Exciting news! @MichaelAklin and my new provocation is out in @GepJournal. We make a simple but far-reaching claim. **Empirically, climate politics is NOT primarily about collective action or free-riding**. A quick 🧵on why we've all been prisoners of the wrong dilemma 1/
For decades now, we've all assumed that free-riding is the binding constraint on global climate politics. Google "climate change" and "free-riding", and it generates 18000+ unique hits. Economists mince few words about this. Here's a Nordhaus quote for flavor: 2/
The logic of free-riding seems powerful. No country can solve climate change alone. But acting is costly. So every country wants to free-ride off of other country's action. But then no-one has an incentive to act. 3/
It's a fabulous idea. And you literally cannot overstate its influence. We've structured decades of climate negotiations on the assumption it is true. But is it? Do the empirics match this reality we've constructed? The surprising answer: not really! 4/
In our article, @MichaelAklin and I review the empirical evidence to evaluate whether it's consistent with our dominant collective-action flavored theory of climate politics. Shocking fact: we can't find ANY empirical evidence that shows it to be clearly correct. 5/
Instead, our review points to three things:
1⃣National policy action occurs in the absence of institutions to manage free-riding. For example, US leaving Kyoto did not alter pace of reforms in other countries. 6/
2⃣The public behaves like an unconditional climate cooperator! Most experiments and surveys do not find evidence that public support for action goes down in the presence of free-riding. Here is a US time-series courtesy of @YaleClimateComm as one example: 7/
3⃣National political actors also behave in a mostly unconditional fashion. For example, we revisit the Byrd-Hagel resolution and Bush's decision to reject Kyoto. We show that free-riding concerns were largely rhetorical, not substantive. 8/
In short, we can't actually locate any empirical evidence to suggest that free-riding in practice constrains global climate politics, even though policymakers and academics have blindly assumed this fact for decades. Much more on this in paper (and more nuanced too!). 9/
So what explains climate politics if not free-riding concerns? We think economic conflict between policy winners and losers is the real binding constraint on global climate politics. It can account for existing empirical evidence more completely *and* parsimoniously. 10/
Our provocation is also intended as an appeal to the wider community. Our work on this is ongoing - we want to know your most persuasive empirical evidence for free-riding in climate politics. Also, happy to share our paper if you don't have access. 11/
We've spent four decades assuming international institutions should primarily remedy free-riding. But maybe that's the wrong dilemma! Given the urgency of the threat, we can't risk our climate politics being a prisoner of the wrong theories. The stakes are too high. 12/12
PS: Our article leads a @GepJournal special issue addressing this need. First, a @thomasnhale article on "catalytic cooperation". Hale describes how a wide range of global problems can be addressed through the leadership of a proactive country.
Next, an article by @fgenovese86 and @pol_economist. Using survey experiments, they show that information about *domestic* distributional effects of climate policies is more valued by people than information about policy decisions abroad.
Will climate change change political behavior? In new @apsrjournal article, @chadhazlett and I find that experiencing a wildfire drives pro-environmental voting - but only in Democratic areas. Short 🧵 1/ cup.org/309PWte
The politics of climate change politics is tough. Leaders need to impose short-term policy costs to deliver long-term climate benefits. Today, the impacts of climate change are impacting Americans. Will this break the climate policymaking stalemate? 2/
Research is pretty mixed on this topic, as I recently reviewed with @peterdhowe, @mudfire and Brittany Shield in ERL. Also, most work focusses on public opinion, not on the ground political behavior 3/ iopscience.iop.org/article/10.108…
My new book Carbon Captured is out! In it, I explain differences across countries in the timing and substance of their climate reforms. A quick 🧵here on one of the book's key arguments - something I call the logic of "double representation" 1/
Often, we talk about climate change as a left-right thing. But this doesn't line up with empirical reality of climate policy debates in most countries. We can't understand climate politics without recognizing this. 2/
The basic idea: climate change became an object of political conflict beginning in the late 1980s as climate science developed. But across advanced economies, political parties and economic interest groups were already well established 3/
I can't pull my mind away from the horrifying loss of life and land in 🇦🇺. Climate politics in Oz have been insane for decades. (The insanity gets a full chapter in my book). Will these fires change anything? Can they undermine the climate skeptics in power? A short 🧵1/
On the surface of it, it's hard to be hopeful. Current PM Morrison refuses to acknowledge that climate change is happening and wants to expand coal production. Here he is, no joke, bringing a lump of it into the Australian parliament. 2/
Kind of like that time when Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe threw a snowball inside the US Senate to disprove climate change. It was snowing outside, you see. 3/
Polarization is huge obstacle to US climate policy. One hope: cross-party clean energy uptake. My new @NatureEnergyJnl article (w @peterdhowe + Chris Miljanich) merges satellite data w/ voter file to explore political behaviors of solar PV households 1/ 🧵 nature.com/articles/s4156…
For decades, US climate beliefs have been sorting around party lines. Today, many Republican officials have turned against the energy transition - in some states they are even working to rollback state-level clean energy policies 2/ theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
But Republicans are not homogenous. Surprising political coalitions like the “Green Tea Party” have captured the imagination. Still, it is an empirical Q: are clean energy Republicans the exception or the norm? 3/ yaleclimateconnections.org/2014/08/climat…
SHORT THREAD: Climate change is happening. It's signature is all over our lives. Will this reshape the politics of climate change? My new open-access review with @peterdhowe, @mudfire, and Brittany Shield in ERL surveys what we know and don't 1/ iopscience.iop.org/article/10.108…
Do climate experiences change shape climate opinions? Contrary to many advocates' hope, there is mixed evidence that extreme weather shapes climate beliefs. Some evidence that very local experiences have short-term effect - but little evidence for durable over-time effects 2/
In part, this is a tough question to answer because the literature has methodological, measurement and conceptual inconsistencies (which we detail in the review for those interested). Another limit is focus on attitudes and behavioral intentions, rather than behavior itself 3/
Eliminate the filibuster and a Dem Senate could pass climate reforms if 2020 goes the party's way - but we also need those reforms to be durable. I write about the Republican elephant in the climate politics room for @TPM THREAD 1/ talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/climate-d…
Across the world, right-wing populists have repealed climate change policy after seizing power. The IPCC makes clear we no longer have time for such fits and starts. A climate package in 2021 needs to be durable for a decade or more 2/ theguardian.com/environment/20…
Is blanket Republican opposition to climate policy inevitable? The answer is more complicated than you might expect. At the elite level, there have been moments where Republican voices have supported climate reforms. 3/