I’ll be live-tweeting the @FletcherSchool #WeaponizedInterdependence conference on this thread. You can watch the conference live on WebEx using the following link:
ow.ly/LrCO50wGxOR.
ow.ly/LrCO50wGxOR.
The first panel is on cyberspace, chaired by @NadiyaKostyuk, features Susan Landau, Pasha Sharikov, Martha Finnemore, and @NTusikov. #weaponizedinterdependence
Susan Landau points out that there are chokepoints on the Internet that the United States is not exploiting, because for not it’s not in its interest to do so. Might that change in the future? You betcha. #weaponizedinterdependence
Pasha Sharikov points out that it remains unclear what qualifies or is interpreted as violent action in cyberspace. #weaponizedinterdependence
Marty Finnemore is up, and gets right to the heart of the matter about the #weaponizedinterdependence phenomenon: how durable are these coercive capacities over time?
One example that Finnemore raises of an actor resisting these kinds of #weaponizedinterdependence effects: China and the Great Firewall.
What puzzles Finnemore is that the USA has not really proselytizes domestic regulatory rules on Internet governance over the past decade. #weaponizedinterdependence
At the #weaponizedinterdependence conference, @NTusikov talks about the chokepoint effect and argues that there are two kinds: access chokepoints and revenue chokepoints. Either can be used to restrict.
.@NTusikov draws on Internet governance literature to point out that even back in the day, governments recognized the possibility of extraterritorial governance: “the jurisdiction is the network itself.” #weaponizedinterdependence
Great @NTusikov observation about which parts of cyberspace are most vulnerable to chokepoint effects. Finance, absolutely. But also cloud computing. #weaponizedinterdependence
Interesting discussion in which @henryfarrell, @ANewman_forward, and @NTusikov on why the U.S. hasn’t exploited chokepoint effects on the Internet that in theory it could exploit. #weaponizedinterdependence
In response to a @BWJ777 question about how to develop regimes constraining #weaponizedinterdependence in cyberspace, Susan Landau says the problem is that Russia, China, and particularly the USA don’t want to play together.
To explain why there hasn’t been productive governance work on protecting cyberspace, Susan Landau drops the mic: “There’s a lot of talk without knowing the tech.” #weaponizedinterdependence
Great Marty Finnemore point about how state capacity in cyberspace is often a path-dependent function of which government agency got assigned the lead on cyber issues a long, long time ago. Back in the day, not obvious which agency (Commerce, NSC, DoD, Treasury, etc.).
The next panel in the #weaponizedinterdependence panel is starting, with @Energy_Liz, @thoatley, @reziemba, and @MkBlyth, chaired by @msuwaidan.
.@reziemba argues that the reason financial statecraft has had a more potent effect on the private sector re: Iran due to de-risking and the “muscle memory” of banks used to these sanctioning practices. #weaponizedinterdependence
Now @thoatley is up. He points out that finance is a “most likely” case of #weaponizedinterdependence, because, in the words of Jonathan Kirshner, it’s a consequentially sticky network structure.
Is #weaponizedinterdependence different from older concepts of interdependence? @thoatley says yes, because in cases like finance, “more is also different.”
In his presentation, @MkBlyth argues that SWIFT was unique because of the dollar. Could other areas of finance be weaponized? Havoc could be wreaked, but coercion is less clear. #weaponizedinterdependence
Now @MkBlyth is talking about how climate change might generate more arenas for #weaponizedinterdependence and if you’ll excuse me I need to curl up into a fetal position for the next hour.
At the #weaponizedinterdependence conference, @Energy_Liz stresses what other panelists have said: that the dollar is super-resilient and not going away anytime soon as the global reserve currency.
And now @Energy_Liz is just totally dissing Malta (because of its lax financial regulation).
There is a pretty strong consensus among the finance panelists that cryptocurrencies will not really challenge the US ability to exploit #weaponizedinterdependence. It’s hard for states to use crypto, and at some point they have to move these assets back into the existing system.
