#TheGambia has filed its reply in US Federal Court to @Facebook’s arguments opposing discovery under §1782 in relation to the #genocide case against #Myanmar at the #ICJ. Here’s a thread summarizing The Gambia’s argument. For Facebook’s argument, see my prior thread (below). 1/17
#TheGambia argues that Facebook wrongly claims its hands are tied by US law, precluding its co-operation. The Gambia’s main argument is that the Stored Communications Act (SCA) (invoked by Facebook) doesn't cover the requests, or, if it does, that statutory exceptions apply. 2/17
First, The Gambia focuses on statutory text to argue that the SCA doesn't apply to foreign governments, its officials or its agents, or to anyone who has engaged in unauthorized use of @Facebook’s platform (i.e., in violation of its own terms). 3/17
According to The Gambia, the statutory history supports this interpretation and shows that Congress did not intend to protect the privacy interests or Fourth Amendment rights of foreign governments/officials (no extraterritoriality). 4/17
Secondly, The Gambia contends that its requests are limited to information that Facebook removed from the platform and preserved, and that the SCA only prohibits divulging communications in ‘temporary electronic storage’ or for purposes of ‘backup protection’. 5/17
According to The Gambia, the fact that Facebook removed content for violating its policies (and made it inaccessible to users) means the requested content is neither in temporary storage nor stored for backup protection (as defined), and thus not subject to SCA protections. 6/17
Thirdly, The Gambia argues that even if the SCA does apply, there are two relevant statutory exceptions that permit @Facebook to disclose the requested materials anyway. #Rohingya#Myanmar 7/17
The first exception (§2702(b)(5)) would, per The Gambia, allow @Facebook to disclose information to protect its own rights or property, which The Gambia suggests means Facebook’s right to protect its own interests by preventing the platform’s misuse for illegal activity. 8/17
The second exception (§2703(b)(3)) permits disclosure by Facebook where a communication was previously made public. The Gambia contends that that no expectation of privacy attaches to material that was publicly posted, which amounts to a waiver/implied consent to disclosure. 9/17
In general, The Gambia’s reply does not deal specifically with whether private communications or drafts on FB that were never made public fall outside the SCA, but it seems to imply that these materials would make up only a tiny slice of the requested material. 10/17
The Gambia then addresses Facebook’s argument that it should seek the requested information through other channels, and that the request is too broad and unworkable. The Gambia gives these arguments short shrift. 11/17
First, The Gambia makes the case that a mutual legal assistance process and the CLOUD Act are cumbersome, and that CLOUD is potentially inapplicable (if SCA doesn't apply). Moreover, The Gambia argues that compliance by Facebook under the CLOUD Act would only be voluntary. 12/17
Secondly, The Gambia rebuts Facebook’s claim that the request isn't narrowly tailored, emphasizing that it seeks material that FB previously identified & acted on. It also asserts that the 2012 timeframe is relevant to proving genocidal intent in relation to 2016-17 events. 13/17
The Gambia also argues that if the Court deems the request too broad, any concerns can be cured, and that privacy concerns could be addressed through a protective order. Since The Gambia’s brief at the #ICJ is due in October, it asks the court act to act quickly. 14/17
My quick take: Based on a first read, several of The Gambia’s textual arguments about the limited scope of the SCA feel strained. I defer to those with SCA expertise, but I have some doubts about whether the Court will accept this narrow reading. 15/17
Also, while pursuing the material through a state-to-state process or the CLOUD Act exception may be cumbersome, it’s not clear that this is in itself a persuasive argument in support of the proposition that the scope of the SCA restrictions should be construed narrowly. 16/17
However, the argument that the SCA doesn’t prevent @Facebook from disclosing public content that it took down (which #TheGambia says ‘forms virtually all of the subpoenaed information’) looks stronger—and may be the clearest path to compelling some disclosure under §1782. -END-
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There’s a lot of buzz about announced plans by Australia, Canada, Germany & Netherlands to jointly sue #Afghanistan at the International Court of Justice (@CIJ_ICJ) for alleged violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman (#CEDAW).
