1/ The following is a thread on the @USCC_GOV report (authored by @JanesINTEL) China’s Logistics Capabilities for
Expeditionary Operations.
It is worth the read in its entirety for the breadth of it scope and depth of its analysis.
Expeditionary Operations.
It is worth the read in its entirety for the breadth of it scope and depth of its analysis.
2/ #China is expanding its expeditionary logistics capability to support three primary goals:
1. Support counter-invention strategy within FIC/SIC;
2. Conduct "international commons operations," befitting its resp. as a Great Power;
3. Defend overseas economic interests.
1. Support counter-invention strategy within FIC/SIC;
2. Conduct "international commons operations," befitting its resp. as a Great Power;
3. Defend overseas economic interests.
3/ The #PLA has three milestones across time horizons for its log. force to achieve:
Short term (<2025): Win "informatized limited war in the maritime direction;"
Medium term (2025-2030): Project power along BRI and be able to fight "overseas...informatized limited war"
Short term (<2025): Win "informatized limited war in the maritime direction;"
Medium term (2025-2030): Project power along BRI and be able to fight "overseas...informatized limited war"
4/ Long term (beyond 2030): Project power abroad, requiring the logistics force "to meet the rapid reaction requirements of transportation projection capabilities, in the event of war anywhere around the globe."
There are lots of notes from US and UK playbook, as we shall see.
There are lots of notes from US and UK playbook, as we shall see.
5/ All good reforms begin at home. As part of the ongoing series of reforms to the #PLA, the PRC created the Logistics Support Department (LSD) and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).
LSD coordinates policy and investments across the joint force, while the individual...
LSD coordinates policy and investments across the joint force, while the individual...
6/ ...services maintain their own log. support structure, such that JLSF provides "support that is applicable across the joint force," while services have their own logistics responsibilities unique to their missions.
US equivalents:
LSD=TRANSCOM/CJCS J4 & J6
JLSF=COCOM J4/DLA
US equivalents:
LSD=TRANSCOM/CJCS J4 & J6
JLSF=COCOM J4/DLA
7/ These reforms have run into a number of issues, including difficulty meshing the new order with the existing system, bureaucratic intransigence (why you shouldn't let a military run a businesses), corruption, and lack of discipline.
8/ Accompanying these org. reforms are a number of legal ones, including:
Nat. Def. Transportation/Traffic Law - 2016
Technical Standards for Implementation of Nat. Def. Req. for Newly Built Civil Ships - 2015
Regulations on Nat. Def. Mob. of Civil Trans. Capacity - 2017
MTF...
Nat. Def. Transportation/Traffic Law - 2016
Technical Standards for Implementation of Nat. Def. Req. for Newly Built Civil Ships - 2015
Regulations on Nat. Def. Mob. of Civil Trans. Capacity - 2017
MTF...
9/ The PRC realized the importance of overseas basing to support its expeditionary power projection requirements. It has embraced a method that relies "on a combination of commercial facilities and light-footprint, dedicated military logistics bases...through (sic) (2030)."
10/ Concentrating in "Indian Ocean Region, Red Sea, and Africa" over the medium term, the PLA have embraced a four method continuum:
1- Indirect commercial
2- Direct commercial
3- Direct military logistics
4- Overseas bases
1- Indirect commercial
2- Direct commercial
3- Direct military logistics
4- Overseas bases
11/
1- Indirect commercial facilities "indirectly support PLA operations via commercial ships;"
2- Direct commercial involves PLA operations directly replenishing at a location;
3-Direct military logistics is akin to their Djibouti Logistics Facility;
1- Indirect commercial facilities "indirectly support PLA operations via commercial ships;"
2- Direct commercial involves PLA operations directly replenishing at a location;
3-Direct military logistics is akin to their Djibouti Logistics Facility;
12/
4- Formal overseas bases where the PLA preposition "weapons and platforms capable of offensive operations."
The following graphics lay out the factors that @JanesINTEL assesses indicate likely future overseas logistics facilities, as well as 18 candidates over next decade.
4- Formal overseas bases where the PLA preposition "weapons and platforms capable of offensive operations."
The following graphics lay out the factors that @JanesINTEL assesses indicate likely future overseas logistics facilities, as well as 18 candidates over next decade.
