1\ Has anyone seen data that compares guilds who ration supply through cap and trade (NYC taxis, floor brokers) to guilds that ration supply through arbitrary certification (doctors, lawyers, teachers, London taxis)?
2\ To keep supply below demand, certification must be stultifying; it must include material irrelevant to the job. Hence the legions of dimwit teachers and doctors
I would think cap and trade gets closer to efficient Coasian outcomes
But I don't know how to test the theory
I would think cap and trade gets closer to efficient Coasian outcomes
But I don't know how to test the theory
3\ Though the comparison between NYC and London taxis suggests a direction for inquiry. Are credentialed taxis more expensive than taxis that just have to buy a license and pass a minimal geography test?
4\ Addendum: why must certification be stultifying? Why can't it select for, say, high intelligence and genius unneeded on the job?
Because for rationing to work, those qualities can't be valued by customers. So anyone who has them will, on the margin, seek work elsewhere
Because for rationing to work, those qualities can't be valued by customers. So anyone who has them will, on the margin, seek work elsewhere
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