#Russia| Alexei Navalny is the leader of the Russian opposition party and an anti-corruption activist. Navalny is also a critic of Putin and his government.
The targeting & killing of AQ #1 in a Kabul safe-house raises a number of questions for me.
1. This type of targeted strike by the CIA needs needs massive amounts of intel. SIGINT & IMINT (usually from drones), and HUMINT (informants). Talibs? 2/
Should it come as a surprise that the AQ #1 is found in Kabul? Just one year after the chaotic and tragic withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan (Biden), and a complete capitulation of power to the Taliban (generated by Trump at Doha) 3/
Reminder, the reason for the U.S commencing kinetic activity in Afghanistan was post 9/11 and to eradicate AQ training camps from Afghan. The efficacy of the strategy was poor as most senior AQ operatives fled across the porous PAK border (Bin Laden). 4/
Gut wrenching. Key point: a #NFZ wouldn’t prevent this. There are 2 main air operations: Defensive Counter Air (DCA) & Offensive Counter Air, Surface Attack (SA). An NFZ comes under DCA. 2/
To target RU rockets/artillery *inside Ukraine* you need Close Air Support (CAS), a subset of Offensive Counter Air Surface Attack (OCA SA) missions. 3/
#Ukraine| thread here by @aldin_ww showing RU Su-25 Frogfoot ac ultra-low level over Donetsk. The Frogfoot is a RU Close Air Support platform [CAS], and an old one - 1975. And from what I can see, the pair are manoeuvring over Donetsk in what looks like a show of force 2/
Cont’d: the pair have no precision guided munitions (PGMs). Just rocket pods and dumb bomb pylons. This recent video below is one of the Su-25s that took a MANPADs to its rear. There’s a number of takeaways from these videos. 3/
3. #Ukraine| the U.S, U.K and other NATO partners are well versed in CAS using multiple modern platforms and PGM weaponry to degrade the enemy. The U.K have been using Typhoon w/ Paveway 500lb PGMs, and Storm Shadow (inertial nav missiles) in N.Iraq. F-35 now in the mix. 4/5.
Agree w/ @jensstoltenberg. If the aim is to disrupt and deter RU use of Ukraine airspace, Stinger is your option. Lots of them, closely monitored by SF. Benefits?
1. Air Crews are shit scared of Stinger which has superior counter counter measures. 2/
When I flew in Iraq and Afghanistan, even the idea of MANPADs being part of our threat, created all sorts of additional protocols. And Stinger, that’s a nightmare. As soon as a RU ac is taken out by Stinger, RU aircrews’ morale will head south. 3/
The logistical tail of creating a 24/7 NFZ is huge. Where will the NATO ac be located? Baltic Air Policing is based out of Lithuania and Estonia. If based out of there, tanking will be required, and you risk Putin striking the bases. Escalation. 4/
War is brutal. It shows you sadness and despair that stays with you forever, no matter how good life might get in the future. If they are extremely lucky, they’ll walk away with their limbs in tact. But mentally, they are likely to be haunted. #Ukraine 2/
2. #Ukraine| I do admire them. It’s an unnecessary fight for national survival. The alternative isn’t any better - living under Putin. But the following days, weeks, and months will rely on a lot of luck and organic judgement. 3 days training gives them next to nothing. 3/
3. #Ukraine| while just a few hours away from Kyiv, in London, Paris, Madrid, Berlin and other major European capitals, we in the West go about our days pretty much as normal, these young lads will be embarking on a journey with low odds of survival. 4/
Just look at city’s like Aleppo in Syria to learn no one wins from this. But the civilian population loses desperately. It will take decades to reconstruct. Kharkiv’s citizens will be displaced, forced to find a new life. Then vilified for hoping to find a better life 😞#Ukraine
2. #Ukraine| evidence suggesting Putin is using cluster munitions in #Kharkiv.
The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CMs) was established in 2010. It bans the munition & requires member countries to clear areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants within 10 years 3/