The past few tumultuous weeks in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have seemingly ended in commitments by both Yerevan and Baku to conclude a peace accord by year's end. Recent events serve notice of at least 5 risks accompanying this process, which I explore here. A (long) 🧵: 1/ Risk 1: Low-cost coercion: The first risk is a strategy of coercion that appears to deliver the outcomes that the coercing side is looking for, with no significant countervailing cost. 2/

While the world is distracted with Ukraine’s success in Kharkiv, there are reports of large-scale Azerbaijani shelling + use of UAVs against targets in Armenia: Jermuk, Goris, Vardenis, Tatev, Kapan. These are locations within the Republic of Armenia, *not* in Nagorny Karabakh (also the site of another escalation at the beginning of August).

I found George’s learner’s grammar of Georgian to be an indispensable resource when I was learning Georgian. George was also an engaging and inspired teacher of the language and I’ll always be grateful to him. 1/

https://twitter.com/KodzokoMetin/status/1531910262705606659

His was the only modern learner’s grammar that was available at the time, and it was also a great privilege to be taught by the same person who wrote the grammar you are learning from. I learned Russian the same way with Anna Pilkington’s inspired course and teaching. 2/

Some thoughts on implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (RIU) for Armenia + Azerbaijan, a 🧵. TLDR? A weakened/hardened Russia presents risks for both states, esp ARM, resulting in strategies of formal compliance or evasion, but AZ also sees tactical opportunities in NK. Whether thru Armenia’s ‘complementarity’ or Azerbaijan’s ‘sovereign foreign policy/non-alignment’ the foreign policies of both states have been predicated on the avoidance of choice. RIU challenges that, forces both states to make both performative and real choices.

Yesterday 19/7 there were reports of gunfire, along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan, in the area of Sadarak / Yeraskh. Azerbaijani social media subsequently suggested reports of advances by Azerbaijani forces. If true would likely be in the no man’s lands that still obtain between the lines of actual control in this area. (In summer 2018, Azerbaijan also reported advances in this area, meaning advances into no man’s lands: cacianalyst.org/publications/a…)

On the ‘borderization’ of #Armenia: this week a number of territorial encroachments by Azerbaijani forces were reported on Armenia proper, along the international border between Armenia and those parts of #Azerbaijan that were under Armenian occupation. On 13/5 Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that some 250 AZE troops had advanced 3.5 kilometres around a remote lake in ARM’s southernmost Syunik region, Sev Lich, that Soviet-era maps indicate is divided by the de jure border. Other movements reported in Gegharkunik.

Six weeks in, 2nd #Karabakh War is at a crucial moment as fighting rages for NK’s historical capital, Shusha (spelled Shushi in Armenian sources). Significance of this town cannot be under-estimated for either side (see thread by @Tom_deWaal) Shusha is a natural fortress, protected by cliffs on its south side, and overlooks NK capital Stepanakert to the north - a local saying has it that "Whoever controls Shusha, controls Karabakh".

ARM + AZ FMs met in Geneva with OSCE's Minsk Group today, but no new ceasefire agreed. Instead, sides agree to observe international humanitarian law by not targeting civilian populations or non-military objects. Crucial that sides are held to this. 1/7 Sides agreed also to implement exchange of bodies and submit lists of POWs within 1 week; and submit comments + questions relating to wider conditions (beyond humanitarian) for a ceasefire - item 2 of the 10/10 Moscow ceasefire document. 2/7

ARM + AZ foreign ministers meet in Geneva tomorrow, in the aftermath of a deadly cycle of civilian suffering: at least 25 Azerbaijani civilians killed yesterday + today, dozens injured, in Armenian strikes on the town of Barda; dead include an @AzRedCrescent volunteer. 1/6 AZ claims use of cluster munitions against its civilians - must be investigated by @amnesty and @hrw. AZ strikes on towns in NK killed one in Shusha, more injured; a hospital building in Stepanakert hit – must also be investigated – more strikes reported tonight. 2/6

Third ceasefire agreed, this time brokered by US (after previous, failed Russian- and French-led efforts), to begin from 0800 local time tomorrow. Follows meetings of ARM + AZ foreign ministers with US officials. Many reasons to doubt it will hold. Three tests of ceasefire viability are: 1) have military goals been achieved? 2) has the cost of carrying on become prohibitive? 3) do 3rd parties have leverage to enforce?

