Some thoughts on BC Liberal plan to eliminate PST for 1 year, and cut it by 4 points (57%) after that:
The 2020 budget says PST would raise $7.9b this fiscal year, rising to $8.6b by 2022. So the Liberals' costing seems too low. #bcpoli ...2
They say their plan would cost $6.9b in year 1, $4b after. Seems like it would be more like $8b in year 1 (depending when it starts), $4.5-5b/year after that. So they are low-balling the fiscal implications of this very expensive idea. ...3
In year 1, their plan would thus increase the (already-record-high) provincial deficit by over half: from projected $13b to something like $21b. I am not averse to larger deficits to spur post-COVID reconstruction, but we need to be sure we're spending the funds well. ...4
Sales taxes are not what's holding back economic recovery: lack of income and confidence is the problem. Canadians are actually saving their income at a record rate (28% of disposable income in 2nd quarter, highest on record, 10x usual saving rate) out of fear of the future. ...5
In this depressed context, where Canadians are already socking away close to 30cents of each dollar of dispoasable income, eliminating sales tax is like pushing on a string. A very expensive string. Much better to spend directly to boost employment, incomes, confidence. ...6
Interesting to note that growth in BC's retail sales has been much stronger than the Canadian average: up 2.1% in July (s.a.) vs. 0.6% for Canada, up 5.7% yr/yr (vs. 2.7% for Canada). BC's sales tax (3rd lowest in Canada to start with) is not holding back retail sales here ...7
And let's compare BC to Alberta (which has no provincial sales tax, and thus is the BC Liberal role model). BC's monthly sales growth was almost 2x Alta's in July. Year/year sales growth 3.5 times better than Alberta's. Alta has many probs, absence of sales tax hasn't helped ...8
In depression-like circumstances, boosting spending is the critical task of macroeconomic policy. Tax cuts are never as effective as direct spending in this regard, because so much of the stimulus leaks out in savings. This leakage is extraordinarily bad during #COVID19 ...9
On the distributional side, sales taxes are mildly regressive, so cutting them could be seen as mildly progressive. The Liberals are playing up this angle, but that concern doesn't fit well with their overall worldview (eg. their opposition to high-income PITs). ...10
But even with a flat rate sales tax, rich people still get far larger absolute savings than low- and middle-income people. And the distributional impact of the tax cut cannot be considered separately from the effects of corresponding program spending. ...11
The combination of raising revenues through a sales tax & spending it on public programs (which are generally strongly progressive in distributional effect) is definitely progressive. Since PST cut will inevitably be accompanied by spending cuts, this is still regressive. ...12
There are far better ways to spend $8b & spur more genuine & lasting economic recovery in BC, including:
* rapidly expand affordable child care
* accelerate physical & social infrastructure projects
* non-market housing
* partner with municipalities to retain vital services ...13
Finally, this episode puts another nail in the coffin of the old stereotype that conservatives are fiscally prudent. They rail about deficits when it suits them (O'Toole is doing so federally now). But spend like drunken sailors, on THEIR priorities, when they have a chance ...14
Here's Andrew Wilkinson, July 15, on the $13b projected deficit: this is "not sustainable," "we can't carry on like this." omny.fm/shows/mike-smy…
Today he wants to *increase* that deficit by over half--and then invoke that deficit to justify later spending cuts. #StarveTheBeast
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OK sir, now let's do 2024.
Hourly wages (measured by the LFS) have grown twice as fast as prices (measured by the CPI) in the last 12 mos.
And by the way, there are several other serious problems with that original chart, in addition to it being 2 years out of date. #cdnecon /2
A. You don't calculate change in real wage by subtracting the inflation rate from % wage growth. You must calculate an index (dividing wage by CPI) and measure how that changes.
