1/ A thread: More Context on the 1975 OAU meeting in Kampala and Idi Amin's relationship with Tanzania-- The Tanzanian protest of this meeting/ Idi Amin goes back to the beginning of Idi Amin’s regime and some pretty interesting diplomatic history.
2/ On January 25, 1971, General Idi Amin seized power from then President of Uganda, Dr. Milton Obote. Obote similarly to Nyerere was a left-leaning Pan Africanist leader of the era.
3/ Both Nyerere and Obote were in Singapore at a commonwealth conference protesting the sale of arms to white minority governments in Southern Africa.
4/ Unable to return to Uganda where Amin was now in power-- Obote returned to East Africa taking up refuge in the Tanzanian statehouse. 
5/ In these early days of the coup in Uganda, the Tanzanian state and Obote launched an aggressive diplomatic effort to prevent the recognition of Amin as the leader of Uganda on the international stage.
6/ On Thursday January 28, 1971, Tanzania announced publicly its stance on non-recognition of Idi Amin’s government in Uganda.
7/ While Most of the Tanzanians official response was curt regarding Amin, certain more radical branches of TANU particularly the youth league did not hold back so much:
8/ Obote as well as some Tanzanian diplomats traveled around East Africa in the early days following the coup and helped secure condemnations of the coup by Amin with denunciations from Siad Barre of Somalia, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.
9/ Obote personally visited Jomo Kenyatta and Haile Sellasie keeping their governments mum on recognition of Amin. Britain however did not hold back and recognized Amin’s government on February 5th.
10/ A TANU study group focused on the coup published their findings in the Standard on February 5 . Due to the alleged involvement of the Israelis as well as praise and support of Amin from the British and South Africans, the Study Group concluded
11/ “ the coup in Uganda is part of the imperialist strategy of subverting our measures of nationalization and economic reconstruction undertaken in furtherance of the Arusha Declaration.
12/ The Imperialists are acting to do away with a President and Government who consistently condemn and fight racism and imperialist exploitation in Africa and the World over.”
13/ After the initial furor over the coup settled, and Idi Amin continued to solidify power, the Tanzanian National Executive Committee (NEC) met for an emergency meeting in February of 1971.
14/ The result of the closed door meeting in the capital created the new iteration of the TANU party guidelines: Mwongozo wa TANU 1971, translated to English in the Tanzania Standard under the title: “The Dar Declaration.”
15/ These guidelines were the largest declaration of new Tanzanian policy since the Arusha Declaration itself.
With the Dar Declaration, the implementation of socialism at home and liberation of Southern Africa in the 1970’s became more ideologically interrelated.
With the Dar Declaration, the implementation of socialism at home and liberation of Southern Africa in the 1970’s became more ideologically interrelated.
16/ These goals became central to the outlook of Tanzanian foreign policy. The integration of these ideological principles arose in the early 70’s with Idi Amin’s coup as the major tipping point.
17/ Tanzania had not so openly and aggressively worked against another African state– with the exception of white minority and colonial regimes– before Idi Amin’s Uganda.
18/ To the Tanzanians, Amin not only was fighting against the socialist revolution Obote had started in Uganda, but also was cozying up with the British, Israelis, and South Africa to support imperialism in Africa as would be seen clearly in the Dar Declaration.
19/ This shook the sense of security which the Tanzanians had held within East Africa.
20/ The Dar Declaration contained thirty-five points concerning the state of liberation in Africa, “foreign policy,” “Uganda and the E.A.C.,” and the creation of militias of TANU members in conjunction with the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Forces.
21/ The Dar Declaration opened by invoking the liberation struggle in Africa and describing it as “a bitter and continuing struggle” where at some points “the success and gains achieved by the people slip away.” The slipping of progress in liberation is interestingly…
22/ …substantiated by referencing the, “sudden changes [which] have been forcefully brought about in Uganda where puppet Amin and a group of fellow soldiers have rebelled against the government of the revolutionary UPC led by President Obote.”
23/ The declaration decried the “puppets” who had “opposed the UPC policy of bringing about unity and socialism and eradicating capitalism and exploitation.”
