Mike Becker Profile picture
Sep 23, 2020 20 tweets 6 min read Read on X
A few points of note on the #ICJ’s order deciding to appoint experts on the question of #reparations in #DRC v #Uganda, which is available here: icj-cij.org/files/case-rel… 1/19
Recall that in its 2005(!) judgment, the Court found that Uganda bore responsibility for unlawful use of force, unlawful intervention, atrocities inflicted upon the Congolese that violated IHRL and IHL, and the unlawful exploitation of natural resources. #ArmedActivities 2/19
For its part, the DRC bore responsibility for attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel and for other conduct in breach of #VCDR obligations (but this will not be the subject of the expert opinion). 3/19
The DRC and Uganda have ostensibly been negotiating a financial settlement for years, taking into account each party’s obligation to make reparation to the other. When this failed, the DRC asked the Court in 2015 to reopen the proceedings to decide the reparations question. 4/19
The parties spent over two years briefing the Court. A hearing was scheduled for March 2019, then postponed twice at the parties’ request as they tried to reach an agreement. When negotiations stalled, the Court decided in April 2020 to schedule a hearing for early 2021. 5/19
In July 2020, the Court decided that some of the estimates and figures submitted by DRC raised questions 'of a technical nature' that merited expert advice & that it would proceed under Article 50 of the Statute and Article 67 of the Rules to commission an expert opinion. 6/19
The expert opinion will address three heads of damage: (a) the extent of loss of life on DRC territory and compensation due; (2) loss of natural resources and its valuation; and (3) property damage by Ugandan forces and its valuation. Uganda’s own claims are not covered. 7/19
Uganda has objected to the Court’s proposal, arguing that it would relieve the DRC of having to prove its claims, and that there is no evidence for the experts to assess. Unsurprisingly, the DRC favoured the Court’s idea. 8/19
Note that Judge Sebutinde (from Uganda) wrote separately to object. In her view, the case doesn’t raise complex issues that require knowledge ‘outside the realm of normal judicial expertise’. Her opinion suggests a pretty narrow view of what constitutes technical knowledge. 9/19
The Court’s Order reiterates that arranging for the expert opinion does not prejudge the question of reparations and that the parties will have the chance to adduce and challenge evidence and examine the experts during an oral hearing. That should be very interesting. 10/19
The opinion will be entrusted to four independent experts (the number may be an effort to promote consensus). It remains unclear who these individual experts will be or what precise type of expertise the Court needs or seeks. The Court will hear from the parties on this. 11/19
The terms of reference pose specific questions: How many civilian deaths in DRC were caused by the armed conflict? What was ‘scale of compensation’ due for an individual death based on ‘prevailing practice’ in the DRC? One might ask why that should be the benchmark. 12/19
Next question: What quantity of natural resources (gold, diamond, timber, etc) was unlawfully exploited and what value should be assigned to the harm suffered by the DRC? This undoubtedly raises difficult questions, including what valuation methodology to adopt & apply. 13/19
Another question: What number and type of properties (homes, schools, hospitals) were damaged or destroyed by Ugandan forces in DRC and what is the approximate cost of rebuilding? Not clear if this means the cost now or then. 14/19
The Court directs the experts to address the quantification questions (how many deaths, how much gold) based on the case file, including UN reports mentioned in the 2005 judgment. Presumably, this means the experts cannot engage in additional fact-finding on those points. 15/19
In principle, this should address the concerns raised by Uganda & Judge Sebutinde that the Court is helping the DRC to meet its burden. Are the experts implicitly being asked to evaluate the DRC’s own counting methodology? This could justify outside expertise in my view. 16/19
In terms of valuation questions, on the other hand, the terms of reference seem to leave it open to the experts to look outside the case file (although they would presumably be addressing the parties’ valuation arguments). Compare Corfu Channel. 17/19
In sum, this is a fascinating #ICJ development. The parties would be well advised to recruit their own experts who can weigh in on the methodological choices of the Court’s expert panel, including where estimates and valuations may rely on stated and unstated assumptions. 18/19
The validity of objections by Uganda/J Sebutinde cannot really be assessed until DRC's arguments & calculations are made public. But, overall, the Court's approach may set an important precedent in how the ICJ & other courts deal with #reparation for mass atrocity, full stop. END
As @danielcpeat rightly points out, the Court's order also refers to publicly available documents, which suggests that there is scope for a degree of fact-finding by the experts on these questions.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Mike Becker