B. The proper change in so-called 'pay' (more on this below) for 2022 was thus -4.0%, not -4.3% /3
C. The StatsCan report which Mr Poilievre cites explicitly states (in both text & charts) that the real income change was -4.0%, not -4.3%. (They can do the math right.) So the CPC chart-makers deliberately chose to use a higher (but false) number. They can't claim ignorance. /4
This is an own goal: Grocery prices did not surge 1.5% on June 25, they grew by 1.5% over the 12 months ending in May 2024. That's *lower* than the rate when Freeland announced the capital gains reform, and *below* the Bank of Canada's optimal 2% target for inflation. #cdnpoli /2
Can we thus credit Freeland's tax reform for *lowering* the rate of grocery inflation? Of course not: it's ridiculous to link the two. Blaming taxes, instead of Loblaws, Cargill, PepsiCo, oil companies, and climate change for high food prices, is world-class bait and switch. /3
Also, this reform does not increase taxes on families who *run* farms. It counts 1/6 more of large gains made by people who *sell* farms--and only *after* exhausting $1.25m lifetime exemption, special reserves to avg one-time gains, & special rules for intra-family transfer. /4
🇨🇦 consumers ride to the rescue!! 0.7% lift in real household consumption accounts for almost all the 0.4% rise in real GDP in 1Q24. That in turn was thanks mostly to a 1.5% rise in labour compensation, which grew 3x faster than consumer prices (consumption deflator). #cdnecon /2
Real wages are growing now at a decent pace, thanks to feisty unions, higher min wages, and workers demanding real wage repair. That has literally saved 🇨🇦 from a recession. This is the macroeconomic phenomenon of wage-led growth in action. #canlab /3
For those still losing sleep over wage-price spirals, don't worry: the GDP deflator fell slightly, and the consumption deflator (akin to CPI) rose just 0.5%. That's the slowest since COVID lockdowns, and pretty much equals the Bank of Canada's 2% annual target. /4
Biggest non-story in #Budge2024 is the deficit. Fcst hardly changed from last year, despite new spending on several initiatives. That's partly cuz of new $$ from the capital gains change (which is great). But mostly cuz revenues keep outpacing pessimistic forecasts. #cdnecon /2
Those forecasts are still deliberately pessimistic, leaving room for positive surprises before the 2025 election. Conservatives who've invested so much in attacking govt for running bigger deficits will be disarmed. A smaller deficit does nothing to help with cost of living. /3
But direct help with necessities of life (dental care, drugs, child care, disability benefits, student lunches, PSE student loans/grants) will make an incremental difference. Most Canadians will receive something from one or more of those programs. /4
Not the worst thing to fear this awful day, but important anyway: get ready for another burst of oil-led inflation. Orthodox central bankers will claim the only thing to do is keep int rates higher, for longer--punishing workers further for a crisis they didn't cause. /2 #cdnecon
Can we learn from the Feb 2022 price shock, and stop profit-led energy inflation (which quickly spread into the broader economy) before it starts? Here's my Dec'23 @TorontoStar column with ideas for how to prevent another oil-led inflation outburst: . /3thestar.com/business/anoth…
The idea of regulating strategic prices (like energy) to stop inflation from getting going (rather than dragging down the whole economy to stop it later), first ridiculed, is now widely accepted (even by places like the Bundesbank), thanks to work by @IsabellaMWeber & others. /4
Carbon-tax fever is reaching a peak, as April 1 (when both the price and the rebate payments increase) approaches. So I'm re-posting my review of gasoline prices in calendar 2023. Key takeaway: the ups and downs of gasoline prices can't be ascribed to carbon pricing. /2 #cdnecon
Gasoline ended '23 5₵/litre lower than it began, despite a higher carbon price (worth about 3₵/l, offset by CAIP rebates). The ups & downs of oil prices are dominated by oil companies & futures markets, not carbon prices. The 2022 oil price surge added 40x more to gas prices./3
The federal Clean Fuel Reg (which Poilievre derided as a second carbon tax) had no lasting impact either. In fact, Cdns who followed Poilievre's advice to gas up before July 1 to avoid this 'tax' actually lost a few bucks (cuz prices *fell* afterward): . /4centreforfuturework.ca/2024/01/03/rev…