Thread by @EngageStrategy1

THREAD:
If you've ever taken any one of a number of ferries from Portsmouth International Port that shuttle back and forth to the continent you may have looked out and seen a rather sad-looking hulk. Stripped of her weapons and radars, she sits quietly alongside Whale Island.
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You may even have taken a moment to wonder what that funny looking grey ship was, how did she get there and why?

This is the story of HMS Bristol, monument to a fleet that never was, one of the last testaments to the "white heat" of a promised technological revolution.
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Our story begins on a cool, clear day in June 1953. Amidst the pomp and circumstance of the coronation of a new Queen the Royal Navy had, as it had for centuries, turned out in all its finery with over 300 ships for a grand fleet review at Spithead in the Solent.
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Behind the imposing looking lines of warships though, the navy of the 1950s was already grappling with worrying shortages of manpower, stretched thin across the remainder of the British Empire, fighting a war in Korea and grappling with how to meet the new Soviet threat.
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Many of these challenges were met in a manner that Admirals of centuries past would have recognised. Ships were pulled from extensive reserve fleets, left over from the last great war, some were modernised and taken into full time commission others run briefly then disposed of./5

The problems were compounded by intense debate about the utility and relevance of conventional forces at all through the 1940s and 50s, as technologists and nuclear theorists painted a vision of war where atomic bombs, not planes, tanks and warships, would decide the outcome./6

The navy took a different view, arguing that there was still a justification for strong conventional forces for conflicts and crises below the level of nuclear war, such as Korea. For various reasons these arguments, also mirrored by parts of the Army, did not gain traction./7

The flaws in the system of activating warships for wartime duty as required were cruelly exposed in the Suez War of 1956. For example, of the five aircraft carriers that would eventually participate only one, Eagle, was in full commission at the onset of the crisis./8

The time it took to assemble the required troops, ships, aircraft and crews, many of which had to be pulled out of mothballs or activated from very low states of readiness, ensured that the political battle was already going in the wrong direction when combat operations began./9

Stock-taking, review and restructuring followed the failure at Suez. Led by the newly appointed minister of defence Duncan Sandys the review described a series of changes that would have a radical influence on the Royal Navy of the 1960s./10

Firstly, the review supported the Royal Navy's argument for its limited war role. Backing the future of its carrier arm and amphibious forces./11

Secondly, the role of the navy in a general war involving nuclear weapons remained in doubt. The final official position being cautious support for continued consideration of what would be required in the event of another war in the Atlantic./12

Finally and importantly for the future of the navy, the review emphasised that the future of warfare rested not only on the power of atomic weapons, but also a variety of missiles operated by units on land, air and at sea./13

The Royal Navy had, during the Second World War, been developing a primitive guided anti-aircraft missile through the GAP/LOPGAP (Liquid Oxygen/Petrol Guided Anti-aircraft Projectile) programme building on the prototype beam-riding "Brakemine" missile developed from 1944./14

A 1947 review of missile technology by the navy sketched out the requirements for the first anti-aircraft missile to be deployed on RN warships. It was also recognised that the team required to do this would outstrip the abilities of the existing GAP participants./15

By September 1949 the "Project 502 Group" had been assembled, consisting of Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft, Sperry and GEC, to develop Stage 1 of the Royal Navy's missile programme. What would eventually become the GWS (Guided Weapon System) 1 "Sea Slug"./16

The programme moved ahead steadily throughout the 1950s, by 1954 a working prototype was being tested on a floating platform known as the Clausten Rolling Platform (to simulate the movement of a ship at sea) at the coastal missile test range at RAF Aberporth in Wales./17

The navy also converted the WW2 era repair ship "Penlee Point" to a missile trials vessel between February 1953 and July 1956. During her five years service as "HMS Girdle Ness", before paying off in 1961, she fired over 200 test missiles./18

While the Sea Slug missile was in development a series of design studies were underway at the Admiralty to examine the type of platform that the new missile system would be fitted to. The initial concept of a cruiser, destroyer and coastal missile ship was soon pared back./19

This was largely due to the increasingly apparent impracticality of the small coastal missile ship evidenced by the Girdle Ness trials./20

