3/ Crypto market infrastructure has improved dramatically in recent years.
It's now quite easy for most people to convert fiat into crypto, withdraw any amount to their own wallet, & then do as they wish without restriction or identification, subject only to the consensus rules.
4/ There's some regulation at the on-ramps & off-ramps, but so far, not enough to seriously infringe on the freedoms of self-custody & privacy.
This is changing.
Policymakers' approach to AML regulation is shifting significantly toward harsher restrictions on a *global* scale.
5/ AML regulations are intended to prevent criminals from using & abusing the financial system.
The goal is to make sure that "crime doesn't pay" -- to stop bad actors from spending illegally-obtained funds & to help law enforcement detect & prosecute the underlying crimes.
6/ AML regulations seek to accomplish this goal by deputizing financial institutions, the gatekeepers of the financial system, to act like government agents.
For example, regulated institutions are required to identify customers, surveil transactions, & file reports with gov't.
7/ AML regulations depend on intermediaries to perform the functions of identification, surveillance, censorship, seizure, exclusion, & more.
Enter Bitcoin -- a peer-to-peer electronic cash system that lets anyone transfer any amount of value to anywhere without intermediaries.
8/ AML regulations break down in the context of cash.
With no intermediary to deputize, gov'ts are less able to detect transactions, identify counterparties, determine sources of funds, conduct censorship & seizure, etc.
This is true for both paper cash & electronic cash.
9/ Many gov'ts would love to get rid of paper cash & some are trying.
But paper cash doesn't pose that big a risk. Like gold, it only works for in-person transfers & isn't easy to move long distances in large amounts.
Regulators are much more concerned about digital transfers.
10/ For years, regulators have cracked down on digital transfers that use institutions like money transmitters & offshore banks.
But aside from the occasional "[country X] bans Bitcoin" headline, most gov'ts haven't tried to significantly restrict Bitcoin or other blockchains.
11/ There are a few reasons for this.
First, gov'ts have been content to regulate on-ramps & off-ramps, partly on the belief that crypto's main utility comes from conversion into fiat.
They've been satisfied by limiting access to conversion & catching criminals in the process.
12/ Second, gov'ts can track crypto transfers via blockchain analytics fairly easily, even supposedly private ones (sorry to break it to you).
Third, there really isn't that much criminal activity in crypto, so the overall risk is low & hasn't warranted a ton of gov't resources.
13/ However, over the last year, Bitcoin has gained geopolitical significance & fiat-pegged stablecoin volume has exploded upward.
As a result, gov'ts are getting more concerned about both illicit activity & the threat to their monetary sovereignty (a topic for another day).
14/ So, what are they doing?
For starters, they're enforcing current AML regulations more aggressively.
Most of us expected BitMEX to get tagged by the CFTC for unregistered derivatives trading, but it was a big deal to see DOJ turn the case criminal. That doesn't happen often.
15/ They're also attacking privacy more aggressively.
Last week's DOJ Framework described anonymous transactions as "a high-risk activity...indicative of possible criminal conduct."
And it had an ominous warning for exchanges about "anonymity enhanced cryptocurrencies" (AEC):
16/ The phrase "...whether it is possible..." is heavily loaded.
Translated into DC speak, this means "we definitely don't think it's possible, so you better not, or else."
Keep in mind, this is a DOJ that disapproved of end-to-end encryption yesterday: justice.gov/opa/pr/interna…
17/ Perhaps most importantly, policymakers *worldwide* are signaling a desire to expand existing laws to restrict access to crypto.
Consider the "Swiss Rule," which practically prohibits self-custody in the guise of verifying the owner of a private key.
18/ This June, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international standard-setting body for AML regulation, said that the "lack of explicit coverage of peer-to-peer transactions...was a source of concern."
Next June, they might adopt the Swiss Rule as a global standard.
19/ I won't bother reciting all the recent gov't statements targeting financial privacy as a major risk. There are too many.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) said it all in its report on central bank digital currencies last week:
"Full anonymity is not plausible."
20/ I fear we're heading for a world where withdrawing crypto from exchanges to self-custody is restricted as a means of attacking privacy.