13/ Out of area deployments (particularly a decade of counter piracy ops in GOA), establishment of the Djibouti Logistics Facility, and expanded use of civilian dual use facilities (particularly BRI related) has allowed for significant stress testing of their model.
14/ As per @JanesINTEL “China can rapidly deploy limited naval and air capabilities in support of military operations other than war but is unable to support major combat operations...or deploy troops and equipment in large numbers overseas.”
The objective is to change this.
The objective is to change this.
15/ For their part, the #PLAN has produced the Type 903A Fuchi class and Type 901 combat support ships.
The Type 901 appears to be geared towards fuel and stores support for PLAN CSGs rather than ordnance. Open source reporting indicates that additional ships will be procured..
The Type 901 appears to be geared towards fuel and stores support for PLAN CSGs rather than ordnance. Open source reporting indicates that additional ships will be procured..
16/ ...to provide more than 1:1 redundancy.
@AndrewSErickson notes, “it is clear that US oiler designs greatly influenced this PLAN tanker class. In fact, aside from largely cosmetic changes in the superstructure configuration and the use of large kingposts for the...
@AndrewSErickson notes, “it is clear that US oiler designs greatly influenced this PLAN tanker class. In fact, aside from largely cosmetic changes in the superstructure configuration and the use of large kingposts for the...
17/...replenishment gear, the Type 901 is, arguably, identical to the USN Supply class.”
@JanesINTEL crucially points out, the peacetime deployment of the 901 can be an important indicator of future expeditionary intentions. Full read in image.
@JanesINTEL crucially points out, the peacetime deployment of the 901 can be an important indicator of future expeditionary intentions. Full read in image.
18/ The Type 903A appears to serve as their general fleet oiler/stores ship, and falls midway between USNS Henry J. Kaiser Class fleet oilers and T-AKEs.
They have supported 11 of the last 13 Gulf of Aden Task Forces dating back to mid-2015.
They have supported 11 of the last 13 Gulf of Aden Task Forces dating back to mid-2015.
19/ The PLAN template is one replenishment ship – 908, 903/A – on every out of area deployment while a 901 accompanies the PLAN CSGs. "Based on past deployments, a single replenishment ship can likely support 2-3 surface combat ships for 2-3 weeks..." before req. ext. support.
20/ The PLAN vision for expeditionary logistics through 2030 appears to comprise 5 components:
1- Dedicated replenishment ship (as seen on GOA anti-piracy deployments);
2- Civilian ports;
3- Dedicated logistics bases (in vein of Djibouti);
4- Civilian UNREP (more to follow);
1- Dedicated replenishment ship (as seen on GOA anti-piracy deployments);
2- Civilian ports;
3- Dedicated logistics bases (in vein of Djibouti);
4- Civilian UNREP (more to follow);
21/
5- Replenishment relay, whereby one non-accompanying replenishment ship tops off an out of area task group. Evidenced during PLAN deployments to Europe to extend support endurance of accompanying replenishment vessel.
5- Replenishment relay, whereby one non-accompanying replenishment ship tops off an out of area task group. Evidenced during PLAN deployments to Europe to extend support endurance of accompanying replenishment vessel.
22/ The PLAN is increasingly incorporating CIV merchant fleet into solid stores and fuels replenishment. In Nov '19, the Fuzhou (COSCO owned) sent stores to two PLAN ships after previously docking in Tanzania (pic). It utilized a non-permanent "modular navigation horizontal...
23/ ...replenishment system." The PLAN will likely leverage extensive civilian control of overseas ports and large fleet to sustain distant task groups notwithstanding limited dedicated auxiliaries. Discussed later in this thread.
24/ The PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) has very recently expanded in size to just over 35,000. This is largely due to transfer of personnel from the ground forces. There are reports that they are having difficulty integrating these new personnel.
25/ Based on existing OOB, PRC could sustain a limited intervention capability (pic 1) until 2030. After 2030 (pic 2), their capability begins to look like a multi-MEU force, with organic amphibious vehicle and aviation capability.
26/ Importantly, there is no indication that the new PLAN LHDs are being developed to support STOVL, indicating that they would require carrier support in contested environments. They also appear to have a shortage of helos (pic) for both assault and at-sea stores replenishment.
27/ The PLAAF is similarly constrained by a lack of transportation and replenishment capabilities, including "strategic lift and tanker aircraft."