This left the missile cruiser and destroyer. Both were pursued until the 1957 review cancelled the cruiser in favour of a single class of large destroyer. Below are pictured sketch outlines of the later missile cruiser design studies./21

The cancellation of the missile cruiser, whose design team was transferred to the new nuclear submarine programme, lent fresh impetus to the destroyer programme and by March 1957 the design was in front of the Admiralty Board for approval./22

A number of changes were made, the addition of an extra deck to improve survivability and enlarge the missile magazine and the removal of the Limbo A/S mortar in favour of space for a helicopter amongst others, but even with these redesigns the first ship was laid down by 1959/23

These were the large destroyers of the County class, modern, fast and heavily armed they were a sea-change in the navy's approach to the way its warships were designed./24

At the heart of all of this was one of the navy's first computerised combat systems: ADA (Action Data Automation). Which used the Ferranti Poseidon computer (pictured) to analyse and display information from the Ship's radar systems./25

The first iteration of this system, ADA DAA was fitted to the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle in 1959, integrating the outputs of her Type 984 air warning, Type 965 long range search and Type 963 carrier approach radars./26

The first four County class took the DAB variant of ADA to sea, able to not only integrate the air picture but also process surface and sub surface contacts./27

The second batch of County class destroyers featured an updated ADA DAB system based on the newer Ferranti FM 1600 computer. The linking of weapons systems into the computer data processing system turned ADA into ADAWS-1 (Action Data Automation Weapons Systems)/28

Just over a year after the first of the County class was laid down, in October of 1960, a staff paper was circulated within the Navy ministry laying out the requirement for an affordable "small ship guided weapon" able to be deployed on warships of 3,000 tonnes or more./29

The two competitors were the Hawker Siddley/Bristol CF.299 Ramjet design and an enhanced version of the Rapier system under development for the Army, labelled PT.428./30

The Bristol/Hawker Siddley design was chosen and would be developed into GWS 30 "Sea Dart"/31

Full development of Sea Dart was authorised in early 1962, with work beginning the next year. At almost the same time, after several studies into task force defence in the context of a limited war East of Suez, staff requirements were being set for a new missile destroyer./32

The Royal Navy was also in the process of selecting an anti-submarine weapon to replace the Limbo A/S mortar./33

By 1959 the Australian navy had independently developed the Ikara rocket propelled torpedo delivery system, superior to the American ASROC at the time as it could be guided in flight (to target a manoeuvring submarine), the RN bought into the system in 1963 for service by 1970/34

As a result of the studies into task force operations, it was decided that the next generation destroyer would carry both the Sea Dart missile system and the Ikara A/S rocket. With three to four destroyers required to protect each group./35

A number of smaller frigates, intended as follow-ons of the Leander class, armed with either Sea Dart or Ikara, would make up the numbers required to protect the four task groups (two carrier groups, one amphibious group and a supply group) envisioned in the early 60s studies./36

Additional studies in 1963 argued that the most economical means of deploying the required number of Sea Dart and Ikara systems to provide task force defence was to combine the systems on a single hull where possible. Additionally, the ship would be employed as a radar picket./37

Getting all the required sensors, weapons systems and their associated directors onto one hull proved impossible to achieve on a ship intended as a cheap frigate replacement. The Type 82 changed classification from Escort, to General Purpose Escort and finally to Destroyer./38

As the list of equipment required for the platform grew, so did its size and cost. In late 1963 the requirement for it to carry a new 4.5" automated gun was added, by this stage the ship was already running at three times the cost of a Leander and over 5,000t displacement./39

The design board were challenged on the cost of T82, and warned that it may be a difficult sell to the government, but responded that it remained the most efficient means of getting the systems to sea in terms of operating costs compared to a larger number of single role ships/40

They also noted that the larger ships would require less manpower overall to achieve the same military effect. Despite this concerns lingered that selling the plan on overall fleet costs rather than the unit cost of the ships would remain a hard ask./41

Although these concerns persisted development continued apace, discussions took place about the nature of the ship's propulsion plant. Given T82's precipitous increase in size would it not be prudent to uplift her machinery to cruiser protection standards?/42

