@randypicker discussion of static monopolization in #Fortnite v Apple displays substantial parallels with the problems faced by antitrust towards tacit collusion 1/n
That is: should antitrust law deem unlawful business coordination without an explicit act of collusion? 2/n
Or put differently, should antitrust law affirm liability towards firms that have not sinned by commission, but which occupy a market that has evolved into a monopoly or tight oligopoly? 3/n
And should terms and conditions that were lawful initially - when the App store launched - become unlawful simply as a result of a long term and incremental change in market structure? 4/n
Article 102 TFEU is more open to such a theory, bc it reputes illegal acts that are ordinarily lawful from all firms as soon as they are practiced by a dominant firm 5/n
By contrast, under section 2, liability is triggered if monopoly is the predictable *outcome* of some act, conduct or course of action 6/n
Put differently, the dependent variable for liability in article 102 TFEU is market structure 7/n
While under section 2, the dependent variable for liability is business conduct 8/n
Back to tacit collusion: there are 2 classic objections to liability against tacit collusion. First, it’s unfair to sanction firms for strictly rational behavior. Two it’s unpractical to order them to behave irrationally. 9/n
In both cases structure is the culprit, not conduct. But ... Richard Posner has shown these objections do not withstand close scrutiny. And they seem less compelling in a single firm conduct case. Why couldn’t Apple decrease prices or relax rules agst platform bypass? 10/n
There’s no strong IP, so not really unfair. And pressuring down the price is perhaps unpractical, but not impossible 11/n
One distinction with tacit collusion cases lies in efficiencies, bc returns to scale and network effects are more important in Apple’s case than in a tacit collusion one 12/n
Dunno if any of this makes sense but go read @randypicker great thread - END

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More from @CompetitionProf

29 May
Long & geeky thread on yesterday @EUCourtPress judgment that annuls the @EUCommission decision that blocked the merger between Telefónica UK & Hutchison 3G merger (T-399/16) 1/n.
In a nutshell, this is a judgment on the *substantiality* of the market power effects required to enjoin a merger 2/n.
Today's reading confirms the main take from yest: not all market power effects from mergers give rise to merger liability 3/n
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