“The basic problem with blockchain is that it doesn’t possess most of the attributes of currency.” @MkBlyth
Interesting @reziemba suggestion that the first arena we might see where the dollar ceases to be the unit of account is not in oil but in natural gas. #weaponizedinterdependence
Both @MkBlyth and @Energy_Liz mention that China is using Belt and Road to create digital capital flows that could *potentially* act as a hedge against the dollar.
The next #WeaponizedInterdependence panel, on energy and transit networks, is starting, with @kaijaschilde chairing, and @BWJ777, @kellysgallagher, @TcavannaP, and Michael Krutikhin presenting.
Bruce Jentleson (@BWJ777) discusses the magnitude of what #weaponizedinterdependence can achieve. Like most sanctions, some successes, but not likely to work on core interests.
Lots of folks think that #BeltandRoad and #WeaponizedInterdependence go hand in hand. But as @TcavannaP points out, no consensus among China scholars that BRI is strategically designed for this.
While @TcavannaP acknowledges that there are potentialities for China to exploit #weaponizedinterdependence, the United States remains in a vastly superior position to do this.
Interesting. @kellysgallagher points out that while China restricts or forbids domestic investments in coal or automobiles, there are no such restrictions on foreign investment.
Mikhaol Krutikhin acknowledges that Russia has used Gazprom to coerce other actions, questions whether any of these efforts have proven significant.
I’m sensing a theme: Krutikhin suggests that Russian attempts to nurture #weaponizedinterdependence have been largely fruitless. Gazprom is not a tool of statecraft, it is a tool of corruption.
Hot damn, @kaijaschilde asks a great question: is the deployment of #weaponizedinterdependence a signal of strength or weakness?
Oy. @kellysgallagher thinks BRI’s coercive capacities are exaggerated, but does note that the commonality among BRI recipients is that the United States is nowhere to be found.
Krutikhin observes that the technological change in energy has been so rapid it’s tough to see if #WeaponizedInterdependence is going on.
While energy might be carbonized now, @kellysgallagher points out that renewable energy operates on a different dimension, due to lower fixed costs. That said, she notes China controls much of the renewable energy cycle.
The overall takeaway from the energy and transit panel is that this is an arena where #WeaponizedInterdependence was never strong and is getting weaker. BRI might foster old-fashioned dependence, but that’s a different thing.
The last substantive panel for #WeaponizedInterdependence is about to start, featuring Anastasia Likhacheva, @charlicarpenter, @AmritaNarlikar, and @thomaswright08, chaired by @FletcherRussia’s Arik Burakovsky.
This last panel is on resistance and reaction to #WeaponizedInterdependence.
And @thomaswright08 kicks off by noting that the great powers are only just reacting to #WeaponizedInterdependence. Hedging has just begun. So it’s WAY too soon to judge the resilience of these networks.
An interesting question: @thomaswright08 asks whether the U.S. and China can arrange a “velvet decoupling” in which both sides nudge towards reduced #WeaponizedInterdependence which nonetheless reduces anxiety. Sort of an arms control regime for interdependence.
.@charlicarpenter points out that #WeaponizedInterdependence exists in arenas with structural power for those with key positionality. This means it can exist not only in physical networks but ideational networks, such as in human rights.
“Interdependence has not just empowered weak states, it has also empowered non-state actors.” @charlicarpenter
Hmmm... WikiLeaks and similar actors can engage in a “reverse panopticon effect.”
Anastasia Likhacheva points out that rising states might try to exercise #WeaponizedInterdependence not just for metarial gain, but prestige. It’s a sign of great power status.
An excellent @AmritaNarlikar explication of what weak states can do to resist #WeaponizedInterdependence. Five options:
1) Lie low;
2) Exploit vulnerability of chokepoints;
3) Hedging
4) Coalition-building
5) Constructing narratives that delegitimize coercive efforts.
1) Lie low;
2) Exploit vulnerability of chokepoints;
3) Hedging
4) Coalition-building
5) Constructing narratives that delegitimize coercive efforts.
Can international institutions mitigate or constrain #WeaponizedInterdependence? @thomaswright08 suggests no, that these institutions might be outdated to cope with these forms of statecraft.
And I’ll close this thread with @AmritaNarlikar’s answer to whether #WeaponizedInterdependence can be phased out: “The tea is out of the kettle.” #fin