Mike Becker Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @mabecker17

May 16
This @BBCNews piece addresses recent confusion about the term ‘plausibility’ in ICJ decisions: . It mostly gets this right; the ICJ refers formally to plausibility of 'rights’ rather than ‘claims’. But there is some lingering confusion here. 1/8bbc.com/news/articles/…
The article discusses a debate within the UK about whether the ICJ's January order—in which the ICJ found the rights at issue to be plausible AND a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to those rights—meant it was incorrect to refer to a ‘plausible risk of genocide’. 2/8
The article describes this as a debate about whether the ICJ ‘was convinced there was a risk of that happening’. But is THAT really what the debate was about? The January order made it very clear that the ICJ saw a real risk of Genocide Convention violations *going forward*. 3/8
Read 8 tweets
May 10
South Africa returns to the #ICJ once again seeking urgent provisional measures against #Israel. The request asks the ICJ to order Israel to immediately withdraw and cease the offensive in Rafah and relinquish control of the Rafah & Kerem Shalom crossings to allow in aid. 1/14
Very strong language: SA describes the #Rafah assault as ‘killing the Palestinian people of Gaza, while Israel is simultaneously starving them, and deliberately denying them humanitarian aid and the basic necessities of life’ (¶19). 2/14
The focus of the request is on how new facts (namely the Rafah assault & shutting down humanitarian aid entry points) amounts to a new urgent risk of irreparable prejudice harm to the rights at issue in the case. 3/14
Read 14 tweets
Apr 26
Re Judge Donoghue's @BBCHARDtalk interview: I realize this won't satisfy many people, but there is a difference between saying (1) that the ICJ did not decide that claims of genocide are plausible (what she said) and (2) that the Court decided that such claims are NOT plausible.
The ICJ did NOT reject South Africa's genocide claims or declare than implausible (this is consistent with Judge Donoghue's remarks). One could instead think about this (i.e., plausibility of the *claim*) as a question the Court did not need to decide in granting interim relief.
What gets lost is that the ICJ found a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the plausible rights of Palestinians in Gaza. This is forward looking. This can be reasonably construed as a finding that S. Africa established a plausible risk of genocide *going forward*.
Read 5 tweets
Apr 9
Having now had the chance to read the Day 2 transcript in #Nicaragua v #Germany, I think Nicaragua may come up empty at the #ICJ. Not because the law means that Nicaragua’s claims are fundamentally flawed or inadmissible, but because the facts, it appears, are on Germany’s side.
Germany’s argument on prima facie jurisdiction (plus Monetary Gold) was not wholly convincing. The key difference b/w claims based on existence of a serious risk of IHL violations/genocide versus claims requiring prior establishment of violations was too easily brushed aside.
That said, I would not discount Germany’s arguments about Nicaragua’s alleged failure to have established the existence of a dispute prior to bringing the case. This case may (unhelpfully?) demonstrate why the dispute requirement (which I strongly dislike) has some merit.
Read 7 tweets
Mar 28
In response to #SouthAfrica’s request of 6 March 2024 & the deteriorating situation in #Gaza, the #ICJ has modified the provisional measures that it indicated against #Israel on 26 January. Here are some key points and observations on the decision and the separate opinions.🧵1/20
What has the ICJ ordered Israel to do? By unanimous vote, the Court directed Israel to take all necessary and effective measures to ensure unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed aid and basic services, including by increasing the number of land crossing points. 2/20
By 15-1, the Court ordered Israel to ensure that its military does not commit acts which violate the rights of Palestinians in Gaza as a protected group under the Genocide Convention, including by preventing delivery of humanitarian aid. 3/20
Read 20 tweets
Jan 26
The #ICJ will issue its decision on #SouthAfrica’s request for provisional measures against #Israel starting at 1 pm today in The Hague. If you are watching the live feed at UN Web TV (), here are some key points to look out for. 🧵tinyurl.com/5n6m94px
Preliminary point: The ICJ will not make any determination today about whether Israel’s actions in #Gaza amount to genocide. This is a question for the merits phase. This decision is about protecting the rights at issue while the case is pending.
First, has SA met the threshold test for the ICJ to issue provisional measures (PMs)? Points of interest: 1. Has South Africa established that a bilateral dispute about the Genocide Convention existed between it and Israel prior to filing the case? This goes to jurisdiction.
Read 11 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(