How many people know anything about the Jan 2017 Intel Assessment (ICA) other than as a pretext for delivering Steele dossier into public view? Public version is astonishingly, even embarrassingly, empty of content. dni.gov/files/document…
2/ nominally, it is 25 pages long, but the text of report itself is only 4 weak pages. 8 of 25 pages are title pages, table of contents or "intentionally empty", 7 pages are annex concerning RT in 2012 (!) election, 4 pages (3 separate sections) are throat-clearing disclaimers,
3/ 2 pages are given over to a summary of the mere 4 pages of "content". One of the precious 4 pages of content was given over to Soviet era allegations.
4/ so, whatever the truth may rest in respect to Russian interference, no one should be under any illusion that the ICA was an informative and convincing document. The few pages of text contain very little evidence. Instead, they are repeated assertions of conclusions.
5/ here is the topline assessments: that Putin sought to "denigrate" Clinton, that Putin had "clear preference for Trump" and, when it appeared that Clinton was going to win, sought to "undermine" her presidency. Any of this sound familiar in light of Russiagate hoax? 
6/ Contemplate an equivalent ICA assessment of the IC itself. Could one fairly say:
"We further assess the US Intelligence Community developed a clear preference for Presidential candidate Clinton."
Answer is obvious.
"We further assess the US Intelligence Community developed a clear preference for Presidential candidate Clinton."
Answer is obvious.
7/ /what about this:
"When it appeared to Democrats and U.S. intel community that candidate Trump had won the election, their influence campaign then focused on undermining his presidency."
"When it appeared to Democrats and U.S. intel community that candidate Trump had won the election, their influence campaign then focused on undermining his presidency."
8/ but it's the lack of evidence in ICA which is most frustrating. Plus the interpretation of anything as confirmation of their theories. Look at these two comments on first page. That Putin tried to hep Trump "when possible" by publicly "contrasting her unfavorably". But also
9/ that Putin also "avoided directly praising President-elect Trump" out of concern that it would backfire. This inconsistent piffle is literally within a few lines of each other.
10/ the ICA also expressed concern that Putin and Trump might achieve the "counterterrorism coalition" against ISIS - which, incidentally, was advocated by Flynn. As opposed to de facto alliance by Brennan and Obama admin with AlQaeda for regime change in Syria.
11/ Obama's Dec 29 sanctions against GRU and GRU officials were surgically designed to decapitate Flynn's desired counterterrorism coalition: GRU is MILITARY intelligence, which Flynn's DIA had coordinated with.
12/ the SSCI Report (vol 3, p 38) intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/… stated that both IC and Department of Defense objected to naming GRU (military intelligence) in sanctions order. But this was dismissed by Susan Rice and Obama admin as mere "rice bowl behavior".
13/ readers may recall that Kislyak attempted to raise question of GRU sanctions in his call with Flynn, asking whether GRU sanctions meant that US "isn't willing to work on terrorist threats". (Flynn didn't engage on sanctions issue and FBI didn't ask him about sanctions.)
14/ here is video grab (ignored by US media, grabbed here by Millenial Millie) showing Flynn's concern over AlQaeda-allied jihadis in Syria using chemicals as false flag to get US involved against Syrian government. One big reason why Flynn had to go.
14/ next (3rd) supposed point that Putin and Russian govt had "clear preference" for Trump over Clinton was assertion that Putin had "positive experiences" with leaders whose "business interests made them more disposed" to deal with Russia. Mere pontificating, not evidence
15/ final (4th) supposed support that Putin and Russian govt had "clear preference" for Trump was that "Putin, Russian officials and pro-Kremlin pundits" stopped criticizing unfairness of US election after election. ICA gave no reference for this. In a quick search, I didn't
16/ locate any pre-election criticism by Putin personally of US election as "unfair" (but do not exclude.) Term "pro-Kremlin pundit", as used in US media, can refer to almost anyone. Not irregular for leaders of foreign countries to congratulate election winners. Obama did it
17/ even tho there were only 3 pages on 2016 assessment, within those 3 pages, same phrases were repeated. Here are two instances on same page (pdf,11; page 1) that "Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump"
18/ similarly, the ICA made identical claims on pages 1 and 2 that "influence campaign aspired to help President-elect Trump’s chances of victory when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to the President-elect".
19/ likewise, another repetition where near-identical assertions were made that "influence campaign" was focused on "undermining" anticipated Clinton presidency (page 1) and "undercutting" and "crippling" it (page 2). What was EVIDENCE in ICA for this?
20/ the supposed evidence according to ICA was that Russian diplomats had "denounced US electoral process" and that "pro-Kremlin bloggers had prepared Twitter campaign #DemocracyRIP" anticipating Clinton victory.
21/ I've been unable to locate any contemporary news stories on Google in which Russian diplomats denounced US electoral process. Does anyone know of any?
google.com/search?rlz=1C1…
google.com/search?rlz=1C1…
22/ as to the DemocracyRIP hashtag, a time limited Twitter search doesn't show anything relevant. It's possible, I suppose, that Twitter deleted all the evidence. You'd think that IC would have archived supposed evidence and given reference.
