Thread by @ckolonko

Time for a thread. As an archaeologist, I spend most of my time looking at wartime defences to work out how they would be used and how they were sited in the landscape to be most effective.

#SWW #WW2 #Pillbox #Archaeology

Every so often I get to look at documents to add further meaning to surviving defences, which is a hugely important. This make me very happy. Unfortunately, documentary research is rarely undertaken for anti-invasion defences. This makes me very sad.

Before I start, I need to clarify some of the misunderstandings around this period. There is a lot of mythology surrounding this whole period, some of which is now ingrained and taken for fact and at worst is #duffhistory. Here’s the main ones-

Dunkirk did not mark the end of fighting in France. Fighting continued for a further 2 weeks after the evacuation from Dunkirk. Further evacuations took place under Operation Aerial (look that one up). Dunkirk did not mark the end of fighting in France. Image © IWM C 1802

The south coast wasn’t the only vulnerable coast (See graphic) in June 1940. There were multiple threats to much of the coast of the UK. East Anglia and it's proximity to northern Germany was always a concern to the C in C of Home Forces.

Also, the earliest program of coastal fortification started during the invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940. The Shetland isles, sections of vulnerable beach and key ports on the East coast were fortified under Gen. Kirke before the South coast was vulnerable. © IWM A 182

There had even been earlier deployment of troops in coastal defence under the Julius Caesar plan established shortly after the outbreak of war, but that’s a story for another time.

Here's a very good book on the whole thing-

naval-military-press.com/product/stoppi…

Now the biggie- the role of the Local Defence Volunteers (LDV), later the Home Guard (HG). Today, the story from May 1940 onwards is dominated by the LDV/HG. I believe this is largely due to a certain 70s sitcom. © IWM HU 83770

Dad’s Army is not a documentary & isn’t a reliable source for trying to understand this period of military history. There, I said it. I believe Dad’s Army has contributed significantly to the regulars and Territorial Army (TA) being largely absent from the current narrative.

The HG were one part of the military effort during the invasion period of June 1940 until the end of 1941, but they were not solely responsible for defence as many believe. The regular army and TA were still the primary front-line force for Home Defence at this time.

The role of the HG varied massively across the country, and there is still a very poor understanding of their role at a local/county level. In general, the role of the HG grew over time but it was a while before they became an organised, effective and efficient fighting force.

I’m going to stick my neck out and say that I’m fairly confident that you would be very hard pressed to find an example of Cpl. Jones or Pvt. Pike types defending the coast during the summer of 1940 instead of Tommy Atkins.

I’m happy to be proven wrong on this though, and would be interested in seeing any primary sources that show the HG being used as front-line troops in coastal defence during the summer of 1940.

So far, my research has shown that the HG in my area of Northern command did not start to play a mobile role inland alongside the regulars until Autumn 1941. And it wasn’t until c.1943 that they started take over the front-line duties of the regulars.

Now that’s over, back to the thread.

We’ll look at the experiences of one battalion of the regular army during 1940 to mid-1941. This is just one story of the many units that found themselves integrated into the Home Army following the Fall of France. Let’s see what we can learn

81 years ago, the 6th Battalion (Bn) of the King’s Own Royal Regiment (KORR) found themselves in a relative state of flux in Paignton, Devon. This was just the start of a fascinating and eventful journey.

On 1 June 1940, the 6 KORR were assembled in Paignton. Little else is mentioned in the war diary, but I believe that the Bn. had been active in France and Belgium within their remit as a Pioneer Bn., they had also been evacuated during Operation Dynamo.

After a fortnight in sunny Devon, the 6 KORR found themselves on the move; something they’d be doing a lot of over the next year. The Bn arrived in Sheffield, fresh from Paignton, on 14 June 1940. Their task was to find guards and do something else which I can’t transcribe.

By the 3 July, the Bn had found additional guards and were moved to Lodge Moor Camp on the outskirts of Sheffield. A large POW camp was established at Lodge Moor during the Second World War, so it must be assumed the 6 KORR were tasked with guarding POWs.

Just 3 days later 6 KORR were on the move again! But this is where we start to see them undertaking an active role in Home Defence. Moving to York on 6 July, the Bn were called upon to act as a mobile column for ‘Z Sector’. I haven’t identified the location of 'Z Sector' yet.

Important point time! Mobile elements tasked with counterattacking and reacting to the invading force existed outside of the GHQ Reserve. They weren’t all static. There were specific forces allotted the task of providing mobile support and counterattacking.

There were further mobile units at a local level, as evidenced here, but this is now forgotten because everyone thinks that because pillboxes are static, everything else was.

C Company (Coy) went to Tadcaster to defend an aerodrome; possibly RAF Church Fenton. The Bn performed these two roles for over 3 months. C Coy eventually re-joined on 19 October. 5 days later the whole Bn was converted from a Pioneer Bn. to an Infantry Rifle Bn.

With their new status as a Rifle Bn, the 6 KORR were ready to move on to pastures new and join the other regular army units defending East Yorkshire and its vulnerable coastline. Their first posting as a Rifle Bn was to Hull, where they arrived on 30 October 1940.

‘But why Hull?’ I hear you cry. Hull was a key strategic port on the East coast and would have been a key objective for an invading force. Fortification of the key East coast ports had started following the invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940.

