10/ over at FBI, Priestap and Jonathan Moffa (the Intel Section Chief in Horowitz) were assigned to the ICA. 
11/ Moffa is a central figure in Russiagate, who hasn't received nearly the amount of scrutiny that he deserves - in part, because, unlike so many other participants, he doesn't seem to have been involved in an affair with a co-worker. He was one of Strzok's "Magnificent Three".
12/ Moffa was present at the very start of Crossfire Hurricane. The Supervisory Intel Analyst (Brian Auten) at Danchenko's interview almost certainly reported to him. So he's at the intersection of false ICA and Danchenko's revelation of Steele inconsistency and embellishments.
14/ the available SSCI narrative picks up on Dec 20, which is said to be when "FBI first informed CIA's team" that FBI wanted to include Steele material. SSCI described Steele as having an "established relationship with FBI".
15/ SSCI report did not disclose that Steele's relationship with FBI had been terminated with cause or that Steele was a contractor for DNC/Hillary Clinton campaign. (Nor were either of these relevant facts disclosed in ICA.)
16/ Horowitz picked up narrative a few days earlier - on Dec 16 when Moffa sent an "email to the FBI" (huh?) saying that McCabe [DD] wanted Steele reporting in ICA, inclusive of "potential compromising material, etc".
17/ Moffa asked the unnamed FBI recipient to draft a section for ICA on these juicy details "in coordination with [Supervisory Intel Analyst]" - the latter (prob Brian Auten), as we now know, was present at the Danchenko interview.
18/ Moffa said he asked McCabe whether to limit to “information concerning Russian election interference or to also include allegations against candidate Trump”. McCabe said to include Steele “election reporting” “due to concerns over possible Russian attempts to blackmail Trump”
19/ McCabe's invocation of supposed "concerns" over "possible Russian attempts to blackmail Trump" obviously contradicts the idea that FBI was investigating "Trump campaign" as opposed to Trump himself.
20/ it also connects to an important under-discussed feature of Steele dossier: most of the dossier e.g. internal Russian machinations between Peskov and Vaino etc does not connect to possible blackmail. For blackmail, it is only collusion allegations and secondarily pee tape.
21/ by focusing on the allegations narrowly pertaining to possible blackmail, key aspects of Steele dossier structure get revealed. But that's for another thread.
22/ in any event, McCabe took position that the scope of Obama's terms of reference (supposedly "all information relevant to Russia and 2016 elections") required the hoovering up (so to speak) of Steele information into ICA
23/ later on Dec 16, following his instructions from McCabe, Moffa sent Priestap, Strzok and one other an updated draft FBI submission for the ICA incorporating Steele allegations "at DD's request".
24/ in the evening of Dec 16 (according to Dec 17 Comey email), Comey told Clapper that FBI would be contributing Steele "reporting" and that FBI was "proceeding cautiously to understand and attempt to verify the reporting as best we can".
25/ the FBI's "cautious" attempts to verify didn't include interviewing Steele's Principal Sub-Source, Igor Danchenko, who lived in northern Virginia, only only a few miles away from the WFO field office. At this stage, it's not clear that they had done much.
26/ Comey vouched to Clapper that Steele was a "credible person with a source and sub-source network in position to report on such things".
27/ in fact, Steele's "source and sub-source" network on Wikileaks collusion allegation was a single anonymous telephone call which, according to PSS, didnt mention Wikileaks and unconfirmed bar rumor and internet legend about a pee tape, falsely said by Steele as "confirmed"
28/ Comey also told Clapper that Burr had already talked to him about "Russian knowledge of sexual activity" by Trump. This is not mentioned in SSCI report. Shows that SSCI members/staff already influenced by Steele material by Dec 16, 2016.
29/ SSCI Volume 4 intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/… (less redacted Less redacted version
https://t.co/zkwRDHL6uo)
includes detailed discussion of controversy about inclusion of Steele allegations, which McCabe, FBI were pressing and CIA/NSC professionals appear to have weakly resisted
https://t.co/zkwRDHL6uo)
includes detailed discussion of controversy about inclusion of Steele allegations, which McCabe, FBI were pressing and CIA/NSC professionals appear to have weakly resisted
30/ both Horowitz &SSCI reported initial resistance by NSC to inclusion of (fraudulent) Steele allegations in ICA. CIA expressed concern on using Steele. CIA believed that Steele “reporting” “was not completely vetted", “internet rumor”, didnt "merit inclusion in body of report”
31/ SSCI, citing AD for [Russia?, Eurasia?] - perhaps Beth Kimber - protested that no “visibility into sub-sourcing dynamic" and thus Steele "not appropriate for inclusion in report". She was, needless to say, right about this, now that we know true weakness of sourcing.
32/ AD [Kimber?] said she asked Priestap for info on sources but Priestap could not/did not "provide names or reliability for subsources". She recommended tht Steele info "not be included", but then weakly compromised on backdoor inclusion in annex. Which was enough for plotters
33/ Priestap pushed back hard against intel AD [Kimber?]. He claimed that FBI had been "able to independently corroborate some of sub-sourcing". Did Horowitz or SSCI ever ask what Priestap had corroborated that wasnt already open source?
