I still can't engage with @NateSilver538 on this site but this tweet misses a v important nuance of the post, which is that a model with fatter tails actually makes our aggregate predictions *worse* for 2008-2016, even though it makes the state-level predictions more inclusive.
This might have something to do with the way we parameterized our a correlated error and how relying on the fundamentals helped us shrink toward 50-50 in 2016 -- Nate needed fat tails then to control for poll error but our model hedged by picking up pro-D bias in swing states.
Also, adding fat tails on the order of what Nate uses only pushes our model down to 93% — so it's not like a huge difference. The bigger reason there's a gap bt our models is that 538 includes some very R-biased partisan data that's pushing their avgs toward 50-50 in key states
Also, this is an entirely separate issue than Nate inflating his time x uncertainty interaction, which was probably the wrong call as the polls turned out to be stable and rather Biden-leaning throughout the cycle (as we theorized).
So while our overall trend could be a few points overconfident (again, at the state level — bc the way we've set it up produces reasonably *conservative* national calibration), I don't buy Nate's argument that his model with a whole lot of movement in the fall is right by default
Anyway, thanks for coming to my TED Talk — I wish Nate and I were on good enough terms to @ each other here because obviously we have more in common than we disagree on
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FOLKS! The initial results of #Election2020 are trickling in from IN and KY. Follow this thread for my analysis and live prediction of results throughout election night.
And remember you can update our election model with your own estimates here ⬇️
If these are anywhere near accurate, Trump is toast.
So, these first results are mostly from absentee votes, so should skew a bit more Democratic than expected. So I am withholding judgement until we get to 100% reporting.
👋👋 Here is a short R script that updates our presidential election forecast live on Tuesday night based on the results that are announced so far. (It didn't feel right to keep this private when the rest of our model is public.) Enjoy!
Yeah, it's pretty cool. You don't have to download any other dependencies at all. The program reads all of the latest data fresh from our site and GitHub repos. Just open up a fresh R window and copy/paste the code.
I wonder what the @FiveThirtyEight and RealClearPolitics averages would show if they excluded polls released by Trump's super PAC (Insider Advantage, Susquehanna) and other ideologically skewed firms with suspect methods (Rasmussen, Trafalgar). This is actually a really big deal.
There is good reason to believe that the way house effects and partisan bias adjustments have been calculated in the past — to control for wonky methodologies or campaign internals — aren't enough to control for the several GOP firms that are essentially catering to the right.
There is also a point about incentives here, which is that the polls that Trump's Super PAC choses to release are probably intended to raise money and motivate his base, rather than accurately measure the reason. That's even worse than the raw Ras + Trafalgar bias
There is a large divide between national and state polls right now, with national poll showing an 11 percentage point advantage for Biden (in two-party %) and state polls hovering around +9.
Our election model is based mostly on the latter — we only really use national polls to fill in the gaps — but I do wonder about what the election would really look like with Biden +11 in state polls too. IA, OH and GA would probably be safely lean D
A 2 point delta nationally is huge in probabilistic terms, esp on election day. It's the difference between FL being 70% Biden and 90%, which might even be enough to push Biden's odds above 95
Vote-switching accounts for 2/3rds of the swing in Democratic margin from 2016 to 2020, according to these figures.
As we found out after the 2018 midterms, the bigger force driving post-Trump electoral change is modest persuasion, rather than huge differential turnout
If you include 2016 third-party voters in the vote choice v turnout calculation, the numbers work out to 89% of the Biden-Trump swing being due to switching among 2016 voters.
Which... hmmm where have I seen that number before... ;)
Our model thinks that some of the big swings toward Biden in other models/aggregates is a bit phantom. That's probably bc it relies heavily on state trends (which have been more stable) when data are available and bc of our partisan non-response adjustment projects.economist.com/us-2020-foreca…
I'd be careful with normal polling averages right now. We know that debates tend to cause temporary swings in the polls, and our model is picking up what we'd expect to see under a phantom swings — big movement in rdd and phone polls with smaller changes in partisan-weighted data
You can see the diff bt state and national trends at play in PA: If Biden really was up 10-11 nationally, our model thinks we should be seeing a lot more polls around +9-10, but instead we have a load of +5-8s and a few outliers around +11.