In which @USArmy Chief of Staff GEN McConville describes how SFABs are different than Special Forces in a way that will certainly rankle most Green Berets 1/n #SOF
"SF is very good at training tactical units; They’re very good at accompanying tactical units. But SFABs build a professional mil force, which is different. How do you do logistics. How do you maintain vehicles. How do you build a professional mil that will provide security.” 2/n
An SF "captain has never been a battalion commander, never a brigade commander, and maybe never even a company commander. They know how to do tactics & sergeants certainly know how to do skillsets...but they’ve never run a battalion." 3/n
"The SFAB is going to have a forward battalion commander that has run a battalion. The brigade commander is a former brigade commander who has run a brigade. That’s how you professionalize these [African] armies.” 4/4
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As with its last report, this latest report on the #Taliban’s relationship with #alQaeda in #Afghanistan is 180 degrees out from the current US assessment. 1/n cbsnews.com/news/afghanist…
“According to the report presented to the UNSC [#alQaeda] has established ‘up to 8 new training camps in #Afghanistan, including four in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan & Uruzgan Provinces, w\a new base to stockpile weaponry in the Panjshir Valley….’ 2/n
“…The terrorist organization also operates 5 madrasas - religious schools where it trains and indoctrinates children to become fighters - in the east & northeast of #Afghanistan, the reports said…” 3/n
I was recently passed a pre-publication copy of Feridun Sinirlioğlu's independent assessment of the situation in #Afghanistan, conducted for the @UN
I'll put some thoughts about it in this THREAD. 1/n
@UN (Since the report isn't out yet, I can't link to it, but you can find various news articles about it via Google, such as this one by @VOANews: ) 2/nvoanews.com/a/un-mandated-…
@UN @VOANews Overall, the assessment is clearly written & admirably forthright, especially given that its audiences are wide-ranging, from the #Taliban to those who hate the Taliban.
Its primary conclusion: "the status quo of int'l engagement is not working." 3/n
Today, the #Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an evaluation report of its contribution to the Resolute Support mission in #Afghanistan that *pulls no punches.*
I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n
Before the findings, a quick comment: the Dutch MFA produced this report b/c "Dutch contributions to missions under Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution are subject to an obligation to evaluate the deployment after it's been completed"
Today, the @JoeBiden admin released its National Security Strategy. I’ll summarize its major points & put some thoughts on #terrorism & #Afghanistan specifically in this THREAD. 1/n
@JoeBiden The strategy exists in 5 parts: (1) overview of the problem; (2) sources of US strength (solutions); (3) global priorities; (4) strategy by region; (5) conclusion.
Oddly, part 1 starts on page 6. Nitpicky, I know, but still weird--who counts the cover as page 1? 3/n
Today the @StateDept held a presser and there were questions about today's announcement of the "#Afghanistan Fund." I'll string those together in this THREAD. 1/n
Thread. In the immediate aftermath of #Afghanistan’s collapse, I attended a virtual event featuring Petraeus & Crocker on what went wrong. Their comments are best summarized as “things were bad until we got there, then they improved until we left & others effed it up.” 1/n
In this article, P4 adopts a similar tone. The “we” he uses is not a “royal we” that includes himself, but a we of “others.” The parts that he describes as having been done right are the parts that he did—aligning resources, getting HQs in place, etc. 2/n
Count the number of times he uses “I” & the associated context. Overwhelmingly these refer to policies that he recommended but weren’t adopted (& were the “right” ones), not mistakes that he personally made. 3/n