Right, it's THREAD time on the Royal Marines' Future Commando Force, amphibious shipping, budgets and options. 
I'll preface everything I say here with a couple of caveats. This is very much a 'first contact' impression and some somewhat rough thoughts, I'm not possessed of all the facts & amphibious warfare practitioners within the RN & RM who do have them are free to correct any mistakes
Second, this isn't a forensic analysis of the budget (although direction of travel and some options will be discussed) and as such any proposed structures and concepts may be taken with a grain of salt.
With that out of the way, let's start with the thing that's probably drawn some attention in the news recently, the Royal Marines are getting a personal equipment overhaul. While i'm averse to getting into the weeds of the practical aspects of this I do have a few thoughts.
Corporate identity matters and this is probably the most significant way the Royal Marines have decided to re-assert theirs, following a decade spent as "just another infantry Brigade" on the Afghanistan rotation, I think there may have been a perception that it had become
difficult to really differentiate them - in the minds of the public and decision makers - from the Army.
The uniform change, stamped with the (green) white ensign and red on black WW2 inspired RM Commando flash seems part of a move to re-emphasise their maritime link and role.
The uniform change, stamped with the (green) white ensign and red on black WW2 inspired RM Commando flash seems part of a move to re-emphasise their maritime link and role.
Lt Col. Reynolds, who led on procurement of the new uniform, emphasised as much:
"The RM Commando uniform 2020 reflects our distinctiveness and the unique capabilities we bring to defence"
"The RM Commando uniform 2020 reflects our distinctiveness and the unique capabilities we bring to defence"
The other major change to personal equipmemt is the wholesale adoption of a new standard rifle series, manufactured by Colt. This is hardly the seismic change it's made out to be. These rifles have been in service with UK Special Forces for decades and the 43 Commando since 2016.
It's an extremely reliable tried and
tested weapons system with a number of features desirable for maritime roled infantry. Specifically greater reliability, enhanced stopping power and ammunition natures designed to reduce the chance of ricochets.
tested weapons system with a number of features desirable for maritime roled infantry. Specifically greater reliability, enhanced stopping power and ammunition natures designed to reduce the chance of ricochets.
The shift to the Colt series rifles is also another important statement of intent on the direction of travel of the Royal Marines, moving closer to the Special Forces end of the spectrum by adopting their standard firearm.
Where does this leave the role the Royal Marines have reprised for 60+ years?
Plenty of critique has been levelled at the future of amphibious theater entry in the modern world, urbanised shorelines, proliferation of guided weapons & more have cast doubt on the concept.
Plenty of critique has been levelled at the future of amphibious theater entry in the modern world, urbanised shorelines, proliferation of guided weapons & more have cast doubt on the concept.
With the substantial defence reductions in 2010 the UK stepped down from the ambition to have a brigade-scale landing capability.
The sale of the 4th Bay class dock landing ship, two Point class logistics support ships and mothballing one of the Albion class LPDs ensured that.
The sale of the 4th Bay class dock landing ship, two Point class logistics support ships and mothballing one of the Albion class LPDs ensured that.
The reduced ambition was to guarantee amphibious lift for a single battalion-sized formation - either 40 or 45 Cdo (with 42 Cdo becoming a dedicated "maritime operations" force.
This is, more or less, where we currently sit.
This is, more or less, where we currently sit.
The way forward, however, is less clear. Economic strain from a range of angles and an overheated MoD budget is likely to put extreme pressure on the current model and any future model we may choose to pursue.
UK amphibious forces are therefore confronted with a 'double threat' of intellectual challenge to the future feasibility of the amphibious theater entry role and strong budgetary headwinds that may militate against radical change featuring any sort of major equipment changes.
There remain serious questions about whether the Future Commando Force intends, or will be formed and equipped to "go over the beach" at scale at all. Instead falling back on much smaller scale distributed raiding operations.
The aircraft carriers and upgraded Mk.4 Merlin fleet certainly offers potential for larger scale aerial insertion than we've been accustomed to with our previous helicopter carriers, but an inability to land heavy equipment means getting over the shoreline remains important.
Neither carrier will receive the command, control and communications outfit to run the force it projects ashore either.
This can be viewed a number of ways but the final assessment is that these ships likely aren't the ones you want to keep close to shore to use those comms.
This can be viewed a number of ways but the final assessment is that these ships likely aren't the ones you want to keep close to shore to use those comms.
