'Decarbonising is easy' once you drop market neutrality:

new policy paper setting out what next after @ecb @Lagarde and @Isabel_Schnabel accepted 'market neutrality' means subsidising carbon intensive companies.
we dug into bond data to identify carbon bias of @ecb corporate bond purchases, a bias that reflects the problematic commitment to market neutrality:

half of outstanding bonds included in the
ECB list are issued by carbon-intensive sectors.
how can ECB green its corporate bond purchase?

A lower-carbon list stops subsidies to fossil fuel companies.

A low-carbon list no longer subsidises carbon-intensive sectors.
and @carolynnlook with an excellent write-up of our research

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
smashing video from our co-authors @Greenpeace - with reminder that we cant fight climate crisis with fiscal tools if central banks continue to subsidise dirty industries

macrofinance take-home: while there is some greenwashing risk in our proposals for @ecb, main outcome would be penalising dirty activities.

A year ago, penalising dirty was unthinkable for central banks, then @Lagarde moved against 'market neutrality'

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More from @DanielaGabor

19 Oct
oh, the FT Editorial Board is now seeing unicorns.
short-lived though, gone in the next paragraph. As is any analytical coherence.
well, nice for US Treasury to have a mouth-piece with such global reach.

Nothing on private creditors refusing to join debt suspension/restructuring, it's all China.

ft.com/content/c4c0eb…
Read 4 tweets
17 Oct
Goldman Sachs/Credit Suisse 2018 repo loans to Ecuador can easily fall under 'predatory lending' to poor countries. Not to exonerate Moreno government, but:

If you're a private institution, you take out repo loan to finance assets, say government bonds you previously purchased.
you 'sell' your government bonds to GS, agree to repurchase them later.
trick - you remain economic owner of government bond collateral & get interest payments from said government.

because you retain credit risk, your repo lender GS has to do collateral management.
w balance sheets: you, Investor 1, have pledged your Ecuador government bonds as collateral to GS, who's given you USD 90 cash for USD 100 of Ecuador government bonds. Haircut 10%.
Ecuador government bonds stay on your balance sheet (assets) because you remain economic owner.
Read 11 tweets
16 Oct
in repo/shadow banking stories, this on Egypt is quite bonkers: in 2016, to get an IMF loan, Egypt had to increase its international reserves.

HSBC offers a $2 billion structured repo trade, as follows.

risk.net/awards/5360881…
HSBC offered $2 billion in return for $4 bn Eurobond sovereign bond collateral (a 50% haircut) and an undisclosed cash margin.

problem? Egypt had no Eurobonds (dollar debt) to pledge as collateral, shut out of international capital markets
Ministry of Finance issues $4 bn in Eurobonds, which it transfers to central bank to pledge to HSBC.
Lots of busy lawyers trying to untangle this from 'monetary financing' or MMT echoes that would unsettle IMF, an institution that doesnt like overt coordination cb-treasury
Read 8 tweets
15 Oct
my @jacobinmag on what slow progress in debt suspension talks this week tell us about G20's Grand SDG Bargain w private finance: it cements unequal power relationship, which poor countries cant challenge & private creditors have few qualms in exploiting.

jacobinmag.com/2020/10/g20-wo…
it unpacks the political economy of the DSSI - the debt service suspension initiative - that was negotiated this week at the WB/IMF Annual Meetings, with disappointing results

and connects it to various interventions this week from poor countries at high risk of debt distress

Read 5 tweets
15 Oct
TFW your theoretical construct is validated by Wikileaks.

here 2009 US document 'Update on Banking Reforms in Egypt' detailing how Americanisation of local financial systems literally pushed by US diplomacy

h/t @brokenimageheap

wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/0…
US-backed financial system MOU (memorandum of understanding) identified several benchmarks that Egypt needed to adopt.
US wanted Egypt to adopt several measures that promote securities market-based finance, including a primary dealer system, the privatisation of insurance companies and the adoption of US/EU style repo market.

Congress didnt fund the repo changes :)
Read 4 tweets
12 Oct
African countries are facing serious COVID19 related debt distress. A short thread on why articles such as below, however well intentioned, play in the hands of (private) creditors.

ft.com/content/fff9c3…
basically, African countries are facing three camps in this fight: US-led official donors (including IMF&WB), China and private creditors.
None are a homogeneous block, but let's assume so.
Official donors agreed temporary liquidity relief - no debt service on official bilateral aid to December 2020.
African countries want this extended.
Read 15 tweets

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