A lot of analysts seem to be arguing that the trade surpluses of certain countries have surged because those countries recovered early from Covid-19, and so are the only economies that can benefit from continued global demand. This way of thinking treats exports as...
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linear increments rather than as part of an economic system.
If their early recoveries from Covid-19 do indeed explain surging exports, in a well-functioning trading system these surging exports should in turn cause domestic shifts that also cause other...
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kinds of imports to rise (or other exports to drop). For example more exports overall should mean that more workers get paid, their consumption rise, and through various multipliers their imports should also rise. But in many of these countries we haven’t seen an...
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equivalent rise in domestic consumption, let alone imports.
Alternatively, a surge in exports would cause the currency to rise, the effect of which would be to shift income from manufacturers to households, the further effect of which should be a contraction in the...
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savings rate and, again, a rise in imports.
But when none of these or other equivalent shifts happen, it can usually be explained by policies that prevent the necessary shifts in income. For example to the extent currency appreciation is suppressed, or policies...
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subsidize manufacturers – either directly, or by lowering credit, tax, logistical, and other costs – at the expense of households, the expected rise in imports as a consequence of greater exports will not happen.
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The point is that contrary to what many analysts are saying, the rapid increases in certain trade surpluses are probably not the direct consequence of ending Covid-19 early. They are more likely the consequence of mercantilist responses to Covid-19 (and the resulting...
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surges in trade surpluses were easily predictable several months ago, when in fact most analysts predicted trade imbalances would contract). You cannot treat exports discretely, as if they are detached from the economy and the overall trading system. Export earnings must...
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be recycled one way or another, and it is domestic policies that determine the ways in which they are recycled.
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Although I sympathize with Stephen King’s frustration at some of the sillier things proposed in the name of MMT, I think it is deceptive to suggest that government borrowing today represents “borrowing from our collective economic futures”.
The fact is that everything we produce today will be consumed or invested by ourselves today, and, likewise, everything we produce in the future will be consumed or invested by ourselves in the future. Borrowing does not increase consumption today at the expense of future...
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consumption. Instead it transfers spending power today from one group to another and then transfers it again in the future as the debt is repaid (although not necessarily from the former to the latter, as taxes and inflation can change the relationship between money...
@fbermingham probably didn't come up with the title, but either way I don’t think Vietnam, mainland China and Taiwan are “poster boys” for world trade at all. If trade had really recovered in these economies, we would see both exports and... scmp.com/economy/china-…
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imports recover, not just exports. This means that the "recovery" in trade has not been driven by a recovery in the domestic economy.
So what drove it? Back in April and May, I was already writing about how certain trade-dependent countries in Asia were responding...
3/4
to Covid-19 with supply-side measures that effectively subsidized exports at the expense of imports, the result of which would be surging trade surpluses – even as trade imbalances around the world contracted and their trade partners struggled to boost demand.
As this FT editorial implies, China has responded to major social and economic changes in China and the world – which were not created, but were sharply accelerated, by Covid-19 – mainly by doubling down on its existing political and economic model.
For over a decade Beijing has promised economic adjustment in the form of a rebalancing of domestic demand, but probably because it does not accept the accompanying social and political adjustments, it has barely adjusted: the limited increase in the consumption share of...
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GDP has had more to do with a decline in GDP growth than with a real rebalancing of income.
I am not a historical determinist, but in the past, systems that have resisted adjusting their institutions during periods of great underlying change have always seemed more...
Parents are protesting in Beijing because an education company to whom they made payments has gone bankrupt, and are demanding that somebody (the government, I guess) make up those payments.
Clearly moral hazard is strongly embedded within the economy, and while much has already been written about its effect on lending discipline, I would add that moral hazard is also a kind of positive feedback mechanism. It reinforces economic activity and growth when times...
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are good by encouraging risk-taking and by effectively lowering transaction costs, but when conditions reverse it can exacerbate the slowdown by inhibiting risk-taking and forcing a (sometimes chaotic) adjustment of expectations.
I don’t think there were any big surprises in China’s very lopsided Q3 GDP growth data. As I have long argued, China is well on its way to recording GDP growth for the year of 2-3%. GDP growth is up 4.9% for the quarter and 0.7% year to date.
It was driven by a 6.9% acceleration in industrial production for the month of September and 5.8% in Q3, adding up to 1.2% growth for the year to date.
Retail sales were better than expected for the month (up 3.3%) but were up only 0.9% for the quarter and are still...
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down a whopping 7.2% for the year to date. Whether you look at the most recent month, the quarter, or the year to date, it is obvious that the recovery in production vastly exceeds the recovery in consumption (for which retail sales is a proxy).
Great article, but while I definitely agree with @RobinWigg that in order to strengthen the robustness of the economy, governments should gradually eliminate the tax deductibility of interest payments, I think he is a little harsh on... ft.com/content/87efe5…
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the Modigliani and Miller framework, which is a deeply insightful one. It shows that debt doesn’t matter to economic value creation only if we ignored the tax deductibility of interest and bankruptcy costs (later adjusted to more general “financial distress” costs).
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The problem is that economists and analysts never really understood how financial distress costs are incurred by businesses (let alone by sovereign borrowers) and how they are self-reinforcing. They occur as agents change their behavior in response to changes in the...