In the end the separation of machinery spaces and extra protection required was judged unnecessary and too costly. Instead a development of the County Class' Combined Steam and Gas Turbine (COSAG) was chosen, with improved survivability due to the separation of boilers and GTs/43

As 1964 came around yet further task group defence studies were conducted, considering the increased cost of the Type 82 it was decided to reduce the number of ships to six (later eight), using the T82 for aircraft control, supplementing the force with a cheap Sea Dart Frigate/44

For various reasons the navy was walking back on the design board's argument about overall fleet cost and large manpower overheads for the larger number of smaller ships now being proposed. Likely over concerns of their ability to sell the more expensive ship to the government/45

At the same time problems were developing with the Anglo-Dutch Type 988 "Broomstick" radar (cheekily named by the Dutch after Admiral Tromp, who put a broom on his mainmast to signify how he had "swept the seas clean" of the English navy in the Anglo-Dutch Wars)./46

By November 1964 the Dutch were becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress on the British side. They needed a firm commitment if collaboration on the project was to continue. Little progress was made and the Dutch cancelled the programme soon after./47

Ultimately Bristol would be fitted with the 1950s vintage Type 965 air search radar, the same system fitted to its predecessor: the County class./48

In 1965 the cost estimate for Type 82 was £16.25m, with the following ships costing £15m, for comparison a Leander class frigate at that time cost £4.5m. Type 82 was, in terms of cost, now more than a County./49

Despite the cost the design was now largely complete and receieved approval for construction by the board of the Admiralty that year. In less than twelve months the navy would be rocked by a body blow, the consequences of which would reach into every corner of the fleet./50

In February of 1966 the increasingly acrimonious battle over the future of the Royal Navy's aircraft carrier fleet came to a head. The new carrier, CVA-01, was to be cancelled and the carrier force run down by the early 1970s./51

For the navy, increasingly isolated on the issue, it was still a profound shock. The First Sea Lord and Navy Minister both resigned over the decision. The planned future fleet structure was more or less in tatters and the navy's intervention role was under question./52

In March of 1966 the Admiralty Board established the Future Fleet Working Party to develop a new fleet structure. Type 82 was briefly elevated to a central role, suggested as a command platform for new escort groups involving British and Commonwealth navies East of Suez./53

Soon after, however, the idea was dropped (along with a proposal to further enhance the design into a true missile cruiser, which would perform a similar role) as the new First Sea Lord began a serious effort to limit "gold plate" on new designs, blamed for the loss of CVA-01./54

It was decided that the Type 82 would be limited to a single ship, built to get the Sea Dart and Ikara missile systems into service sooner than would otherwise have been possible, and the singleton HMS Bristol was laid down at Swan Hunter on the Tyne in November 1967.

Launched on the 30th of June 1969 she continued fitting out until trials and commissioning in mid-1973./56

https://twitter.com/EngageStrategy1/status/1132008368397279232/photo/1

In the fleet she was well received by her crew: she was modern, well laid out internally, comfortable and mechanically sturdy. In no small part because she was the last ship designed "in house" by the RN's own design staff, applying the lessons learned on the County Class./57

A major boiler fire in 1974 meant she spent the best part of three years running on her Gas Turbines alone before they could be fully repaired. Her propulsion plant's inbuilt redundancy proved a definite success./58

Despite being one of the most modern fighting ships in the fleet Bristol would spend the first six years of her service operating as a trials platform for all her new equipment. She was not outfitted for frontline service until 1979./59

Her fully integrated combat system, ADAWS2 (powered by the Ferranti FM1600 computer), was the first of its kind in the Royal Navy: linking all her sensors and weapons into one Combat Management system. It proved highly effective and formed the basis for RN CMS for decades./60

The list of innovations on Type 82 was, and still is, truly astonishing for a ship which proved so reliable./61

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In 1979 Bristol received her most important refit since the repair of her boilers three years earlier. She finally received her front line equipment fit, including 20mm cannons for close defence, Corvus decoy launchers and electronic warfare equipment./63

Internally she was also modified, with task group command facilities added along with additional communications equipment./64

