I see four main types of potential issues with proximity tracing apps:
1) Opaque/centralized mass profiling
2) Insufficient epidemiological/practical efficacy
3) Everything related to how governments implement them, e.g. making them (de-facto) compulsory
4) Mission creep
1) Opaque/centralized mass profiling
2) Insufficient epidemiological/practical efficacy
3) Everything related to how governments implement them, e.g. making them (de-facto) compulsory
4) Mission creep
The Google/Apple approach *may* largely prevent (1) by governments.
G/A probably have still access to some data. They must amend their ToS with legally binding statements that STRICTLY prohibit them from exploiting any of it. In this case, (1) is perhaps largely resolved.
G/A probably have still access to some data. They must amend their ToS with legally binding statements that STRICTLY prohibit them from exploiting any of it. In this case, (1) is perhaps largely resolved.
The other issues are challenging enough.
There is a heated debate with regards to (2). Concerns include large numbers of false positives/negatives, misuse, a lack of follow-up testing capacity, generally an over reliance on tech while ignoring other stuff. And of course the question of adoption, which is related to (3).
But I also wouldn't rule out the possibility that proximity tracing may be a relevant part of a strategy in the next months.
So, I currently see (3) and (4) as main issues.
Those may largely depend on the degree of authoritarianism and the health of public debate in a country.
So, I currently see (3) and (4) as main issues.
Those may largely depend on the degree of authoritarianism and the health of public debate in a country.
The ways of how governments could turn such an app into a system of digital social control are potentially unlimited, even if opaque mass profiling is impossible. They could make it compulsory or require it to get tested/treated or to enable free movement.
On the other hand, it's important to consider that we already experience massive (temporary) restrictions of fundamental rights, because there is no other way to fix this dystopia.
Of course, also private institutions e.g. employers could make such an app (de-facto) compulsory.
Of course, also private institutions e.g. employers could make such an app (de-facto) compulsory.
And yes, even if Google/Apple would definitely not exploit this data, relying on them certainly reinforces their monopoly / lock-in power.
They may still misuse their ToS/design power, and eventually even become identity providers for certain measures 🥶
They may still misuse their ToS/design power, and eventually even become identity providers for certain measures 🥶
In case of Austria, the country I live in, I currently trust the government, the public sphere and the legal system enough to endorse the existing proximity tracing app hosted by the Red Cross (even if funded by an insurance company and developed by Accenture).
It's complicated.
It's complicated.
(An organization I trust is responsible for data protection, @maxschrems+@epicenter_works will review the code, the Red Cross will make the code publicly available. We had a massive debate when dumb conservative politicians discussed making it compulsory. Now govt says it won't)