As far as I know, this would mark only the second time that a state has sought to base ICJ jurisdiction on CEDAW art 29. But the @guardian piece about the announcement appears to be a bit mixed up about how this will work. theguardian.com/world/2024/sep…
CEDAW art 29 requires the state bringing a case about a CEDAW dispute to first attempt to settle the dispute by negotiation. If negotiations fail, that state must request ad hoc arbitration (not by the ICJ). This triggers the six-month period referred to in the article.
This @BBCNews piece addresses recent confusion about the term ‘plausibility’ in ICJ decisions: . It mostly gets this right; the ICJ refers formally to plausibility of 'rights’ rather than ‘claims’. But there is some lingering confusion here. 1/8bbc.com/news/articles/…
The article discusses a debate within the UK about whether the ICJ's January order—in which the ICJ found the rights at issue to be plausible AND a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to those rights—meant it was incorrect to refer to a ‘plausible risk of genocide’. 2/8
The article describes this as a debate about whether the ICJ ‘was convinced there was a risk of that happening’. But is THAT really what the debate was about? The January order made it very clear that the ICJ saw a real risk of Genocide Convention violations *going forward*. 3/8
South Africa returns to the #ICJ once again seeking urgent provisional measures against #Israel. The request asks the ICJ to order Israel to immediately withdraw and cease the offensive in Rafah and relinquish control of the Rafah & Kerem Shalom crossings to allow in aid. 1/14
Very strong language: SA describes the #Rafah assault as ‘killing the Palestinian people of Gaza, while Israel is simultaneously starving them, and deliberately denying them humanitarian aid and the basic necessities of life’ (¶19). 2/14
The focus of the request is on how new facts (namely the Rafah assault & shutting down humanitarian aid entry points) amounts to a new urgent risk of irreparable prejudice harm to the rights at issue in the case. 3/14
Re Judge Donoghue's @BBCHARDtalk interview: I realize this won't satisfy many people, but there is a difference between saying (1) that the ICJ did not decide that claims of genocide are plausible (what she said) and (2) that the Court decided that such claims are NOT plausible.
The ICJ did NOT reject South Africa's genocide claims or declare than implausible (this is consistent with Judge Donoghue's remarks). One could instead think about this (i.e., plausibility of the *claim*) as a question the Court did not need to decide in granting interim relief.
What gets lost is that the ICJ found a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the plausible rights of Palestinians in Gaza. This is forward looking. This can be reasonably construed as a finding that S. Africa established a plausible risk of genocide *going forward*.
Having now had the chance to read the Day 2 transcript in #Nicaragua v #Germany, I think Nicaragua may come up empty at the #ICJ. Not because the law means that Nicaragua’s claims are fundamentally flawed or inadmissible, but because the facts, it appears, are on Germany’s side.
Germany’s argument on prima facie jurisdiction (plus Monetary Gold) was not wholly convincing. The key difference b/w claims based on existence of a serious risk of IHL violations/genocide versus claims requiring prior establishment of violations was too easily brushed aside.
That said, I would not discount Germany’s arguments about Nicaragua’s alleged failure to have established the existence of a dispute prior to bringing the case. This case may (unhelpfully?) demonstrate why the dispute requirement (which I strongly dislike) has some merit.
In response to #SouthAfrica’s request of 6 March 2024 & the deteriorating situation in #Gaza, the #ICJ has modified the provisional measures that it indicated against #Israel on 26 January. Here are some key points and observations on the decision and the separate opinions.🧵1/20
What has the ICJ ordered Israel to do? By unanimous vote, the Court directed Israel to take all necessary and effective measures to ensure unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed aid and basic services, including by increasing the number of land crossing points. 2/20
By 15-1, the Court ordered Israel to ensure that its military does not commit acts which violate the rights of Palestinians in Gaza as a protected group under the Genocide Convention, including by preventing delivery of humanitarian aid. 3/20