34/ Priestap's reason for insisting on inclusion of Steele "reporting" is worth watching closely: FBI argued that Obama's directive - to include "everything in their possession" - required inclusion even of material that didn't meet IC standards.
35/ this seems potentially very significant to me. Clever bureaucrats, of which there were many in Obama admin, know the importance of terms of reference for an investigation. Obama's terms of reference (carefully not given in writing) opened door for inclusion of material
36/ in ICA that didn't meet the standards of the "time tested process" that was later vaunted by inside NSC professionals and presumed by Mike Morell to have been applied in the ICA.
37/ I presume that senior Obama officials had been read in on Steele info. Did they intentionally construct terms of reference for the ICA so that Steele info would get included, even if it didn't meet NSC quality standards? Would be hard/impossible to prove. They're clever.
38/ CIA AD [Kimber?] "noted that FBI insisted on including Steele reporting because 'they didn't want to look like they were hiding anything'". Yeah, sure. Like it was really hard to persuade McCabe to include damagin allegations against Trump. The CIA AD was conned by FBI.
39/ Conned by McCabe, Priestap and Moffa, the CIA AD unwisely came to conclusion that their reasoning "sounded fair" and passed material forward to Brennan and CIA DD Cohen.
40/ when FBI's submission of Steele reporting was presented to CIA analysts, they apparently objected vehemently since it was "very unvetted" and they couldn't have "analytic confidence" in details prior to ICA due date.
41/ the CIA analysts did not have enough fortitude to keep the Steele fraud out altogether, and acquiesced in its inclusion in an annex provided there was a"big caveat put on top of annex, that this is totally unvetted".
42/ needless to say, there was no such "big caveat" that Steele material was "totally unvetted" in actual ICA. It said that there had been "limited corroboration" and (falsely) that information from these subsources had been "corroborated" in the past.
43/ the CIA DD for Analysis told SSCI that CIA would "never" have included Steele "reporting" in a CIA product because "source was so indirect".
44/ according to SSCI, there was "bitter argument" between intel professionals and FBI over how to present (fraudulent) Steele material. FBI was not content with Steele material in an Annex (tho that ultimately was all that felony leakers needed.)
45/ rather than adhering to the "time tested process" later vaunted by intel community against Trump admin, CIA argued that they had to include because it was already in distribution within Washington.
46/ Clapper tried to argue that Steele disinformation "was not included as an organic part of the ICA". Clapper recognized tht this was "maybe a distinction without a difference", but "to us", it was a "very important point".
47/ as events turned out, it was the inclusion of Steele dossier material in ICA at all that was sufficient to spark the resistance. Clapper's failure to understand risk of inclusion of fraudulent material not meeting validation standards was, at best, a monumental intel failure.
48/ Brennan similarly purported to disdain Steele material, but, like Clapper, prissily argued that Steele material "was not used in any way" as far as judgements in the ICA were concerned.
49/ ICA itself made no allegation of collusion between Trump and Russia or pee tape incident. It was mostly Russophobic interpretations of open source material that one would expect from Bolton or Nuland tht didnt depend on Steele, but were mostly opinion, not fact. (Another day)
50/ Brennan said that Comey made "very strong case" for inclusion of Steele material on grounds that NSC/CIA "didn't know where FBI investigation was as far as some of those things".
51/ as we now know, FBI had done diddly-squat to interview Steele's Primary Sub-Source as of late December. And when Danchenko blew up the dossier four weeks later, Comey didn't inform Susan Rice's replacement (Flynn) or new D-CIA or DNI.
52/ from the SSCI chronology, it appears tht, before ICA presented to Obama and Trump teams, Brennan received call from [UK] intel official stating clearly that Steele had no official support. This ought to have been an ICA caveat but Brennan withheld from ICA.
53/ continuing with SSCI narrative, Comey told committee that he had "insisted" on inclusion of Steele material, but ultimately didn't "really care" whether it was in ICA or annex. (Nor did eventual felony leaker care either.)
54/ Horowitz sheds a little light on dispute. He reported that, on Dec 28, McCabe wrote to ODNI Principal Deputy Director [Stephanie O'Sullivan] asking to meet on dispute.
55/ Horowitz reported that McCabe gave three reasons: Obama's request for the kitchen sink; Steele info "was not completely vetted" but "consistent with" info from other sources; and "need to advise" President about Steele reporting.
56/ to say that Steele info "was not completely vetted" was obviously deception by McCabe: it wasn't vetted at all. And what were their "other sources" of consistent information. Did Horowitz or anyone ask?
57/ on Dec 29, McCabe and CIA DD Cohen met, with McCabe agreeing to place material in annex, notwithstanding Comey's insistence the prior day.
58/ Brennan, intentionally or unintentionally, shut his eyes to the risk of including the (fraudulent) Steele material in an official intelligence product, pretending that inclusion in an annex insulated CIA and DNI from culpability in violation of IC standards.
59/ the NSA was kept in the dark on both the controversy and the Steele dossier allegations until Dec 29. Like the other non-FBI intel professionals, they shut their eyes to risk to incoming administration of inclusion of (fraudulent) Steele material in ICA.
60/ the ICA was finalized as a Memorandum to President, and dated on Dec 30, one day after Obama admin announcement of sanctions against FSB and GRU, expulsion of diplomats and release of their absurdly irrelevant technical memo on hacking.