She performed her new task group command role in the 1981 NATO Exercise "Ocean Safari", simulating the defence of sea lanes against Soviet naval and air forces./65

She wasn't immediately available to form part of the initial Task Force that sailed for the South Atlantic in early April 1982. She would lead the second wave of major surface combatants, most of which departed on May 10th./66

This force comprised the destroyers Bristol and Cardiff, the frigates Active, Andromeda, Avenger, Minerva and Penelope as well as the Auxiliary tankers Bayleaf and Olna. The group linked up with the main task force on May 26th./67

On May 22nd Bristol fired a pair of Sea Dart missiles at what it believed to be an Argentine air raid, it was later discovered to have been a spurious contact created by interference from other nearby ships' radars. /68

Bristol and Cardiff in particular proved invaluable due to Admiral Woodward's heavy losses in modern air defence destroyers. With Sheffield and Coventry sunk and Glasgow damaged. Until the Bristol Group's arrival Woodward only had a single modern destroyer: HMS Exeter./69

Bristol briefly performed the role of "LOLA Manager" on the 28th of May, defending and co-ordinating the movements of civilian and royal fleet auxiliary shipping moving in and out of the area of operations before being relieved by HMS Glamorgan the following day./70

For Bristol the remainder of the war was less eventful. The marines and soldiers were ashore and the land campaign progressed rapidly from late May until the Argentine forces, surrounded in Port Stanley, surrendered on the 14th of June./71

Bristol's job wasn't done though. As one of a handful of ships with substantial command facilities she took over as the theatre command platform from the aircraft carrier Hermes, hosting Woodward's successor Vice Admiral Derek Reffel and his command staff./72

She remained on-station until September 17th, when she was relieved by the newly commissioned light carrier HMS Illustrious./73

Despite returning several months after the rest of the task force she received a powerful welcome on her return to the UK./74

A series of recorded interviews documented the experiences and feelings of her ship's company as they returned to the UK:







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Months of hard service in the South winter Atlantic had taken their toll on the ship though and she entered refit shortly after her return. Lessons learned from the war were implemented: two additional 20mm and two 30mm cannons, as well as new decoy launchers, were added./76

With the navy still short on modern destroyers after the losses in the Falklands it was decided not only to keep Bristol in the fleet, but upgrade her with the new 1022 search radar. She entered refit in 1984 but suffered a serious boiler explosion, requiring further repairs./77

Her Ikara launcher was also removed at this time, the system was being withdrawn across the fleet because it was incompatible with the new Stingray lightweight torpedo. Plans to fit lightweight torpedo launchers to Bristol were never progressed./78

As a singleton class, by the late 80s she was becoming increasingly costly to run. In 1987 she was withdrawn from frontline service to become the lead ship of the Dartmouth training squadron, which also included the frigates Minerva and Ariadne./79

Her last hurrah was the training cruise "Endeavour '90" from January to July 1990, which ranged out to South America and the West Coast of the United States through the Panama Canal./80

Bristol was finally withdrawn from the fleet for conversion into the accommodation ship for HMS Excellent on Whale Island in Portsmouth in 1991, replacing the County class destroyer HMS Kent./81

With the exception of a year long refit at A&P Tyne from 2010-2011, to bring her in line with the latest health, safety and fire standards, Bristol has remained alongside at Whale Island ever since./82

Bristol's story is one of the hope, ambition and technology of the 1960s running into a series of political and military decisions which ultimately doomed the class as originally envisioned. As built Bristol was a pale shadow of what she was intended to be./83

Nonetheless she soldiered on, ever reliable, well designed, well built and well liked. She took hundreds of young men to war and brought them all back. She was that rarest of things, a good ship through and through./84

She's the last quiet reminder of a navy that almost was. A silent testament to a time when our grasp exceeded our reach./85

To me though, she'll always be the fighting carrier escort she was designed to be.

Agris in Cardine Rerum

Engaging Strategy, out.

Oh, and as an addendum, when it came time to replace the Type 42 Sea Dart frigates, the spiritual successor of the Bristol was what we built.

ES, for good this time, signing out.