Rem Korteweg Profile picture
Senior Fellow @clingendaelorg, PhD. Europe - Foreign Policy - Trade - Security - Transatlantic - UK/EU Warning, may tweet in Dutch! All tweets personal, obvs
@littlegravitas@c.im 🇺🇦 🇪🇺 🇮🇱 🇵🇸 #FBPE Profile picture andrew101 Profile picture Rick Page Profile picture 3 subscribed
Apr 20 9 tweets 2 min read
What does this mess teach us?

1) EU's timing was totally off, at least if it wanted a positive response frm London. Perhaps BXL's timing had more to do w VDL extending a hand to the UK at the end of her term. In any case it had little to do with political realities in London
/1 This suggests either VDL came up with the idea herself, or she was poorly advised by @PedroSerranoEU's team in London (which I don’t believe as they are highly competent)

Is there another option?

/2
Aug 25, 2022 11 tweets 3 min read
This piece by @AllisterHeath is quite something.

Almost like he's applying to be Liz Truss' communications director.

A couple of quotes (because, you know, paywall...)

/1


telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/08/2… 1. Brexit hasn't been properly "done":

"As a result of the staggering implementation failures of the past six years, we have so far borne the costs of leaving the EU - the majority of which were the result of a choice by vindictive European protectionists...

/2
Aug 22, 2022 14 tweets 6 min read
I just finished re-reading the #Iliad

Or rather, I read @stephenfry’s highly enjoyable version “Troy”

Here are a couple of points with some relevance to today’s war in #Ukraine

A short 🧵(with some classical art)

/1 Image Who is to blame for the war, and at what point did it become inevitable?

Was it the Trojan abduction of Helen, the judgement of Paris, the lottery Odysseus organised, Paris’ and Antimachus' undermining of the Greek ultimatum?...

/2 Image
Apr 18, 2022 19 tweets 5 min read
If the West doesn’t want to get directly involved in Ukraine, it has two options:

-Arm Ukraine
-Use economic tools of coercion (sanctions)

We are doing the first. But the second remains tricky.

Some thoughts on economic sanctions.

A thread. 🧵

/1
If you are serious about using sanctions as a tool, you also accept harming your own economy.

Imposing sanctions ALWAYS means striking a balance between the amount of economic pain you are willing to absorb versus the amount of economic pain you can inflict on the other.

/2
Mar 2, 2021 10 tweets 4 min read
We hebben de #Verkiezingen2021 programma's van de 13 grootste partijen doorgelicht op de buitenland standpunten. Dit is het resultaat.

Verwarrend? Valt wel mee: hoe groter en donkerder de bol, hoe meer ambitie op het onderwerp. (Leeg = geen info in het programma).

/1 Op 9 vraagstukken laten de programma's zich goed vergelijken:

1. meer EU?
2. uitbreiding EU?
3. Europese economische onafhankelijkheid?
4. handelsverdragen?
5. arbeidsmigratie?
6. OS-budget?
7. band met VS/ NAVO?
8. Europese defensiesamenwerking?
9. Defensie budget?

/2
Jan 10, 2021 12 tweets 3 min read
On March 17, the Netherlands will have general elections.

Two parties - PVV & FVD - want a Nexit, a departure from the EU, in line with Brexit.

As the reality of the EU-UK trade agreement kicks in, let's take a look at what these parties want.

/1


theguardian.com/politics/2021/… Firstly, good to note, here is their recent polling,

PVV: 14% - 23 seats (currently 20 seats)
FVD: 2.5% - 4 seats (currently 2 seats)

A government needs 76 seats to govern.

Give or take, these parties appeal to about 20% of the electorate.

/2
Dec 6, 2020 8 tweets 2 min read
Important points in David's Sunday morning rant.

There is no meaningful political discussion in Parliament about the impact of No Deal.

There is no public push-back against No Deal from cabinet ministers, who know better.

It is taken as fact that the EU is bad.

