A hackneyed opening that dismisses carriers as "vulnerable white elephants" after zero engagement with the very live debate around their modern utility.
"Originally scheduled for 2012"
Yes, that rather inconvenient recession got in the way.
"Originally scheduled for 2012"
Yes, that rather inconvenient recession got in the way.
Presumably other maritime capabilities, such as the UK's existing amphibious shipping, nuclear deterrent and mine warfare forces do not require protecting with big expensive surface escorts.
As for the "only strategic purpose" line, flippant and laughably wrong.
As for the "only strategic purpose" line, flippant and laughably wrong.
This is just flat wrong. Most of the cost escalation came from the 2008 decision to slow the build of both ships, save money in-year and preserve shipbuilding jobs during the recession. This added ~£1.6bn to the programme cost.
The 2010 CATOBAR flip flop added about £100m.
The 2010 CATOBAR flip flop added about £100m.
Flatly, this is just nonsense. The size escalation can be tracked through the major iterations of the CVF design. The Alpha variant was much larger and more extravagant. The Bravo was a "minimum" design (in the 50,000t bracket) that couldn't do the job & had structural problems.
The Charlie was a further development of the Bravo to try and make it work (It didn't) and the final Delta variant is what we got. The capability goals being met with a "minimum plus" design that resolved most of the Bravo/Charlie's weaknesses. An effective compromise.
Which, as you may have noticed, has everything to do with meeting UK technical requirements and sweet FA to do with gurning over the Nimitz class.
Except the MoD settled on a considerably smaller and less ambitious design than the original Alpha concept. If anything CVF grew, then shrank then grew again to a happy middle ground for what it was being asked to do.
"No UK shipyard was big enough", except for Rosyth.
That "brand new facility" in Rosyth cost £50m. In the scale of the QEC programme, sod all.
That "brand new facility" in Rosyth cost £50m. In the scale of the QEC programme, sod all.
The renovations were largely just modifications to No1 dock's bottom, buying the crane and widening the entrance.
So basically everything in there swings from unjustified assertions to total rot and it's pretty damn misleading.
The carrier programme is interesting in many regards and there are plenty of discussions to have about it.
This is not how to do it.
Engaging Strategy, out.
The carrier programme is interesting in many regards and there are plenty of discussions to have about it.
This is not how to do it.
Engaging Strategy, out.
And while I'm on the subject, why does nobody address the other "white elephant" in the room, the utter abortion that was the Invincible class helicopter cruiser in the "strike carrier" (a term being used very loosely here) role?
Because for some reason we have this starry-eyed idea that bodging inadequate kit into roles it was never designed to do and thinking that's a good outcome is great.
We built QEC because that's what the minimum required to do the job credibly looks like.
We built QEC because that's what the minimum required to do the job credibly looks like.
Got a problem with that? Get out of the carrier strike game.
Don't come whining about it not being "30 or 40,000 tons" when 30 or 40,000 tons wasn't ever capable of giving us what we required.
Lord knows the 22,000 ton Invincible class couldn't.
Don't come whining about it not being "30 or 40,000 tons" when 30 or 40,000 tons wasn't ever capable of giving us what we required.
Lord knows the 22,000 ton Invincible class couldn't.