24/ The solidarity for socialism in Uganda is contextualized within the need for African liberation and the relation to revolutions and counter-revolutions..
25/ By the time of the February Ministers Meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa, almost none of the governments of East Africa had given formal recognition to Idi Amin’s government in Kampala. ... CONTINUED....
26/ The stage was set for the first major conflict in the arena of international diplomacy between the President in exile and the new Ugandan government.
27/ The February 26 meeting of the Council of Ministers for the OAU adjourned in Addis Ababa with the conundrum of two Ugandan delegations seeking to attend.
28/ Idi Amin’s foreign minister Wanume Kibedi arrived with a delegation while Sam Odaka, Obote’s foreign minister arrived from Tanzania to represent Uganda.
The political question of recognition being forced at the OAU meeting resulted in the early closure of the session.
The political question of recognition being forced at the OAU meeting resulted in the early closure of the session.
29/ The chairmanship of the Council of Ministers being held by Omar Arteh, the Somali Foreign Minister did nothing to help this dilemma given the hard early stance against Amin that his government had taken.
30/ In fact, Omar Arteh had even held a meeting with both Nyerere and Obote in Dar es Salaam on January 31, 1971. Because the lack of consensus in February, the issue of diplomatic recognition at the OAU was pushed back to the June meetings.
31/ This spelled much larger trouble given OAU Summit was scheduled to be held in Kampala.
32/ The delegations from Somalia and Tanzania had motioned to seat Obote’s delegation at the Addis Ababa Ministers Meeting while the Nigerians, Ghanaians, and Liberians favored seating the delegation from Kampala creating a deadlock over the course of three days.
33/ Following this debacle at the ministers meeting, then head of the OAU Kenneth Kaunda personally lobbied for the OAU summit of 1971 to be changed from Kampala to Addis Ababa.
34/ This was an unprecedented effort to achieve a change that would nominally undermine Idi Amin’s Ugandan government. As Chair of the OAU, Kaunda garnered the 31 state majority necessary to change the venue to Addis Ababa.
35/ While a victory for the Tanzanian camp’s campaign against Uganda, internationally it was by some viewed more pragmatically as a way to preserve the OAU itself.
36/ The issue of Ugandan delegations was settled at the initiation of the June 11, Ministers Conference preceding the Summit in Addis Ababa. Representatives of Idi Amin’s government were seated and no delegation representing Obote participated.
37/ Amin’s rule was formally recognized by the African countries. Idi Amin was the bonafide President of Uganda in the international arena. After six months had elapsed with no counter coup, the likelihood of Obote regaining the Ugandan Presidency had become very unlikely.
38/ Obote and his supporters in Tanzania had been virtually ignored by the Tanzanian and foreign press since the February Ministers conference.
39/ Tanzania while continuing to recognize Obote was not giving him the platform which had characterized the initial response to Amin’s coup. Amin’s Uganda notably attended the Ministers meeting while it refused to attend the main Summit in protest of the location change.
40/ It was in this context that on June 19, the Tanzanian government released to the press and circulated among the delegations attending the Summit meeting a document titled, “The OAU and The Freedom Struggle.” While pushing for the overarching political goal of liberation and…
41/ …against dialogue with the settler regimes, the Tanzanian government leveraged the international political debate regarding apartheid to push for the exclusion and isolation of Government’s like Idi Amin’s by barring membership from the OAU on the basis of a lack of…
42/ …commitment to liberation ideals.
43/ Point being— no love was lost between Tanzania and Uganda across the first half of the 1970’s and the history of the OAU being used as a site of political contestation goes back to the beginning of Tanzania’s reaction to Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda.
44/ It’s tied in with the political movements for socialism and African liberation that made the relationship so particularly sour between the states.
45/ There’s more to be said and written on this including border conflicts in 71 and an exile invasion of Uganda in 72 as well as the Mogadishu agreement that followed and more politicking in the EAC, but that’s for a different thread.
@Unseen_Archive thread inspired by your recent sharing of Reuters footage.
@IssaShivji would love to hear your thoughts on all this too!