/1 In that context, how can Boris Johnson move to compromise on LPF, governance and fish.

And so, Johnson is now among the least popular Tory politicians, as seen by Tories.

/2


Dec 3, 2020 12 tweets 3 min read
Dinsdag en/of woensdag komt de Taxation Bill in het Britse parlement.

De wet komt in de kritieke eindfase van de #Brexit onderhandelingen.

Waarom is de wet zo belangrijk?

Deze wet kan een volgende schending van het Noord-Ierse Protocol betekenen (na de IM Bill).

/1 VK wil met de wet eenzijdig kunnen bepalen of Britse export naar N-Ierland aan tarieven onderhevig is, of niet.

Maar in het exit-verdrag is besloten dat EU & VK dit samen gaan bepalen.

Goederen die eenmaal in Belfast zijn aangekomen, mogen vrij doorgaan, de EU in.

/2
Nov 12, 2020 8 tweets 3 min read
"The Caribbean doppelgänger of the Irish border"

This story about Anguilla & #Brexit is fascinating and underreported.

And relevant for 🇳🇱.

Why? Anguilla and its citizens rely HEAVILY on Sint Maarten and St Eustatius, both are Dutch municipalities

/1


mycountryeurope.com/politics/brexi… Anguilla: pop. 14.000, is a British Overseas Territory

It gets 90% of its fuel (which it needs for energy and fresh water) from St Eustatius.

Main travel hub is Sint Maarten. It has the only airport for long-haul flights.

FR-administered Saint-Martin is the medical hub.

/2
Sep 27, 2020 22 tweets 4 min read
So, a little thread on the challenges we face in #Brexit Round 9 and Boris’ backfiring IM Bill.

Despite (or perhaps, because of) the collapse in trust due to the IM Bill, a deal between the EU and UK can still be done. But it will come at a cost. And BJ will have to pay it.

/1
EU has made it clear it wont freeze FTA talks in response to the IM Bill. ‘Parallelism’ does not apply regarding implementation of NI Protocol. But EU27 will consider legal action once their deadline expires later this week.

/2
Sep 25, 2020 10 tweets 4 min read
Great thread on the Kent permit.

Now how does it work on the other side of the North Sea?

/1 The Port of Rotterdam (incl ferries at Hook of Holland and Vlaardingen) uses its @Portbase system as a “digital border”.

For export to UK, it’s mandatory to pre-notify all customs documents through this system. Before arriving at the Port.

portbase.com/en/services/no…

/2
Sep 21, 2020 12 tweets 8 min read
The Netherlands is traditionally one of America's staunchest allies. Atlanticism runs deep.

But what does the Dutch population think of today's transatlantic relations, European strategic autonomy, and a 'Cold War' with China?

We took the Dutch pulse. (N = 23.000)

THREAD /1 The Dutch are pivoting to 'more Europe'.

72% of the Dutch population support deeper cooperation with France & Germany, in light of Brexit and Trump's America First policies.

/2
Sep 2, 2020 4 tweets 2 min read
Good resumé of Barnier's comments at a very good @iiea event.

Barnier also repeated that implementation of the WA is "only way to prevent hard border" in Ireland and "preserve integrity of SM."

/1 Barnier: "encouraging steps" have been taken by @michaelgove, but EU must be sure that EU customs codes is implemented "in its entirety" and that "all necessary controls on live animals and animal-derived products" arriving in NI from GB are in place

(NI-GB border, anyone?)

/2
Sep 1, 2020 4 tweets 3 min read
If there is a mini-shuffle, if, then who could take the trade portfolio?

Given trade's importance (here, truly, the EU can wield its power), it has to be a Commissioner with a strong profile.

If not Dombrovskis (who has it now ad interim)...

/1 .@vestager would be fantastic. She's also had the competition file for 6 years. Time for a change? Renew would Rejoice.

or @TimmermansEU. Somewhat invisible on Green Deal. His knowledge of climate policy wd help push Commission ambition to connect climate & trade. Plus...

