this. They're quite clear: new US sanctions announced in May are going to make it difficult for Huawei to maintain its supply chains, which creates risks about reliability. 3/ ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/a-di…
1. @HarvardBiz has just published a new piece by @ANewman_forward and I on coronavirus and "reverse protectionism." hbr.org/2020/03/will-g… We look at how supply chain fears are reshaping global markets and spilling over into vaccine development, which should be cooperative
2. The logic is straightforward - that in a world where states fear that they don't have enough basic medical supplies for their citizens, they are going to want to hoard what they have. Regular protectionism involves import restriction. Reverse protectionism restricts exports.
3. We have seen this happening within the EU - where Germany initially responded to Italy's urgent request for medical supplies by restricting exports of medical equipment, while the French government effectively requisitioned all the medical masks in its national territory.
Back from recent #Tokyo trip, many interesting discussions on #geoeconomics ie developments in 5G, investment screening, export control, industrial strategy, and the EPA/SPA. Talks with Japan's MFA, EU Delegation, think tanks and academia. Some observations: [LONG THREAD]
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For Tokyo, US implmt. of export controls under ECRA is next big thing. Shape and form of BIS/DoC 'emerging & foundational tech' still open but potential implications for Japanese (and EU) business is massive (extraterritorial enforcement/sanctions?)
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globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/update-on-u-s-…
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globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/update-on-u-s-…
And Europe? As @MaaikeOh and @BrigitteDekker_ show in this recent @Clingendaelorg report, European debate on export controls almost absent, not part of any EU strategic documents (eg latest EU China Outlook). Equally pale at MS level
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clingendael.org/sites/default/…
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clingendael.org/sites/default/…
I’ll be live-tweeting the @FletcherSchool #WeaponizedInterdependence conference on this thread. You can watch the conference live on WebEx using the following link:
ow.ly/LrCO50wGxOR.
ow.ly/LrCO50wGxOR.
The first panel is on cyberspace, chaired by @NadiyaKostyuk, features Susan Landau, Pasha Sharikov, Martha Finnemore, and @NTusikov. #weaponizedinterdependence
Susan Landau points out that there are chokepoints on the Internet that the United States is not exploiting, because for not it’s not in its interest to do so. Might that change in the future? You betcha. #weaponizedinterdependence
1. The attack on the Saudi oil facility is different in some obvious ways from the economic coercion strategies that @ANewman_forward and I describe in our work on #WeaponizedInterdependence - mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.11… . However, there is a distinct family resemblance.
2. What the attackers (whether Houthi or Iran) have done is to discover a crucial chokepoint in the Saudi oil production system (and to some extent in the global oil system). This has allowed them to achieve substantial effects - a 20% spike in oil prices - for a tiny outlay.
3. The implications are clear. Most people who looked at globalization, assumed that it was going to result in more liquid markets, that were far more difficult to manipulate. Oil markets were supposed to be a paradigmatic example. This is turning out to be wrong.
1. Tech companies are in for a wild ride in Europe. @vestager is back and she is loaded for bear. As @ANewman_forward and I describe inOf Privacy and Power - amazon.com/Privacy-Power-… - Vestager helped to shape new approach to regulating tech companies
2. In the book, we quote @bendrath, who describes how Vestager came to be convinced that a new model of technology regulation was needed. The power of technology platforms companies doesn't precisely fit into standard regulatory categories.
3. Clearly, antitrust policy is implicated, as @linamkhan and others have aptly demonstrated. Tech companies are able to leverage their platforms to dominate markets using both traditional and non-traditional tools. This also worries Silicon Valley thinkers like @timoreilly
