1. According to the macro-models used by the European Commission itself to assess the new 2030 climate target, the answer is: NO. At best, the EC economy would expand by 0.5% due to increased climate ambition.
2. This is not surprising. Other studies have illustrated that the macroeconomic effect of Green New Deals is likely to be small (around +0.1% of annual GDP growth according the literature review conducted by Gueret et al, 2019) newforum.org/climate/on-the…
3. For the time being (but deeper analysis will come) I would then still stick to my Oct 2019 point 👇 bruegel.org/2019/10/coming…
4. To be politically sustainable in the long-run, policymakers must be honest about the nature of the Green Deal and not over-promise on the growth aspect. Saving our climate is already an important mission, let's focus on this and ensure the process is as smooth as possible. END
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NEW🚨Europe's energy situation is today much more comfortable than many of us could have expected just a few months ago. But we are not out of the woods. We need to start now preparing for next winter. Our new study provides no-regret options to do so 🧵 bruegel.org/policy-brief/e…
1. The EU has so far weathered the energy crisis and will manage winter 2022/23 even if Russia abruptly halts all pipeline gas flows. However, preparations must be made for winter 2023-24. In particular, gas storage facilities should be 90 percent full by 1 October 2023.
2. Assuming limited Russian exports continue, and weather conditions are typical, demand up to 1 October 2023 must remain 13% lower than the previous five-year average. The EU should therefore extend its demand-reduction target, which is currently set to expire on 31 March 2023.
EU leaders took some important decisions during the night. A short thread to distill the key elements and reflect on their implications (1/6)
For the first time, European countries will jointly procure gas. Mandatory demand pooling for at least 15% of their gas storage filling needs next year, to better navigate the difficult waters of a tight global LNG market. /2
At the same time, EU will develop a new gas price benchmark, to reflect the new reality of the decoupling from pipeline Russian gas and the renewed role of LNG in Europe's gas supply architecture. /3
NEW🚨What energy policy actions have EU governments undertaken to tackle the crisis? This new @Bruegel_org dataset provides a first overview of policies to promote gas diversification, fuel switching, energy savings, renewables and efficiency. THREAD 1/10
RU invasion of UA has profoundly reoriented energy policy in Europe. Mainly thanks to the dedicated work of my colleagues @GSgaravatti & @CeciliaTrasi, we can now offer a clear picture of what’s really happening in the field. Any comment/suggestion is warmly appreciated! 2/10
Gas supply deals. Italy is by far the country that signed more new gas supply deals, also due to its established energy relationships with several African suppliers. Other countries – such as Germany – have so far not secured substantial deals. 3/10
The European Commission will unveil on Tuesday a new package of legal proposals to tackle high energy prices. @johnainger and @E_Krukowska had a first look at the draft document. Here below a summary of they points to be expected 👇
🟢Temporary dynamic price limit for TTF transactions.
🟢Temporary intra-day price spike cap mechanism to avoid extreme volatility in energy derivative markets.
🟢New benchmark for LNG to be started by end-2022, to be ready for 2023 gas storage filling season.
🔴No extension of the Iberian price cap model to Europe.
🟢Measures to boost liquidity in energy markets by increasing the clearing threshold for non-financial counterparties to EUR 4 bn and broadening the list of eligible assets that could be used as collateral for one year.
Gas price cap🇪🇺President von der Leyen just confirmed in the European Parliament that the EU might temporarily agree on a price cap on gas used in electricity generation. (the "Iberian model"). This would be a mistake for at least 3 reasons.
1⃣ The Iberian exception has incentivised gas consumption. A broad application of this approach to the EU would likely increase gas prices, to the detriment of industrial consumers that use gas directly rather than via electricity.
2⃣ The Iberian approach could lead to the export of subsidised electricity to countries that are not paying for the subsidy. To mitigate this problem, all member states would need to have a similar level of subsidisation of the gas. But will they?
Here are the 4 key measures just agreed by EU energy ministers🇪🇺
1. Electricity demand reduction. Voluntary reduction target of 10% of gross electricity consumption and a mandatory reduction target of 5% of the electricity consumption in peak hours.
2. Cap on market revenues for inframarginals. Cap of market revenues at 180 euros/MWh for RES, nuclear, lignite electricity generators, including intermediaries. Member states agreed to use measures of their choice to collect and redirect revenues towards final customers.