I've been fortunate to be able to track the political attitudes of a set of American adults recruited by Knowledge Networks using off-line methods before 2008. I've repeatedly surveyed these folks, most recently via Ipsos 10/7-10/22/20. n=1,131. Some initial results.
(By the way, if you are curious for some previous work using this panel, check out these @FiveThirtyEight articles:)
This is *not* a representative sample of the current electorate. Since this is a long-running panel, the youngest respondents are now 30. And it has been subject to attrition. Here I report unweighted results.
But still potentially instructive to see where people were in the past vs. this month. Here, for instance, are post-election 2016 (rows; -1=Clinton, 0=neither, 1=Trump) vs. this month's wave (columns).
39.7% of people always with Dems; 33.9% always with GOP.
9.4% were with neither in '16; now with Biden.
5.4% were with neither in '16, now with Trump.
3.0% were with Trump '16, now Biden.
1.0% were with Clinton '16, now Biden.
Biden has 52% of a group where Clinton '16 had 42%.
Trump has 40% of a group where he had 38%.
Simply put, a lot of the 2016-2020 movement is among those who didn't back either candidate in 2016, and they are breaking for Biden.
Do I worry about differential response rates? Yes.
Here, I add "9" for responses I didn't observe in 10/20, report raw counts.
Even though post-election '16 wave had slightly more Clinton (40.3%) than Trump (39.1%) backers, 20 more '16 Trump backers not present in latest wave.
(Hope to add to this thread later.)
* 1.0% were with Clinton '16, now Trump. Apologies.
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Was Trump's 2016 victory driven more by turnout or persuasion? That question shadowed the 2020 Democratic presidential primary. In this new @monkeycageblog piece I try to answer it, drawing on new research with @seth_j_hill and Greg Huber.
That lets us make figures like this, which plots the GOP's gain on the y-axis by decile of precinct turnout stability (x-axis). Higher stability=more of the same voters in 2012, 2016.
Shift to GOP is *larger* on average in more stable precincts. Suggests persuasion is impt. 3/n
In early April, @spbhanot and I conducted a survey via @Civiqs to look at how online Pennsylvanians were responding to COVID-19. Now, @abuttenheim joins us for a second wave with many of the same respondents to see what those views look like (May 30-June 2, n=2,045).
In early April, 59% said "We must continue to stay home for as long as necessary, even if the economy suffers." By early June, that was down to 43%, with 46% instead saying "We must reopen the economy as soon as possible, even if more people will get sick." (Had been 27%.) 2/n
I teamed up with @abuttenheim and @spbhanot to administer an online survey via @civiqs of 1,912 Pennsylvania adults April 4th-8th focusing on residents' responses to coronavirus, and am going to tweet some of the topline results in this thread. 1/n
When asked about trade-offs between re-opening the economy and keeping it closed to prevent the spread of the virus, 59% said we should "stay home for as long as necessary" while 27% said we should re-open the economy as soon as possible, even if more people get sick." 2/n
On the economy question, there is a stark divide between Republicans and Democrats. The percentage of Democrats saying we should re-open the economy as soon as possible? Just 4%. Republicans? 49%. Independents come in at 29%.
With Sen. Sanders throwing his hat into the ring, some data and observations from his 2016 primary campaign... 1/10
As with any political coalition of any meaningful size, Sanders' 2016 supporters weren't all alike. Sanders' 2016 campaign combined voters on the left w/ more disaffected, anti-establishment voters. I wrote about this coalition for @538politics here: fivethirtyeight.com/features/does-… 2/10
Take Sanders' 2016 victory in West Virginia Dem primary. Sanders did better in the places where Keith Judd had done better running against Obama in 2012. The ultimate protest candidate, Judd was a federal inmate who won > 40% of the WV vote in 2012. 3/10
Central question w/ Kennedy's retirement is political impact of potentially overturning Roe. My new book "The Increasingly United States" (goo.gl/SgHtsb) provides a way to approach that. Key is to first recognize that nationalization can mean two different things. 1/n
Politics can be nationalized when state, national divisions are over similar issues (figures on right side). But politics can also be nationalized when voters care only about nat'l issues, aren't engaged in state or local pol (figures on bottom). 2/n
These two sides of nationalization don't always move in tandem. Along the first dimension, nationalization rose in 1930s and 1940s, declined until ~1980, grew to new heights after. 3/n