In the short term, the PLAAF has acquired numerous aircraft from Ukraine since 2012.
In the short term, the PLAAF has acquired numerous aircraft from Ukraine since 2012.
28/ These are stop-gaps while they ramp up indigenous production of the Y-20 aircraft, with variants for airlift and tanking.
"Approximately 12 Y-20s have been confirmed as in service based on their serial numbers." Their max payload is 51 tons at a max range of 5,200 KM.
"Approximately 12 Y-20s have been confirmed as in service based on their serial numbers." Their max payload is 51 tons at a max range of 5,200 KM.
29/ Compounding their development and production issues, the PLAAF is reliant on Russia for both engines and pod-based refueling technology, although appears to be developing its own domestic variants of both.
30/ "Over the next 5-10 years, Jane’s expects that the PLAAF could have up to 70 strategic lift assets by 2025, including 18 Il-76s and roughly 50 Y-20s, with 100+ Y-20s possible by 2030."
31/ Some key limitations on China's development of a robust expeditionary airlift capability include local resistance to the development of PLA bases (a la Djibouti). This in turn forces a reliance on foreign civilian or military airport, which may be unavailable during wartime.
32/ Turning now to civilian integration with the PLA's expeditionary logistics capability, the PRC has recently instituted "Technical Standards for the Implementation of National Defense Requirements for Newly Built Civil Ships."
Applying to container, roll-on/roll-off,...
Applying to container, roll-on/roll-off,...
33/ ...multipurpose, bulk carrier and break bulk vessels. In turn, the government offers subsidies to cover cost of this additional MILSPEC for civilian shipbuilders (cargo and oilers), as well as insurance for damage during conflict. This is derived from a 2017 law (pic)...
34/ ...which appears to be aimed at enabling military utility of civilian vessels. The law is linked below:
eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2…
It appears as though the PRC views on ships taken up from trade (STUFT) was heavily influenced by experience of the Royal Navy in the Falklands...
eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2…
It appears as though the PRC views on ships taken up from trade (STUFT) was heavily influenced by experience of the Royal Navy in the Falklands...
35/ ...as well as the US utilization of preferential cargo and other incentives to sustain its overseas logistics networks.
For more, I recommend that you head over to @WarOnTheRocks
warontherocks.com/2019/01/sealif…
For more, I recommend that you head over to @WarOnTheRocks
warontherocks.com/2019/01/sealif…
36/ Open sources estimate that there are 63 RO-RO and 360 container carriers capable of supporting long distance military operations, 230 vessels capable of stores UNREP (comparable in speed and size to Fuzhou), and an unknown number of tankers of military utility.
37/ Regarding civilian provision of underway fuels, the PLA has increasingly practiced with this since 2016. They also have extensive experience conducting ship-to-ship petroleum transfers as they help DPRK violate UN sanctions, but I digress...
janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/…
janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/…
38/ The PLAN is not alone in its pursuit of CIV-MIL fusion. The PLAAF appears to be nurturing their own version of the US Civil Reserve Air Fleet with their “strategic air support fleets.” These are supported by private sector “strategic support cargo brigades,” which have...
39/ ...recently featured in HA/DR “strategic combat readiness exercises.”
The PLAAF and civilian aircraft have conducted multiple NEO operations, recently in Libya and Yemen. The PLAAF transports ran shuttles the to safe airports for subsequent carriage aboard civ. airliners.
The PLAAF and civilian aircraft have conducted multiple NEO operations, recently in Libya and Yemen. The PLAAF transports ran shuttles the to safe airports for subsequent carriage aboard civ. airliners.
40/ “Chinese experts....estimate that China will have approximately 8,000 civilian passenger aircraft and over 2,600 cargo aircraft by 2035, up from 3,160 total passenger aircraft and only 143 medium and large civilian cargo aircraft today.”
42/ ...that China has prioritized for expeditionary operations, including containerization and palletization technologies, unmanned systems that enable automated loading and unloading, precision airdrop technology, and oil pipeline monitoring technologies, among others.”
43/ This is especially important in light of the heavy premium that the PLA intends to place on their civilian support infrastructure to serve as unofficial air and maritime auxiliaries.
44/ As a final plug, the appendices are well worth exploring if interested in PLAN Gulf of Aden TFs, the rationale behind certain potential overseas base locations, and satellite imagery of potential overseas PRC bases.
