Today Vladimir Putin signed an order On the Fundamentals of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence State Policy, which is quite self-explanatory. The document is only in Russian for the moment, but I assume it will be translated. For now, here’s a thread on the main points 1/20
The biggest news here is that the document is public. The last one was signed by President Medvedev in 2010 and was supposed to last till 2020. It went in a package with the 2010 Military doctrine but unlike the doctrine, it was classified. kremlin.ru/events/preside… 2/20
This led to some US “experts” claiming it was the true Russian nuclear doctrine, containing all the clandestine evil plans. It was contrasted with the unclassified Military doctrine which contained chapters on nuclear weapons as well 3/20
Russians who have seen the classified version told me they didn’t really differ. The version which was released today supports those claims russianforces.org/Decree355.pdf (searchable version courtesy @russianforces) 4/20
It’s hard to say why the 2020 version of the Fundamentals was made public. Maybe it’s because the last mil doctrine was in 2014, there is no update coming in the nearest future, but some clarifications were still needed in the nuclear sphere 5/20
There were a lot of speculations saying that a new Russian military doctrine was upcoming, but they are yet to materialize. What we do know, is that based on the Fundamentals the nuclear chapters of the mil doctrine would not change too much 6/20
The Fundamentals draw significantly from the 2014 Mil doctrine. Their central part is para 17, laying down conditions under which Russia will consider nuclear use (the final decision remains with the President – para 18) – those are straight from the mil doctrine 7/20
Russia will consider nuclear use if attacked with nukes/WMD or overwhelmed conventionally to the point where the existence of the state is under threat. However, par 19 adds some important nuances 8/20
Launch of missiles against Russia will be enough to consider nuclear response (launch on warning). Pres Putin spoke about it at length at Valdai en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…, now it was for the first time codified in an official document 9/20
Para 19в is most revolutionary – impact on civilian or military facilities critical for nuclear retaliatory actions will be considered as possible condition for nuclear use. It was generally understood that targeting nuclear forces is bad idea even with conventional weapons 10/20
Para 19в adds that all nuclear infrastructure or anything critical for nuclear retaliation is off-limits. The definition is quite broad and surely that’s how it was planned. 11/20
Then there is para 12 on military risks which can become mil threats for Russia & should be deterred with nukes. It’s a long list mostly about having nuclear weapons or other stuff which can hit Ru or intercept its nukes, but there is also nuclear proliferation for example 12/20
Some experts see it almost as a threat towards countries that could threaten Russia with sophisticated weapons. I disagree: A) para 17-19 have nothing of this B) military risks came into Fundamentals from mil doctrine where they were just risks & no talk about punishment 13/20
So, I would read it as a list of things Russia doesn’t like and feels can lead to problems, but a) not necessarily, b) if para 19 is not triggered whatever happens will probably stay conventional 14/20
Finally, there is para 4: State nuclear deterrence policy is aimed at deterring aggression & if military conflict starts at preventing escalation and ending hostilities at acceptable terms 15/20
This issue raised a lot of debate. Some say it means that the presence of Russian nukes will prevent the enemy from escalating. It could well be so. But the ending hostilities part is borrowed from para 34 of the Mil doctrine 16/20
Para 34 of Mil doctrine talks abt defeating enemy forces & compelling enemy to end hostilities. With this in mind you can read para 4 as talking about use of nuclear weapons in case deterrence fails & conditions of para 19 are in place. But I might be pushing this one 17/20
No escalate to de-escalate strategy in this document as well, sorry 18/20
No escalate to win either 19/20
Those were some highlights. For a more detailed picture take a look at Dima’s thread, and we'll probably be discussing this one for a while 20/20
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