Thread by @PhilippRotmann

Ze Germans & international security: Free riders? Pacifists? Shackled by their own self-doubt? Caught in a mental "end-of-history" trap since 1989?

Wait a minute. @bressansar, @sarahbrockmeier & I mined some recently released survey data.

Prepare for some surprises. 1/

Before I dive into the study (gppi.net/2020/06/06/new…), a caveat: no existing survey/qual study is fine-grained enough to take on the smart & nuanced hypotheses on the German condition i.e. by @jan_techau (the-american-interest.com/2019/10/04/no-…) or Thomas Bagger (tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…). 2/

But hey, you came for the numbers!

First, about everybody (voting-age Germans, 18+). There used to be a solid majority for "foreign policy restraint"/"we're doing enough".

That majority disappeared last year (2019). Yes, it did.

3/

What, the end of the "culture of restraint"? Well, let's take a careful look at the data (and we'll talk about the #COVID19 shock later).

What's this poll, and do other polls confirm this? 4/

This is from a weekly tracking poll run by Forsa on behalf of the German government. The poll covers a wide range of issues, and every three weeks it asks the fluffy question if people want their country to "take more responsibility" in world politics. 5/

As you can see in the chart, the once-comfortable majority of "restrainers" (as recently as 2016-17) slowly disappears, to the benefit of those who want to see their government take "more responsibility". The latter group doesn't dominate, however. 6/

There are two other recurring surveys (run only once a year, though), one by the Bundeswehr/@Ipsos and the other by @KoerberIP/@KantarPublic. Their questions differ, so hard to compare. But: Körber poll offers modest support & Bundeswehr one doesn't contradict this trend. 7/

In April 2019, the government also ran (through Forschungsgruppe Wahlen) a more specific survey about engaging in "conflict resolution". It's a different question, but wow: 43% want MORE, a whopping 11 pct pts more than the 32% who like the status quo. 8/

To conclude re: Germans as a whole, the shift from 2016 to 2019 is robust (far bigger than those statistical margins of error), the previous majority of restrainers is gone, BUT it's an open question if the growing demand for more ambition will achieve a majority or not. 9/

*#COVID19 footnote: obviously, people have been preoccupied with things other than foreign policy in recent months. This much is obvious from spring 2020 polling. Still, there is a piece of evidence in our study that the longer trend may not have been stopped or reversed yet. 10/

But wait: we found something even more striking than this shift among Germans as a whole, and that's about people between 18 and 30 years of age -- part Generation Z, part younger Millennials.

Most of them actually want a more ambitious foreign policy. Hello, @heikomaas! 11/

So the age gap on foreign policy attitudes has recently grown: compared to older people (30+, what?! this includes me), many more younger people demand a more ambitious foreign policy, and some time around late 2018/early 2019 they achieved a majority among their age group. 12/

We've got some detailed charts in the study revealing some massive differences between younger vs. older women, and younger vs. older East Germans, as well as among supporters of different political parties. gppi.net/2020/06/06/new… 13/

One thing we cannot tell from the current data, since most of the shift among the younger respondents has occurred very recently, is how likely it is to hold. Some attitudes change as people get older, others stay and become generational. To find out, we mostly need to wait. 14/

Some questions from the April 2019 in-depth survey about dealing with international crises and conflicts help us make some basic observations about GenZ/younger Millenials in Germany re: foreign policy, however. 15/

Younger Germans are less anxious & more optimistic, less scared of migration or terrorism than older ones, so this isn't driven by threat. Their demand to engage rather fits w/ greater comfort to push positive change, w/o any naivité as to Germany's power to shape events. 16/

Now, what do these 18-to-29-year-olds mean if they agree with vague stuff like "taking international responsibility" and "getting involved in conflict resolution"?

Here, we're facing some data gaps. Everybody likes diplomacy, so pollsters don't spend 💶 to ask about it. 17/

Strangely enough, while everybody also likes development "aid", pollsters keep spending 💶 to ask about THAT. They find that even more young people want more development than older people do. (Note the huge margin of error for young people, not a huge no of respondents here.) 18/

When it comes to military force, it gets interesting again: Strict disapproval of military force is much less common among Germans under 30, compared to older Germans. (Note the differences if ppl are asked for conflict resolution or counter-terrorism.) 19/

There is a similar gap by age when people are asked about dealing with "grave human rights violations". ~85% want to take "decisive action" against, but ~15 pct pts more young people support sanctions & almost twice as many young people support military action than older ppl. 20/

Defense spending: there is negligible support for cuts, the status quo (after substantial growth in recent years) enjoys support, but how many people want further increases depends on how the question is framed (reminding respondents of operations abroad doesn't help). 21/

One for the EU-vs-NATO nerdfest: Younger Germans are more likely than older ones to want EU "engagement", but also more likely (89%!) to agree that "we'll continue to need NATO". For military stuff, 55% (all ages) prefer "to use" NATO while 58% want to build an EU army. 22/

Finally, arms sales--a very sensitive topic, where we found striking differences: People got five choices, from a total ban to unrestricted exports. We clustered them into restrictive (reddish) and permissive (green to yellow). Look how majorities differ by age:
23/

That's it! We were quite surprised to learn what a treasure trove of data the government had been depositing at @gesis_org all along. While @KoerberIP and #ZMSBw launch & promote their findings every year, the government press office doesn't. 24/

It would be great to see more comparative analysis, a closer look at the phrasing and framing of questions, and more polling in general about foreign policy attitudes. And of course, what about our closest partners in the EU: what to they think? gppi.net/2020/06/06/new… FIN

unroll please @threadreaderapp

*Sorry, 48% not 43%, that was a typo. Makes for a 15 pct pt difference to the 32% who like the status quo -- see the chart for the correct figures.