Thread by @TrentTelenko

1/There has been a great deal on hypersonic weapons recently on Twitter.

This thread is my take on them & why Russia, China and the USA are going there.

2/I agree and disagree with one of the better recent twitter threads on hypersonic weapons.

Hypersonic weapons are yet another overhyped weapon system liked the F-35, Zumwalt DDG and Ford class carrier.

https://twitter.com/bleddb/status/1314503402664198145

3/That does not mean deploying them would not aid the national security interests of China, Russia & the USA.

I have touched on Chinese interests with this tweet.

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1317446264590577664

4/That tweet in turn was spawned by this original video of the H6N with an HGV.

https://twitter.com/OedoSoldier/status/1317316788594438144

5/The wide scale deployment and production of several hundred SM-3 IB exo-atmospheric interceptors a year on USN Aegis combatants since 2017 is calling the Chinese 1st Island chain A2AD based on anti-ship ballistic missiles.

See:
cimsec.org/tightening-the…

6/The Chinese anti-access air defense (A2AD) system is in turn a copy plus adaptation (W/ASBM) of the Russian A2AD systems.

Russian's A2AD system's role was to push E-3 Sentry AWACS and KC-135 tankers 250-to-350Km behind the FLOT so the Russians could control their own air space

7/...& keep A-10's and F-16's with laser guided munitions off the back of their troops.

See these links for A2AD background:

ausairpower.net/APA-S-400-Triu…

ausairpower.net/APA-S-500-Triu…

8/The Russians have concerns for the SM-3, but not directly regards it's A2AD systems.

What the Russians are concerned about is America's deployment of enough SM-3 IIA ABM's to stop a simultaneous attack of EMP nuke equipped DPRK & Iranian ICBM's.

9/The production of the SM-3 IIA starts in 2021, building up to hundreds of interceptors a year.

The war stock goal is a 100% kill on a simultaneous Iranian & North Korean ICBM strike with four available ship-deployed SM-3 IIA's per whatever ICBM force these two powers have.

10/... (AKA Two volley's of two SM-3 IIB missiles per incoming ICBM on deployed Aegis combatants.)

If you are a Russian looking at what would be left over after a US 1st strike on a Russian nuclear force of 570 ICBM's, a 48 strategic bombers plus 12 subs in SLBM bastions...

11/...that is utterly terrifying come 2024(+).

A ragged Russian strategic 2nd strike hitting an intact US Navy Aegis ABM force could mostly bounce because the post 1st strike Russian C2 could not generate a coordinated attack to saturate it.

12/The Russians are now looking for surges of USN Aegis missile defense combatants off the US coasts in the same way NATO was looking for surges of Soviet Subs as a war indicator. And given the regular work ups and rotations of CVBG's, that's a problem.

13/Avangard​ hypersonic glide vehicle on IRBM's & ICBM's would enable a SEAD strike on the fixed ground based ABM radars supporting Aegis ships to allow a ragged Russian 2nd strike take out American cities and POL.

14/Russian Avangard​ HGV would not be a strategic 1st strike missile.

It is too slow and it's heat signature can be tracked from Geosynchronous orbit by US DSP satellites.

15/Russian nuclear doctrine is also focused on "demonstration/intimidation" single nuke strikes as a part of their strategic doctrine and Avangard​ delivers that capability...

...outside SM-6 and THAAD interceptor range.

16/This brings up the need to define hypersonics. A hypersonic glide vehicle is a term of art. There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons

 Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) & launched from a rocket before gliding to target. It is a type of depressed trajectory MaRV

17/
 Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or “scramjets,” after acquiring their target.

See definitions here:
missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat…

18/Whether we are talking MaRV, HGV or HCM, they all share the same problem as a re-entering manned space craft.

They have an opaque R/F ionization layer above the high supersonic.

Slowing down to the high supersonic gives THAAD & SM-6 an engagement opportunity.

19/This slow down is required to give sensors, radar in particular, the ability to hit it's target.

See Pershing II MaRV video here:
gfycat.com/keyfemaleblesb…

20/The combination of GMD & SM-3 upper layer and either a SM-6, THAAD, PAC-3 lower gives a two layer IRBM/ICBM defense that frustrates nuclear missile attack planning to the point no rational actor will do so without a massive saturation attack.

Hence HGV's to avoid GMD/SM-3.

21/American national interest in hypersonics are related to the Russian & Chinese A2AD systems & to the USAF Standoff Munitions Application Center (SMAC)

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1315751222352244740

22/SMAC cut it's teeth on the Russian S-300/S-400/S-500 based A2AD.

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1315751224059269120

23/Specifically, the high end "Kaliningrad class" threat with a S-400.

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1315751225875460096

24/The US Military drive for hypersonics along with the low/stealthy stand off munitions like LRSAM seems to be develop the missile equivalent of a multi-trajectory artillery time on target (TOT) with integrated EW/cyber elements like MALD-X & Grey Wolf to overwhelm the A2AD C3I.

25/25 The USA has lost it's edge in electronic warfare compared to peer opponent A2AD systems.

But it has replaced part of what was lost via better planning & simulation used for multi-vector stand off munitions & decoys TOT against SAM batteries or what they are defending

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