/2
Aug 26, 2020 7 tweets 2 min read
Lots of buzz re Tony Abbott's role as post-Brexit UK trade advisor. (Be sure to read @DavidHenigUK's hot-take)

Aside from his earlier embrace of No Deal (he wrote a piece called "No Deal? No problem!") it's striking this role is given to a non-Brit

/1


theguardian.com/australia-news… Why is this striking? After all, UK is open-minded Global Britain.

Well, I recall European EU (trade) experts being kept at arms-length from advising HMG after the #Brexit referendum.

For fear they might be double-agents advising the Other Side. Only Brits Allowed!

/2
Aug 21, 2020 13 tweets 7 min read
For @AIGemea #GlobalTradeSeries 2020 I had the pleasure of talking to @ignaciobercero & @elvirefabry abt the EU’s trade strategy amid US-Chinese tensions, Covid19, & how the EU can avoid the lure of protectionism & build domestic support for trade.
Key points below.

THREAD

/1 In response to Covid: “reshoring is unlikely to go very far in the EU”, said Ignacio.

EU too dependent on exports & it’s difficult to localize value chains. But there will be more talk abt strategic stockpiles, diversification of value chains (e.g w Africa) and subsidies.

/2
Jul 9, 2020 6 tweets 2 min read
Leaders flock to The Hague to try to persuade @MinPres Rutte

There is a short-term and a long-term view.

Short-term: It matters what the Dutch do. Putting your foot down, means others take you serious. Hey, NL could even get (some of) its way in the negotiations.

1/ Long-term: by being perceived as the "Chieftain of the nay-sayers", Dutch are doing damage to how they are viewed in Brussels. Not constructive, but difficult.

Memories are long in Brussels.

And other govts will wonder, is NL still part of "the team"?

/2
Apr 8, 2020 4 tweets 2 min read
In times like this it is worth pointing out that 🇮🇹 and🇳🇱 share many common positions on EU issues.

As founding members, they have a strong history of commitment to the EU project. They share common views on the internal market, international trade and climate change.

/1
They both value the transatlantic relationship and are committed to European defense integration. Uniquely, they shared a seat on the UN Security Council in 2018-2019. They are strong trading partners, and have good bilateral ties.

/2
Feb 12, 2020 11 tweets 5 min read
For my English-language followers; I apologise for tweeting a lot in Dutch the past two days about #CETA.

Today, NL parliament is debating ratification of #CETA. A majority in favour is not guaranteed.

Parallels with Wallonia's #CETA block in 2016 have been made, but... 1/N ...that comparison is wrong for a very important reason.

CETA has already been agreed by the European Parliament.
In 2016, it wasn't. Talks were ongoing.

It has been provisionally applied since late 2017.

Ratification is underway.

A Dutch No wd put NL & EU in a pickle. /2
Nov 21, 2019 5 tweets 2 min read
I don't buy the "Salzburg ambush" thesis. It was clear during summer of 2017 that Chequers was seen as unworkable in EU27 quarters. And we know HMG officials reported such to no10. With months left on the clock, was the EU's tough line at Salzburg really a "fatal blow"?
1/ Or was it foolhardy on no10's side to put all its eggs in the Salzburg-Chequers basket?
Also, it could only be a fatal blow to May, if indeed the UK was a much weaker negotiating partner than many in the UK are willing to accept.
2/
Nov 19, 2019 12 tweets 3 min read
So, lots of discussion this morning about @anandMenon1's FT piece.

I have mountains of respect for Anand (and us cloggies are generally quite impressed by mountains), but I disagree with him here.

1/

on.ft.com/2r4mc3m via @FT EU decision to split negotiations in 2 phases was a strategic choice and preordained EU would be unwilling to be flexible on phase-2 issues (i.e. trade) if phase-1 exit not sorted.

But UK always tried to bring both phases together: e.g. "what is UK buying for £39 billion?"

/2