We'd have two separate crypto markets: one of "clean" custodial coins & another of "dirty" self-sovereign ones, with no bridge between.
21/ This is a worst-case scenario, to be sure, & all hope isn't lost.
Many of us are working to convince policymakers why it's a terrible idea, & I'll have a lot more to say on that soon.
But you should know that it's a live issue, & our main challenge for years to come.
[end]
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The short answer (not legal advice) is the money probably gets bailed-in just like other deposits at the failed bank & no special dynamics protect stablecoin holders, afaik.
The longer answer requires looking at the relationships between all the parties . . .
2/ First, you have the stablecoin issuer & the bank custodying its reserve; is there anything special here to protect against a bail-in?
Second, you have the stablecoin issuer & the stablecoin holders; is there anything special here to give holders recourse in case of a bail-in?
3/ The best place I can think of to look for insight on these questions is in the terms, conditions, & disclosures of the issuers' whitepapers, user agreements, & attestations (links at end of thread).
1/ My last thoughts on security tokens & then I'll stop triggering everyone trying to shill their STO products here:
I agree it's possible to eke out some efficiencies by putting any financial instrument on a blockchain, & yes, disrupting central securities depositories is neat.
2/ To me, this fits the blockchain use case of "companies can save a few dollars by automating their back office."
That's fine! Nothing wrong with that!
It's just not particulary interesting in the broader context of crypto, & it gives off a very "blockchain, not bitcoin" vibe.
3/ What *is* interesting, maybe revolutionary, is allowing self-custody of financial instruments & exposing them to the composability of open protocols.
The problem is that security tokens are somewhat unfit for these goals, not only due to regulation, but by their very nature.
I'm suspicious of describing "DeFi tokens" as a category.
These tokens have vastly different characteristics & pose varied & complex risks, as do their underlying protocols.
Calling them all "DeFi tokens" both legitimizes the terrible projects & undermines the space as a whole.
I have the same problem with "personal tokens."
Some are just interesting & harmless experiments by people playing with new tech. Others are blatant attempts to raise money by selling investment contracts, reminiscent of ICOs.
The former suffers by association with the latter.
There's something genuinely exciting happening here: the creation of natively digital assets with novel, unique, & diverse (if experimental) properties.
But if we've learned anything in crypto, it's that real innovation begets flawed imitation, which begets fraudulent schemes.
2/ The cabinet includes the Vice-President & the heads of all fifteen executive departments. It gathers often to advise the President on critical issues of national concern.
These days we take the cabinet for granted, assuming it's a standard segment of the bureaucracy.
Not so.
3/ Despite its pivotal role in federal governance for centuries, the cabinet is not authorized or even addressed in the Constitution.
This was not mere oversight. The framers of the Constitution considered & *explicitly rejected* proposals to establish an executive cabinet.
1/ The BlockOne & Nebulous enforcement actions could be the most important moves from the SEC since June 2018, when Bill Hinman said bitcoin & ether aren't securities.
Call me crazy, but I think the SEC believes EOS & Siacoins aren't securities either. That's huge. Here's why.
Not coincidentally, yesterday was the last day of the SEC's fiscal year, which usually means big news.
3/ The SEC has settled a number of enforcement actions against token issuers before now, such as Paragon, Airfox & Gladius.
Still, yesterday's actions break new ground: EOS is the first target with a "top ten" market cap & Sia is the first from entirely before the DAO Report.
1/ Ripple just filed a motion to dismiss the XRP securities class action. The motion is perfectly designed to delay the case as long as possible & is deeply unsatisfying for those of us who want a ruling on whether XRP is a security.
Here are the highlights & what comes next:
2/ First, a note to all the XRP fans preparing to murder my mentions: I have no view on whether XRP is a security. Only the courts can answer that question now. If anyone tells you they already know the answer, run away. Also, this from my last XRP thread:
3/ If you aren't a lawyer, the motion may not be much fun for you to read. Ripple makes a dozen separate arguments for dismissal of all seven claims & most involve highly technical issues related to this specific plaintiff, not XRP. See here: cloudup.com/csNy_2uT5WE