It doesn’t deliver on a “clear* Conservative manifesto commitment”. The Conservative manifesto and election campaign told us that the Withdrawal Agreement was a wonderful deal that would be ratified. Nothing about reneging on it.
(*Another example of use of “clear” being a tell that what is being asserted is anything but.)
The clauses do not protect the integrity of the U.K. internal market or the peace process.
They are a “cunning plan” (in the Baldrick sense of the term) to get the current government out of a commitment on State aid (Article 10) that it failed to look at properly, and now wishes it hadn’t signed because of its potential effect in GB.
A principled or sensible government would deal with the problem by putting on the table a robust UK subsidy regime and asking the EU to agree to amend or delete Article 10. But No 10 under its current occupation doesn’t seem to be brimming over with either principle or sense.
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We may have a vaccine against Covid. That means a decision for the government (@theresecoffey at @DWP) on whether to extend the scheme under the Vaccine Damages Act 1979 legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/17/… to vaccinations against Covid.
You’ll see that it entitles anyone suffering severe disablement (60% disabled) caused by a vaccine against listed diseases to a payment of £120,000 from the state. Unlike a product liability claim, it’s irrelevant what the manufacturer knew or should have known about its effects.
This, I’m afraid, misses the point. @SBarrettBar points to cases where national courts (the ECJ is a national court for these purposes) have identified a conflict between their domestic legal order & international law, and said that they have to follow their domestic legal order.
Such conflicts usually arise accidentally, in that the domestic legislature and executive have misunderstood what their own legal order, or international law, requires, and have ended up in a situation where the two don’t match up. Both of Steven’s examples are in that category.
Errare humanum est. These things happen. And what international law requires, or what the domestic legal order requires, are often unclear until a competent court has ruled.
There is an argument that Part 5 of the IM Bill (the bit that permits breaches of the Withdrawal Agreement) doesn’t undermine the Good Friday Agreement - but not for the reason claimed by Eustice.
If the current government does accept the stripping out of Part 5 of the Internal Market Bill (that’s the breach of the NI Protocol bit) then the case for putting forward a robust UK subsidy regime grows even stronger.
That is because Article 10 of the Protocol does have “reach back” effects into Great Britain. Any UK or GB subsidy or tax discount that could be said to have potential knock-on effects on NI/EU trade patterns in goods will be caught.
Examples: a UK corporation tax discount benefitting companies active in the goods sector in NI. A Covid-19 loan guarantee scheme applying to all UK businesses.
On subsidy control, note that the solution apparently proposed by the EU is pretty much along the lines suggested by numerous U.K. lawyers expert in the field as a landing place between the legitimate concerns of the EU and the current UK government’s antipathy to “alignment”.
There are some differences between those proposals: but the basic structure of each of them is along the lines apparently now proposed by the EU. The current UK government should now bite the bullet and accept this sensible way forward.