Thread by @JominiW

1/ Ukraine TVD, 20 FEB-07 APR 23. The past 7 weeks saw a continuation of the Russian Winter Offensive as major pushes continued in Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka. Russia made important gains, Ukrainian defenses continue to hold. #UkraineRussiaWar #RussianArmy #UkraineFrontLines

2/ Current weather outlook for the Ukraine TVD. The mud season will continue to impede maneuver, especially in severely restricted terrain. The weather favors small-scale assault forces. Night operations will continue to be difficult.

3/ Operational Terms. To assist in easy of comprehension of the threads graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (note: I am still refining and updating this list, please bear with me as I do, thank you).

4/ North OD. The Northern Operational Direction (OD) remains the principal support zone for both Russian and t Ukrainian forces. Activity remains centered on cross border artillery strikes along key lines of communication to disrupt reconstitution & training efforts. #Sumy

5/ Luhansk OD. The pace of operations in this Operational Direction (OD) has slowed for both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Fighting has been centered on Hryanykivka on the Oskil River, Novoselivske (NEof Svatove), and the area between Chervonopopivka and Nevske. #Luhansk

6/ Donetsk OD. Donetsk Oblast remains the decisive OD for Russian Ground Forces. Developments in Avdiivka have been overshadowed by the focus on Bakhmut. Russian gains here are the most worrisome to the integrity of Ukraine's defense of the Donbas Strategic Front. #Donetsk

7/ Kreminna AO. SVRF offensive action along this line of operation continues but has slowed in pace and scale. Russian attacks persist through the Serebrian Forest towards Serebryanka & the Siverskyi-Donets. 2d AC continued its attack from Shypylvka towards Bilohorivk #Kreminna

8/ Bakhmut AO. Bakhmut remains the critical Objective Point of Maneuver in the Donbas. The fall of Krasna Hora in mid-February turned into a pivotal event for Russian forces, as it set tactical conditions for Wagner Group & the VDV to advance deep into north Bakhmut #Bakhmut

9/ Avdiivka AO. The SVRF has made important gains in Avdiivka, capturing more territory in the past 7-weeks than since hostilities resumed in Feb 2022. Russian success has come at a high price, however these gains threaten to dislodge the ZSU from prepared defenses. #Avdiivka

10/ Zaporizhzhia OD. The most significant development in the Zaporizhzhia OD over the past 7-weeks was the localized ZSU counterattack south of Orikhiv which managed to push into Novodanylivka, liberating the town. #Zaporizhzhia

11/ Vuhledar AO. Russian efforts to capture Vuhledar have largely ground to a halt. This has allowed Ukrainian forces in the Vuhledar area to conduct a series of small-scale counter attacks that have pushed back against what little gains the Russians made in Jan 2023 #Vuhledar

12/ Kherson OD. Russian forces will continue an active defense on the Dnipro River with a focus on gaining control over the Dnipro Delta. UKR forces will continue to probe Russian defenses while missile & artillery strikes target logistic nodes in Kherson and Crimea. #Kherson

13/ Ukraine OTMO. The Black Seas Fleet remains focused on force protection of vessels, facilities, & personnel rather than offensive operations or active patrolling of sea lanes & the northern Black Sea coast / littoral. #Sevastopol

14/ Ukraine SVKO. Russian aerospace forces continue to prioritize targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure & troop concentrations over suppression of Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian HIMARS & UCAVs will continue targeting Russian supply & command nodes. #airdefensefofukraine

15/ This is another short update focused on theater wide actions of the past seven weeks. Again thank you for your patients, suggestions, & continued support as I start to increase content in the coming weeks.

16/ This open-source operational summary of the Ukrainian TVD is based on information from the ZSU & VSRF daily operations briefs, various Ukrainian & Russian Telegram channels, western intel agencies public statements, military analysts, & my own professional experience.

17/ Any errors to the information presented here is strictly my own and will be corrected as soon as it is discovered.