While straight-line projections may be inviting, they are really questionable even in the best of circumstances. Bloomberg says that if China’s economy can stick to the growth trajectory of recent years, it’ll surpass the U.S. within the next decade.
This is true if it is just a statement about arithmetic. For China’s GDP to match that of the US in ten years requires that Chinese GDP grow annually by roughly 3.4 percentage points more than the US. In the past five years, China grew by 4.3 percentage points faster.
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Can China grow by 3.4 percentage points faster over the next ten years? Perhaps, but at the rate Chinese growth has been slowing, that would be pretty extraordinary – and historically unprecedented: no investment-driven “miracle” economy in history has been able to avoid...
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a difficult adjustment once it was unable to increase the debt burden quickly enough.
Consider that total social financing (the official measure of aggregate debt) grew in the past five years from 123 trillion to 251 trillion, or from 191% of GDP to 254% of GDP at...
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the end of 2019, and that by the end of this year total social financing it will be around 280-85% of GDP. Assuming (very, very optimistically) that there will no deterioration from the past five years to the next ten years in the amount of credit growth required to...
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generate a unit of GDP growth, this implies that by the end of the decade, China’s official debt-to-GDP must be at least 400% and perhaps as much as 450% if it is to reduce its growth rate by just 1 percentage point.
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Unless you assume that there is no relationship between high growth rates and the surge in debt, in other words, to say that China’s GDP will match that of the US in a decade if it can grow 3.4 percentage points faster annually than the US might sound like a reasonable...
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statement, but it is no different than saying that China’s GDP will match that of the US in a decade if its debt-to-GDP ratio can rise from 280% to 400-450% in ten years. If the latter statement isn’t plausible, neither is the former.
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While I've always expected that after 2020 Beijing would target growth rates between 5% and 6%, there is simply no way that sustainable consumption, exports and productive private investment can contribute enough growth to get even halfway there.
This means that the only way to achieve these levels of growth will require a further expansion of the share of public-sector investment and real-estate development in the economy, and, with it, continued rapid growth in China's debt burden.
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I estimate that if China's reported GDP continues to grow by 5-6% a year over the next three years, the official debt-to-GDP ratio will climb from 254% at the end of 2019 to at least 360-390% of GDP by the end of 2023. We don't know where debt capacity limits lie, but we...
Although I sympathize with Stephen King’s frustration at some of the sillier things proposed in the name of MMT, I think it is deceptive to suggest that government borrowing today represents “borrowing from our collective economic futures”.
The fact is that everything we produce today will be consumed or invested by ourselves today, and, likewise, everything we produce in the future will be consumed or invested by ourselves in the future. Borrowing does not increase consumption today at the expense of future...
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consumption. Instead it transfers spending power today from one group to another and then transfers it again in the future as the debt is repaid (although not necessarily from the former to the latter, as taxes and inflation can change the relationship between money...
A lot of analysts seem to be arguing that the trade surpluses of certain countries have surged because those countries recovered early from Covid-19, and so are the only economies that can benefit from continued global demand. This way of thinking treats exports as...
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linear increments rather than as part of an economic system.
If their early recoveries from Covid-19 do indeed explain surging exports, in a well-functioning trading system these surging exports should in turn cause domestic shifts that also cause other...
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kinds of imports to rise (or other exports to drop). For example more exports overall should mean that more workers get paid, their consumption rise, and through various multipliers their imports should also rise. But in many of these countries we haven’t seen an...
@fbermingham probably didn't come up with the title, but either way I don’t think Vietnam, mainland China and Taiwan are “poster boys” for world trade at all. If trade had really recovered in these economies, we would see both exports and... scmp.com/economy/china-…
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imports recover, not just exports. This means that the "recovery" in trade has not been driven by a recovery in the domestic economy.
So what drove it? Back in April and May, I was already writing about how certain trade-dependent countries in Asia were responding...
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to Covid-19 with supply-side measures that effectively subsidized exports at the expense of imports, the result of which would be surging trade surpluses – even as trade imbalances around the world contracted and their trade partners struggled to boost demand.
As this FT editorial implies, China has responded to major social and economic changes in China and the world – which were not created, but were sharply accelerated, by Covid-19 – mainly by doubling down on its existing political and economic model.
For over a decade Beijing has promised economic adjustment in the form of a rebalancing of domestic demand, but probably because it does not accept the accompanying social and political adjustments, it has barely adjusted: the limited increase in the consumption share of...
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GDP has had more to do with a decline in GDP growth than with a real rebalancing of income.
I am not a historical determinist, but in the past, systems that have resisted adjusting their institutions during periods of great underlying change have always seemed more...
Parents are protesting in Beijing because an education company to whom they made payments has gone bankrupt, and are demanding that somebody (the government, I guess) make up those payments.
Clearly moral hazard is strongly embedded within the economy, and while much has already been written about its effect on lending discipline, I would add that moral hazard is also a kind of positive feedback mechanism. It reinforces economic activity and growth when times...
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are good by encouraging risk-taking and by effectively lowering transaction costs, but when conditions reverse it can exacerbate the slowdown by inhibiting risk-taking and forcing a (sometimes chaotic) adjustment of expectations.