Which brings us neatly on to the active LPD.
I've seen mich criticism levelled at these ships and the number of times they've reportedly "narrowly avoided" being cut seems to increase exponentially with each SDSR.
I've seen mich criticism levelled at these ships and the number of times they've reportedly "narrowly avoided" being cut seems to increase exponentially with each SDSR.
I suppose you could interpret that a number of ways.
Either that dock ships are obsolescent totems of a bygone age of amphibious warfare (to which I'd say most of the rest of the world seems to disagree) clinging on because of narrow military/political interests.
Either that dock ships are obsolescent totems of a bygone age of amphibious warfare (to which I'd say most of the rest of the world seems to disagree) clinging on because of narrow military/political interests.
Or that despite their expense and complexity they continue to prove themselves extremely useful at most turns, despite rarely being called upon to do high intensity amphibious operations and they remain the most potent afloat command and control platforms the UK possesses.
Regardless of your view, the retention of these ships may prove difficult in the future. However, with nominal out of service dates in the mid 2030s both ships still have a lot of useful life left in them.
I would err on the side of retention in the current form until imminent replacement is necessary, rather than desirable.
This is built on the assumption that the "Littoral Strike Ship" is unlikely to happen, or be an affordable option compared to running on one LPD.
This is built on the assumption that the "Littoral Strike Ship" is unlikely to happen, or be an affordable option compared to running on one LPD.
The LPD itself isn't wholly unsuitable for the new RM structure either. Plenty of dock space for existing fast insertion craft and slower landing craft, as well as a large flight deck (albeit with no hangar), means the LPD can still "do" smaller scale distributed raiding.
A similar thing could be said of the Bay class auxiliary dock landing ships in service with the fleet auxiliary which aren't already committed to supporting other forces - such as the Bahrain based Mine Countermeasures ships.
Depending on the depth and scale of the economic damage and the defence spending priorities of the government we could very well see UK amphibious forces having to, rather than cutting their coat to fit their cloth, rather make a coat out of whatever material is left.
The carriers are certainly one option, especially when considering lighter raiding with helicopter insertion, where C2 facilities on the scale only the LPD can presently provide are less vital.
Of particular interest here is ongoing work on an RM force to rescue downed pilots.
Of particular interest here is ongoing work on an RM force to rescue downed pilots.
Another option could be routine embarkation of one or two of the new, smaller, 16-man RM troops on the next generation of frigates and destroyers. Type 31 in particular has a lot of additional bunks for augmentees.
This course of action could see a return to the routine presence of marines and greater integration into ships' companies on RN warships - something which was common until after the Second World War - able to provide specific infantry skills for shore parties and force protection
As well as offering options for distributed small scale raiding operations using the ship's flight or specialist boats.
Embarking a Merlin Mk.4 and/or ORC boats on a Type 31 or Type 26 with an RM troop could be an interesting option in this regard.
Embarking a Merlin Mk.4 and/or ORC boats on a Type 31 or Type 26 with an RM troop could be an interesting option in this regard.
There remain many questions surrounding the future of the Royal Marines, in particular their amphibious shipping, if the UK is to fully abandon the ambition to land at scale then we need to be clear eyed about what this means and the options remaining.
Small scale distributed raiding operations can be used to support and facilitate a more substantial landing, but cannot replace it, or the need to be able to engage and prevail over conventional forces.
If the Royal Marines cease to be a standalone theater-entry force then what does that mean for the only other theater-entry force at the MoD's disposal? The Army's 16 Air Assault Brigade. Who also face similar questions about relevance and budgetary pressure.
What, also, does this mean for the future of the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force if the Dutch become the senior partner when it comes to high-end amphibious Command and Control facilities and dock landing ships?
Could future RM operations at scale be contingent on Dutch ships?
Could future RM operations at scale be contingent on Dutch ships?
And what inpact might the withdrawal of British amphibious lift and the transformation of the Royal Marines into lighter raiding forces have on the defence of NATO's Northern flank, where the UKNLAF are expected to be first on scene, before the USMC?
There are major questions ahead and serious investment and disinvestmemt decisions to be made.
I hope that they are made with clear eyes about what certain decisions and force structures will allow defence to do, and what it will prevent it from doing.
I hope that they are made with clear eyes about what certain decisions and force structures will allow defence to do, and what it will prevent it from doing.
I hope that's some interesting food for thought.
Engaging Strategy Out.
Engaging Strategy Out.