Here the Bn took up the outer defences of Hull, under the operational command of the Officer Commanding Hull Garrison. The Coys were deployed across this outer perimeter of defences. Note how C Coy have been held back as a mobile reserve. Again, the defences weren’t purely static

The 6 KORR stayed under the command of Hull Garrison throughout most of November, before being posted to what must have been a bleak and wintery East Coast, arriving in Burton Pidsea on 29 November 1940. A vast improvement on Hull? Who can say😉

Responsible for defending the coast from Intack Plantation to Mappleton, the 6 KORR came under the command of the 218 Independent Infantry Brigade that was responsible for defence of much of East Yorkshire, including the coast from Spurn Point up to the North end of Filey.

218 Inf Brigade was formed c. August 1940, taking over defence from 66 Division who had been responsible for defending the coast from Spurn Point to Whitby between June-July 1940.

Here, the 6 KORR joined regular units including 2 Bn Dorset Regiment, pictured at Hornsea in July 1940 (© IWM H 2649). The 2 DR had also been pulled out of Dunkirk in late May 1940 and then spent almost 2 years defending the coast of Yorkshire.

The 6 KORR sat on the coast of East Yorkshire throughout the winter of 40/41, covering 15 miles of coast. Annoyingly, the operation order for this period wasn’t attached to the war diary, so I can’t tell you any more about this deployment at the minute.

By the new year, it was time for the KORRs to move again. On 19 February 1941, arriving in Filey, they would occupy D Sub sector as the Left Reserve Bn (D Bn). Billeted in Filey, they would support B Bn, the Left Forward Bn responsible for the front-line defence of Filey Bay.

(Quick chronology of units responsible defence of Filey Bay. Coast was secured June 1940 by 2/6th Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers (TA), 8 Bn. King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in October 1940, 11 Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment from November 1940 and 8 Bn. KOYLI again in February)

Their responsibilities were numerous, but included important tasks such as acting as a mobile force to counterattack the enemy, undertake blocking actions at set strategic points, immobilise petrol pumps in the event of a landing and provide Coys for anti-parachute duties.

They were one of two reserve Bns responsible for the Bridlington Sector of 218 Brigade. Cleary, by early 1941 that the defensive strategy for this area had been planned in minute detail, e.g. even down to the routes the Bn would take if they were to occupy sectors to the South.

A Coy rejoined the 6 KORR from Aldbrough on 26 February 1940 after bringing the replacement Bn. up to speed on the defences previously occupied by the 6 KORR over the Winter.

After 2 months acting as Left Reserve Bn, the 6 KORR were once again moved onto the front line. On 19 April 1941, the Bn took over as the Left Fwd Bn, leaving them responsible for the front line defence of Filey Bay; a frontage of about 9 miles.

The KORR were joined in Bridlington Sector, 218 Inf Brig, by 10 Bn Duke of Wellington’s, 6 Bn King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and 11 Bn York and Lancaster regiment. They were supported by field and coastal batteries of the Royal Artillery. Known Bn localities marked in blue.

Their main responsibilities now were occupying a series of defended localities focussed around the vulnerable beach exits. D, B & C Coys were deployed forward, with A Coy acting as reserve at Speeton.

Although 3 Coys were under orders to fight to the last round/man, A Coy were tasked with occupying prepared localities around Speeton to stop the enemy in front of them, counterattacking any of the fwd Coy positions, & undertaking anti-parachute duty.

50% of the fwd Coys troops were required to ‘Stand To’ every day 1 ½ hours before sunrise, with the other 50% ready to occupy the positions in an emergency. They were only to ‘Stand Down’ when visibility seawards was possible out to 5 miles. After this, sentries would be posted.

Other duties included patrolling to the North and South along the cliff tops to make contact with the adjacent Bns. every night.

The whole Bn were to be at 30 minutes readiness to react to the codeword to ‘Stand To’ at all times. Upon ‘Action Stations’ the whole Bn would ‘Stand To’ if not already doing so, notify in writing the local HG commanders, and ensure the red markers were removed from minefields.

Interestingly, they were also to wear eye shields, possibly a pre-emptive measure in case gas was dropped?

The 6 KORR’s story in Yorkshire comes to an end on 23 May 1941, when the Bn boarded two trains in Filey and left for a new posting in Weston super Mare. Upon arrival they were billeted in the town under the command of Western Area, HQ Frome.

They had no operational orders but were expected to stand at readiness to provide 3 Coys for guarding aerodrome and mobile reserve duties.

There’s a couple of things to take away from this thread.

Firstly, the experience of the 6 KORR demonstrates a regular rotation of units throughout the Home Defences, with units spending time on the front, followed by time in reserve. The units weren’t simply dumped on the coast and left there for the duration.

And this is only one Bn’s activity in a single Command. This scene would have been amplified across the country, yet we still know next to nothing about this period. When I can eventually get to the @UkNatArchives , which isn’t easy or cheap when you’re up North.

I also want to build up a decent chronology of the units that were operational in 218 Brigade and look at the actual role played by the Home Guard within the area. This is a long way off for now.

Next, it’s clear that the anti-invasion defence wasn’t completely static. There were units deployed as mobile reserves. I guess because these units left no physical trace (unlike pillboxes) that it’s easier to just assume that the country’s defence relied on units being static.

Finally, to properly appreciate and understand the effectiveness of these defences it is vitally important that the role of the regulars and TAs is recognised and researched.

The continued focus on just the HG seriously hampers our understanding of the effectiveness of the defences and defenders during this complex but important period.

The future of such research lies in looking at how the military forces (incl. Navy and RAF) worked in unison and how this partnership developed during the period which the anti-invasion defences were active between 1940 to late 1942.

Not sure why I didn't run this past @Slothynoodles

If you've not had enough, there's another thread on this subject here-

Imagine what this map would look like if the movements of all Battalions deployed within the Home Forces was mapped. I think it'd be pretty busy.