There is an argument that Part 5 of the IM Bill (the bit that permits breaches of the Withdrawal Agreement) doesn’t undermine the Good Friday Agreement - but not for the reason claimed by Eustice.
You could therefore say that if Article 10 is used just to prevent “reach back” to GB, what you are really doing is correcting a mistake that the current government made when it signed a provision that clearly entailed reach back, and not affecting NI (or the GFA) at all.
The current government won’t use that argument because (a) it concedes its own carelessness in signing Art.10 - and abandons its pretence that there’s EU “bad faith” here - and (b) it’s inconsistent with its “protect NI’s place in the U.K.” justification.
But it would be vaguely plausible if run.
That said, I think “vaguely plausible” doesn’t mean “right”. There’s a reason A10 applies to UK or GB measures that extend to or have knock-on effects on NI trade.
It protects the EU against the possibility that businesses in NI benefit from UK measures in ways that give them an unfair leg up when they export to the EU across the open NI/EU border - the Irish border.
If the U.K. can rewrite what A10 means at will, then that protection goes. That puts pressure on the open border and hence the GFA.
Finally, Eustice’s argument about legal clarity and certainty doesn’t hold a drop of water. A10 is as clear as anti-subsidy provisions ever are. And A12 sets out in plain text how issues as to its application are resolved: by the Commission, the UK courts and ultimately the ECJ.
That said, there is a strong case that A10 is not a sustainable arrangement: a case I have sympathy for (though the govt should have thought about that before signing it).
But the answer isn’t a hare-brained and unconscionable plan to breach international law: it’s to set up and commit to a robust subsidy regime of our own, and then persuade the EU do drop A10 on that basis as part of an agreed FTA.
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We may have a vaccine against Covid. That means a decision for the government (@theresecoffey at @DWP) on whether to extend the scheme under the Vaccine Damages Act 1979 legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/17/… to vaccinations against Covid.
You’ll see that it entitles anyone suffering severe disablement (60% disabled) caused by a vaccine against listed diseases to a payment of £120,000 from the state. Unlike a product liability claim, it’s irrelevant what the manufacturer knew or should have known about its effects.
It doesn’t deliver on a “clear* Conservative manifesto commitment”. The Conservative manifesto and election campaign told us that the Withdrawal Agreement was a wonderful deal that would be ratified. Nothing about reneging on it.
This, I’m afraid, misses the point. @SBarrettBar points to cases where national courts (the ECJ is a national court for these purposes) have identified a conflict between their domestic legal order & international law, and said that they have to follow their domestic legal order.
Such conflicts usually arise accidentally, in that the domestic legislature and executive have misunderstood what their own legal order, or international law, requires, and have ended up in a situation where the two don’t match up. Both of Steven’s examples are in that category.
Errare humanum est. These things happen. And what international law requires, or what the domestic legal order requires, are often unclear until a competent court has ruled.
If the current government does accept the stripping out of Part 5 of the Internal Market Bill (that’s the breach of the NI Protocol bit) then the case for putting forward a robust UK subsidy regime grows even stronger.
That is because Article 10 of the Protocol does have “reach back” effects into Great Britain. Any UK or GB subsidy or tax discount that could be said to have potential knock-on effects on NI/EU trade patterns in goods will be caught.
Examples: a UK corporation tax discount benefitting companies active in the goods sector in NI. A Covid-19 loan guarantee scheme applying to all UK businesses.
On subsidy control, note that the solution apparently proposed by the EU is pretty much along the lines suggested by numerous U.K. lawyers expert in the field as a landing place between the legitimate concerns of the EU and the current UK government’s antipathy to “alignment”.
There are some differences between those proposals: but the basic structure of each of them is along the lines apparently now proposed by the EU. The current UK government should now bite the bullet and accept this sensible way forward.