Day 5 of a new Armenian-Azerbaijani War: Where is Russia? I’m trying to figure out Russia’s role/strategy + set out some thoughts here; would be interested to hear other’s (constructive) thoughts on this (thread). 1/19
Russia quick to call for restraint 27/9; Lavrov talking to NP + IA, Putin talked to Macron 30/9, calls for ceasefire + offers mediation. But by day 5 in 2016 Russia had convened ARM + AZ military chiefs in Moscow + brokered ceasefire. In 2020 is Russia “hanging back”: why? 2/19
“Putin-as-strategist” school suggests hanging back is calculated: Moscow is allowing Azerbaijan + Turkey room for military action to undermine the Minsk Group, remind Armenia it needs Russia + indebt Erdogan, who benefits domestically if Azerbaijan takes back territories 3/19
Problems with this analysis: Does Putin need to discipline Pashinyan? Armenia’s geopolitical loyalty is not in doubt. Reports of mercenaries, if confirmed, likely seen by Kremlin as v provocative. Competing with Turkey in Syria/Libya is one thing, in “near abroad” another. 5/19
And does Russia really want to undermine the Minsk Group, where Russia makes nice with internationalist multilateralism + sees self as informal leader? Russian co-Chairs serve much longer terms than US/French CCs + symbolic cooperation on a secondary issue suits Putin. 6/19
Opposite school suggests Russia taken by surprise: Pavel Baev argues that Moscow was complacent abt its capacities in the NK conflict + extent of energy leverage over Turkey, plus distracted with Belarus, and now cannot come up with a meaningful initiative. 7/19
But even if Russia taken by surprise, scale of hostilities far beyond April 2016; for Azerbaijan too much invested to quickly agree to Moscow’s mediation + revert to a fruitless peace process without significant results? 9/19
And unlike in 2016 Turkey's backing (and putative Putin-Pashinyan antipathy) gives Baku confidence to resist what it sees as self-serving Russian conflict management. 10/19
My take? New war exposes the incoherence of Russia’s “pivotal deterrence” policy, which I argued in my book Anatomy of a Rivalry has been Moscow’s strategy for the last 15 years or so; this sees Russia as a “pivot” seeking to prevent war between ARM + AZ. 11/19
Pivotal deterrence requires manufacturing of uncertainty through diverse tactics (asymmetric alliance-making, arms transfers to both, mediation initiatives), keeping both ARM+ AZ uncertain, inducing caution in AZ + concessions from ARM. It pretty much worked for 15 years. 12/19
But pivotal deterrence works best when its targets don’t have other alliance options. Turkey’s entry has changed that and pivotal deterrence has failed. Russia’s “hanging back” represents policy failure + scrabbling to think through a new one/what to keep of the old policy. 13/19
But to do that Moscow has to navigate straddling two sets of “rules of the game”. As I argued for OC-Media, the new ARM-AZ war is symptomatic of global shifts from multilateralism to multipolarity. 14/19
Multilateral diplomacy is in crisis and vulnerable to rising regional powers + entrepreneurs of authoritarian conflict management (as theorised by the brilliant @david_g_lewis). Russia straddles both. 15/19
Russia’s dominance in the NK context has depended on its accommodation of the framework on which the Minsk Group, a quintessential product of post-Cold War multilateralism, is founded. 16/19
Without it, Russia look like a classic post-imperial power throwing its weight around in its “backyard” (a view I’ve heard many times from Azerbaijanis). Thus Minsk Group multilateralism has been shallow, but symbolically significant for Russia. 17/19
But with multilateralism in general + OSCE in particular in crisis + US absent, a question for Russia is whether to jump ship and fully adopt the multipolar playbook. That, however, means choosing who to back, which Russia has meticulously avoided in NK context for years. 18/19
Thus, does Russian hesitancy and hanging back represent having to think through coherence + strategy, when incoherence + tactics served Russian interests so well for so long? 19/19
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The past few tumultuous weeks in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have seemingly ended in commitments by both Yerevan and Baku to conclude a peace accord by year's end. Recent events serve notice of at least 5 risks accompanying this process, which I explore here. A (long) 🧵: 1/
Risk 1: Low-cost coercion: The first risk is a strategy of coercion that appears to deliver the outcomes that the coercing side is looking for, with no significant countervailing cost. 2/
crisisgroup.org/europe-central… True, Azerbaijan’s cross-border strikes on Armenia in September elevated the inter-state level of the conflict, resulting in a consolidation of international support for the territorial integrity norm. 3/
While the world is distracted with Ukraine’s success in Kharkiv, there are reports of large-scale Azerbaijani shelling + use of UAVs against targets in Armenia: Jermuk, Goris, Vardenis, Tatev, Kapan.
These are locations within the Republic of Armenia, *not* in Nagorny Karabakh (also the site of another escalation at the beginning of August).
The attacks come less than two weeks after the country’s leaders met with EUCO President Charles Michel in Brussels to review progress on prior agreements to move forward with connectivity, border demarcation, humanitarian issues and the possibility of a peace treaty.
I found George’s learner’s grammar of Georgian to be an indispensable resource when I was learning Georgian. George was also an engaging and inspired teacher of the language and I’ll always be grateful to him. 1/
His was the only modern learner’s grammar that was available at the time, and it was also a great privilege to be taught by the same person who wrote the grammar you are learning from. I learned Russian the same way with Anna Pilkington’s inspired course and teaching. 2/
Yes, the grammar showcased some of George’s political views in ways one wouldn’t usually find in a language grammar. Had I been the series editor I would no doubt have had issues with this to say the least. 3/
Some thoughts on implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (RIU) for Armenia + Azerbaijan, a 🧵. TLDR? A weakened/hardened Russia presents risks for both states, esp ARM, resulting in strategies of formal compliance or evasion, but AZ also sees tactical opportunities in NK.
Whether thru Armenia’s ‘complementarity’ or Azerbaijan’s ‘sovereign foreign policy/non-alignment’ the foreign policies of both states have been predicated on the avoidance of choice. RIU challenges that, forces both states to make both performative and real choices.
RIU radicalises relations between the West, where ARM + AZ both have a variety of important linkages, and the country with the single greatest leverage over both. Unsurprisingly, we have seen ARM + AZ strategies of formal compliance with RU and tactical evasions where possible.
Yesterday 19/7 there were reports of gunfire, along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan, in the area of Sadarak / Yeraskh. Azerbaijani social media subsequently suggested reports of advances by Azerbaijani forces.
If true would likely be in the no man’s lands that still obtain between the lines of actual control in this area. (In summer 2018, Azerbaijan also reported advances in this area, meaning advances into no man’s lands: cacianalyst.org/publications/a…)
aysor.am/en/news/2021/0… On 20/7 local Armenian community head in Yeraskh Rudik Oghikyan was reported wounded by Azerbaijani fire, on the same day that Ilham Aliyev is meeting Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss implementation of Armenia-Azerbaijan agreements so far.
On the ‘borderization’ of #Armenia: this week a number of territorial encroachments by Azerbaijani forces were reported on Armenia proper, along the international border between Armenia and those parts of #Azerbaijan that were under Armenian occupation.
On 13/5 Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that some 250 AZE troops had advanced 3.5 kilometres around a remote lake in ARM’s southernmost Syunik region, Sev Lich, that Soviet-era maps indicate is divided by the de jure border. Other movements reported in Gegharkunik.
AZE says it is demarcating the border per maps in its possession. France and the US have called on AZE to withdraw. ARM has referred the matter to to the CSTO. As of today, latest reports are that Russian troops from the Gyumri base are on way to Syunik.