Armenian-Azerbaijani war at a critical conjuncture. AZ forces have extended advance along southern flank to recapture yesterday Zangilan. Now reportedly advancing northwards through Qubatly towards Lachin, the corridor connecting ARM + NK. 1/9 This corridor is one of the Basic Principles, but these and diplomacy in general not mentioned (unlike in interviews to intl media) in Ilham Aliyev’s address to the nation yesterday. Already supportive of military action, AZ public is being prepared for total victory. 2/9

Second ceasefire of 17/10 also failed; sides blame each other and without ceasefire monitoring mechanism impossible to be sure but common sense suggests AZ has military advantage and therefore more to gain from continuation. 1/9 Intense fighting continued in north and southern areas of front, and Ilham Aliyev announced today recapture of another 13 villages in Jebrayil; also yesterday historically symbolic Khudaferin Bridges, constructed 11-13th centuries across River Aras. 2/9

After 3 weeks of war: A new *temporary* “humanitarian truce” has been declared between ARM & AZ forces, to come into force tonight as of 0000, 18/10. Announcement evokes both OSCE co-Chair nations’ statement + failed humanitarian ceasefire brokered 10/10 by Russia. 1/10 Why now? Last 36 hrs have seen appalling missile strikes/bombardment of population centres: Stepanakert in NK hit again; Ganja hit for second time, destroying residential building and killing 13 Azerbaijani civilians. Nearly 100 civilians killed on all sides now. 2/10

There are voices rightly highlighting relentless focus on geopolitics in the tragedy in + around #Karabakh. Geopolitics is what we can most easily see, and means to most easily simplify complexity + align it with political agendas. But it shouldn't be the main story now. 1/11 We only have intermittent or highly mediated glimpses of what is happening on ground, but clear that a humanitarian catastrophe is happening in NK, with main towns enduring massive destruction + half of the Armenian population – up to 70,000 people – fleeing the territory. 2/11

Monday’s ceasefire document refers to the Basic Principles (BP), under discussion within the Minsk Group. Conflict parties as of 12/10 still affirm Minsk Group negotiations; lot of BP mentions in social media over the last 48 hours, even as intense fighting continues 1/13 So what are the BP (also known as ‘Madrid Principles’), how do the sides see them and how relevant might they be after this new war? The BP is a list of bullet points setting out core principles for an ARM-AZ peace, on which a peace agreement could then be based. 2/13

#Armenia-#Azerbaijan ceasefire of 10/10 failed from the off. Stepanakert reported hit that night and 9 reported killed and dozens wounded in missile strikes on Ganja, AZ’s 2nd city; at least 2 civilians also reported killed during AZ operation in Hadrut, south NK, on 10/10. 1/11 These deaths affirm each side’s worst fears of the other: state-sanctioned terror and ethnic cleansing. Further radicalises societies and makes standing down more costly for leaders. 2/11

After 2 weeks of war, Russia brokers a humanitarian ceasefire (CF) following 10 hours of talks between FMs Bayramov and Mnatsakanyan in Moscow. Sides agree: CF due to begin around now at 1200 local time, 10 October 2020. Further aspects to the CF to be ‘additionally agreed’; parties to start substantive talks on the Basic Principles in Minsk Group framework and negotiation format to remain unchanged.

Day 6, a brief summary: after very tentative signs of deceleration on Thurs/Friday, today saw a significant surge in fighting. All parties made statements or speeches indicating battles today seen as critical. ARM MoD says this is full-scale war, land + air + cyber. 1/7 Reported Armenian KIA stands at c. 206, ARM MoD has published details of 243 Azerbaijanis it claims KIA, but real figures for both likely much higher, especially after intense fighting in NE and SE of Line of Contact today; many hundreds more wounded. 2/7

How did #Armenia and #Azerbaijan get to this point? This thread brings together my short comments written April 2016-September 2020, mostly for @CHRussiaEurasia, but also @ips_journal, @OCMediaorg and @ValdaiClub. For a deeper background dive, see my book. chathamhouse.org/expert/comment… The '4-day war' breaks out in April 2016.

Day 5 of a new Armenian-Azerbaijani War: Where is Russia? I’m trying to figure out Russia’s role/strategy + set out some thoughts here; would be interested to hear other’s (constructive) thoughts on this (thread). 1/19 Russia quick to call for restraint 27/9; Lavrov talking to NP + IA, Putin talked to Macron 30/9, calls for ceasefire + offers mediation. But by day 5 in 2016 Russia had convened ARM + AZ military chiefs in Moscow + brokered ceasefire. In 2020 is Russia “hanging back”: why? 2/19

New Armenian-Azerbaijani violence: some reflections at the end of day 1 (thread). Any reflections at this stage are inevitably provisional in a highly fluid context, no hindsight here and could be wrong (constructive correction welcomed). 1/9 Relevant comparison is April 2016, although appears to be larger-scale: an intentional but limited aims operation aimed at recovering territories + consolidating more advantageous new ceasefire, packaged as a military win. Political, as well as military, motivations are key. 2/9