1/ Ukrainian TVD, Day 77-79. The past 72 hrs has seen the Ukrainian military press the advantages made by their limited Kharkiv counteroffensive to push Russian forces into the Belgorod Oblast. Russian offensive action along the Siverskyi Donets Line has achieved little success.
2/ Weather. Forecast for the next 10 days will see increased rainstorms & cloud cover, severely degrading air & artillery strikes and ground assaults. Wind speed and direction will favor Ukrainian artillery strikes, however. Rainfall will continue to restrict movement to roads.
3/ Kharkiv OD. Russian forces have been thoroughly defeated north of Kharkiv. Russia has been conducting a fighting withdrawal since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive rather than trying to establishing a new defensive line. #UkraineRussianWar #Kharkiv
4/ The redeployment of 1st GTA & VDV units to the Vovchansk & Kupyansk areas indicates an eastward defensive shift tying into the natural barrier of the Siverskyi Donets River to augment the defensive capability & capacity of Russian forces to guard their rail & road GLOCs.
5/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. Russian forces have suffered a series of significant setbacks with a few marginal successes over the past several days. Attrition & redeployment of 1st GTA / VDV units from the Izium Axis has forced Russia to assume the defense in this area. #Donbas
6/ Further east in the Severodoentsk Salient two attempts to ford the Siverskyi Donets NW of Severodoentsk and envelop the Salient from the NW and west resulted in a decisive defeat of at least one guards brigade, possibly two.
7/ Russian forces may be coming close to a culmination point in which they will have no choice but to halt offensive action for a more extensive refit to reconstitute combat losses. Before this occurs, they will likely shift to an all or nothing effort to seize Severodonetsk.
8/ Zaporizhzhia OD. Little has changed in the Zaporizhzhia OD over the past several days. Russian forces continue to rely on air & artillery strikes against Ukrainian defensive positions as units still reconstitute from the Siege of Mariupol.
9/ Azovstal. Against unrelenting air and artillery attacks, the defenders of the Azovstal complex still holding their ground. Russian attacks have secured the west entrance to Azovstal. In Mariupol, occupation authorities increase checkpoints to detain “suspicious” residents.
10/ Odesa-Kherson OD. There has been little change in the Kherson-Odesa OD. Missile strikes continue against Odesa, tensions remain high along the Moldova border. Ukrainian reports indicate occupation authorities are having difficulties establishing a proxy Kherson govt. #Odesa
11/ Black Sea. Snake Island is a maritime decisive strategic point from which the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) can extend control over the SW coast of Ukraine, interdicting shipping in and out of Odesa. The BSF will likely continue attempts to extend control over this region.
12/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS air sorties have held steady at 250 in a 24-hrs period. Russian forces continue to improve air defense networks in Kherson and Snake Island. An improved air defense network in this region will exert control over Ukrainian shipping in the Black Sea.
13/ Battle Damage Assessment. Russian forces sustained considerable losses in several attempts to ford the Siverskyi Donets in the vicinity of Bilohorivka & Pryvillya. Though estimates vary, it is clear that at least 60-70 armored vehicles & hundreds of troops have been lost.
14/ These types of losses are crippling to Russian efforts in this critical region & simply not sustainable at Russia’s current replacement process. Russia can replace these losses, but it will take a considerable time and reliance on older equipment.
15/ Ukrainian TV, Day 77-79. Russia struggles to find an effective response to Sweden’s & Finland’s impending requests to join NATO, as well as new sanctions. Western aid to Ukraine continues to expand & accelerate as Western nations host Ukrainian Soldiers for training.
16/ Info War. Russia’s audience for information operations remains domestic. Russian state media has featured a few segments like this one, likely meant to elevate fears of a call for a general mobilization to maintain tacit support for the war effort.
17/ Information advantage. In an interview with AP News, Belarusian dictator Lukashenko criticizes the Russian war effort stating the war is “not going according to plan” & called for an end to hostilities, undermining Russia’s war justification narrative.
18/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees total 8.5+ million with 6.33+ million in countries bordering Ukraine, another 2.14+ throughout Europe, and 7.6+ million internally displaced people throughout Ukraine (1.4+ million in eastern & 519K in southern Ukraine).
19/ The Washington Post reports Russia is operating so-called “filtration” camps (i.e., concentration camps) in the Donetsk Oblast. Video released via Telegram shows a camp in the village of Bezimenne east of Mariupol where residents have been sent. washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/…
20/ Overall Assessment. As surmised in my 03 May thread on the potential for a breakthrough along the Siverskyi Donets, Russia’s attempt at an integrated attack has failed to be synchronized in space & time. Any success will be localized to Severdonetsk.
21/ The best-case scenario outlined for Russian forces is increasingly likely not to occur. The Russian offensive in the Donbas may likely culminate in the next 2-3 weeks, with the forward line of contact relatively unchanged along the Izium & Lyman Axes.
22/ The Russians are likely still make progress in the Severodonetsk Salient, but successes will continue to come at a high price, remain slow, and may not push all Ukrainian forces out of the Luhansk Oblast. Lysychansk will likely remain under Ukrainian control by early June.
23/ Ukrainian forces are positioning themselves to potentially conduct, at scale, the type of general counteroffensive surmised in my 14 April post. Ukrainian forces will likely not commit to an operation of this scale until recent losses have been replaced.
24/ These maps have been created by me based off the most reliable information of activity in the Ukrainian Theater of War from a variety of OSINT sources. Errors will be corrected as soon as they are identified.
25/ Information regarding Ukrainian units are meant to be general, are based on Ukrainian General Staff statements and social media posts, official Ukrainian government press releases, and local news. It does not depict current unit movements. END
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