So, a little thread on the challenges we face in #Brexit Round 9 and Boris’ backfiring IM Bill.
Despite (or perhaps, because of) the collapse in trust due to the IM Bill, a deal between the EU and UK can still be done. But it will come at a cost. And BJ will have to pay it.
/1
EU has made it clear it wont freeze FTA talks in response to the IM Bill. ‘Parallelism’ does not apply regarding implementation of NI Protocol. But EU27 will consider legal action once their deadline expires later this week.
/2
But BJ may anticipate this, and "want" it.
Nothing says “I’m tough on Brussels” than being sued by EU lawyers.
/3
So talks may continue, while legal steps are taken over the IM Bill.
The UK knows EU27 will only sign an FTA if the sensitive bits of UKIM are removed. But the EU knows the reverse is true as well: HMG can only withdraw the sensitive bits once an EU-UK deal has been agreed.
/4
And even a “thin” EU-UK deal with a pact on state aid has the benefit of making most of the sensitive parts of the IM Bill superfluous.
(No need to charge GB-NI tariffs when you have a zero-tariff deal)
/5
So, it’s in BJ’s interest to wait till after a deal emerges before adapting the IM Bill, so he can claim “My threat to violate international law has forced the EU to give me my FTA.”
(p.s. any legal procedures over the IM Bill will stretch beyond 31/12/2020.)
/6
The Finance Bill or a UK intention to leave the European Convention on Human Rights could add extra fireworks. But essentially the same dynamic could apply.
/7
So a positive reading of current developments is that this is all about creating a smoke screen for the Ultras at home.
Showing them, BJ means business.
While actually preparing the ground for concessions.
/8
At the negotiating table, if BJ wants a deal, he will have to move closer to the EU27 -- on state aid, LPF and governance – than the EU27 will move to him.
/9
This is perhaps why HMG has been briefing last week it is keen to go into “the tunnel”.
The tunnel is a place so dark, it won’t be immediately clear that BJ has made any concessions. In other words, it’s all about duping the ERG.
/10
With the negotiating teams navigating their way thru the tunnel, it won’t be immediately clear what U-turns BJ has made, giving BJ time to massage the Ultras in his party.
No surprise that some in the ERG are worried.
/11
This is why Brexiteers, like Steve Baker, have expressed concern that BJ’s IM Bill might be a prelude to a conciliatory move towards Brussels.
He may well be right.
After all, they know BJ has done this before.
/12
But alas, alas, because trust in the UK has collapsed in recent weeks, the EU27 have indicated they want clearer signals that BJ is ready to move in their direction before entering "The Tunnel."
This would suggest his IM Bill smoke screen may have hopelessly backfired.
/13
There are other reasons to be pessimistic.
BJ may not make a U-turn, not because he doesn’t want to, but because he can’t.
/14
Some say BJ needs a deal because his backbenchers are concerned about his handling of Covid19 and the economy, and the Tories are worried about Labour getting a boost (see recent polls).
To me this overlooks an important point.
/15
Given what BJ & Frost have been promising backbenchers for the past year, it seems like a bit of a stretch to assume those same backbenchers will be thrilled about BJ signing up to EU LPF guidelines & state aid.
/16
If backbenchers are angry with him now over Covid19, imagine their fury once he turns the UK into an LPF rule-taker.
Besides, the EU will now insist on tougher governance safeguards/ dispute settlement to underpin a deal. Again, the IM Bill smokescreen will have backfired.
/17
Given this, politically, for BJ the easy route might be No Deal.
Especially if BJ thinks a No Deal can be kept short.
(After all, we all know ‘No Deal’ won’t be the end of EU-UK talks, right? The uncertainty is over how long the No Deal intermezzo will be.)
/18
If he can keep No Deal short and sharp, BJ might bet that the economic disruption caused will silence the Ultras, and he can return to the negotiating table a freer man.
/19
He might bet wrong (and Cummings might be right), and the pain and disruption of No Deal is less than expected, and he’ll be all the happier for it. Hoorah!
But of course, if No Deal is long and painful, he’ll pay a political price.
/20
Assuming BJ wants a deal, this would be a tremendously risky bet, but he may see no other option.
There is of course another possibility, and that is the Ivan Rogers hypothesis that BJ actually doesn’t want a deal, and all this is about managing the blame game.
/21
The point is, there is little the EU27 can do about all this.
In fact, the EU’s ‘escalation’ in response to the IM Bill may be precisely what BJ wants.
Once again, Brexit will be determined not by dynamics in the EU, but by dynamics in and around No.10.
Happy Round 9!
/N
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We have a new Dutch 🇳🇱 coalition agreement!
Here are some highlights with an international/ EU dimension:
Defence
- Continued military, political & financial support for #Ukraine
- Legally enshrine 2% defence spending
- Support for NL & European defence industry
/1
Migration
- NL will seek opt-out for (parts of) European asylum/migration policy, and will discuss setting up mini-Schengen’s in times of crisis
- NL will work with EU members to externalise migration policy to 3rd countries
/2
Migration (cont'd)
- NL will seek limits to freedom of movement for new EU members (i.e. same thing that happened in 2004)
- Various measures to dissuade migration, including fewer international students in Bachelors programmes, except technical studies
/3
1) EU's timing was totally off, at least if it wanted a positive response frm London. Perhaps BXL's timing had more to do w VDL extending a hand to the UK at the end of her term. In any case it had little to do with political realities in London
/1
This suggests either VDL came up with the idea herself, or she was poorly advised by @PedroSerranoEU's team in London (which I don’t believe as they are highly competent)
Is there another option?
/2
@PedroSerranoEU .@anandMenon1 suggests here that the Commission wanted to pre-empt bilateral efforts by individual member-states
Plausible. Tho I haven’t heard many Europeans talk about bilateral deals with the UK on visas and youth mobility (aside from the French)
/3 theguardian.com/politics/2024/…
"As a result of the staggering implementation failures of the past six years, we have so far borne the costs of leaving the EU - the majority of which were the result of a choice by vindictive European protectionists...
/2
"...rather than the necessary outcome of leaving - while only enjoying a small fraction of the possible benefits."
Interesting perspective: trade barriers r blamed on 'European protectionists' instead of the logical outcome of leaving an internal market. But OK.
Or rather, I read @stephenfry’s highly enjoyable version “Troy”
Here are a couple of points with some relevance to today’s war in #Ukraine
A short 🧵(with some classical art)
/1
Who is to blame for the war, and at what point did it become inevitable?
Was it the Trojan abduction of Helen, the judgement of Paris, the lottery Odysseus organised, Paris’ and Antimachus' undermining of the Greek ultimatum?...
/2
Or was it the challenge Troy presented to Agamemnon’s hegemony as “king of men”....
... or the Greek pursuit of Troy’s spoils?
In the case of Russia vs Ukraine, we also see multiple reasons being debated, some more realistic than others.
If the West doesn’t want to get directly involved in Ukraine, it has two options:
-Arm Ukraine
-Use economic tools of coercion (sanctions)
We are doing the first. But the second remains tricky.
Some thoughts on economic sanctions.
A thread. 🧵
/1
If you are serious about using sanctions as a tool, you also accept harming your own economy.
Imposing sanctions ALWAYS means striking a balance between the amount of economic pain you are willing to absorb versus the amount of economic pain you can inflict on the other.
/2
Examples.
Personal sanctions are relatively painless; their impact is also limited.
Prohibiting sales of luxury goods is bad for oligarchs and bad for LVMH, but probably won’t lead to a change in behaviour either.