Thread by @krakek1

On the topic of arms control, de-alerting and the like.

As we prepare for possible extension of NST specifically and some sort of future arms control in general I would caution against mirror immaging and copypasting exact approaches across the board. 1/7

This is not only true due to different concerns the parties may have and thus seek to adress but also due to technical, doctrinal and geographical differences between the parties.

So lets look at the de-alerting as one of the common ideas floating around. 2/7

The main argument seems to be that the (US) silo based ICBM force is non survivable and must be used in a LoW style strike, which can lead to launches on false warning, etc.

This leads to the conclusion that SSBNs and other mobile platforms are inherently better 3/7

And in case of US this is very much true, however it is not in case of Russia, as:

- Russian SSBNs (and ICBM TELs) have much lower readiness (~1/6 when compared to ~1/2 of the US force)
- are the lighter component (Trident-II is more capable than MM-III, reverse is for Ru) 4/7

- are on pierside/garrison alert most of the time

Together this means that a significant portion of the Russian RVs are alert on vulnerable, densily packed and in case of SSBNs geographically exposed launchers. 5/7

De-alerting such launchers meaningfully may not just change the LoW dynamics that those mobile launchers (counter intuitively) overwhelmingly participate in, but may also affect early/fast damage limitation strike capability. 6/7

For example as the things stand there is a significant insentive for Russia to use those exposed SLBMs on pierside early in conflict.

And this is without discussing the possible vulnerability of mobile launchers on patrol due to conventional weakness and new strike means. 7/7

CC @KomissarWhipla @PTopych @NewtonTheory @russianforces @PaperMissiles @nukestrat @pranayrvaddi @missilescholar