This, I’m afraid, misses the point. @SBarrettBar points to cases where national courts (the ECJ is a national court for these purposes) have identified a conflict between their domestic legal order & international law, and said that they have to follow their domestic legal order.
Such conflicts usually arise accidentally, in that the domestic legislature and executive have misunderstood what their own legal order, or international law, requires, and have ended up in a situation where the two don’t match up. Both of Steven’s examples are in that category.
Errare humanum est. These things happen. And what international law requires, or what the domestic legal order requires, are often unclear until a competent court has ruled.
That is completely different from a case where a government deliberately and knowingly asking its legislature to pass legislation that it admits is an undoubted and obvious breach of international law (in this case, of a treaty that the same government negotiated 12 months ago).
I’m afraid others have tried to fly this canard, including Bill Cash and Lord Lilley. But it is a canard, and should now be served on a plate and stuffed with orange.
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We may have a vaccine against Covid. That means a decision for the government (@theresecoffey at @DWP) on whether to extend the scheme under the Vaccine Damages Act 1979 legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/17/… to vaccinations against Covid.
You’ll see that it entitles anyone suffering severe disablement (60% disabled) caused by a vaccine against listed diseases to a payment of £120,000 from the state. Unlike a product liability claim, it’s irrelevant what the manufacturer knew or should have known about its effects.
It doesn’t deliver on a “clear* Conservative manifesto commitment”. The Conservative manifesto and election campaign told us that the Withdrawal Agreement was a wonderful deal that would be ratified. Nothing about reneging on it.
There is an argument that Part 5 of the IM Bill (the bit that permits breaches of the Withdrawal Agreement) doesn’t undermine the Good Friday Agreement - but not for the reason claimed by Eustice.
If the current government does accept the stripping out of Part 5 of the Internal Market Bill (that’s the breach of the NI Protocol bit) then the case for putting forward a robust UK subsidy regime grows even stronger.
That is because Article 10 of the Protocol does have “reach back” effects into Great Britain. Any UK or GB subsidy or tax discount that could be said to have potential knock-on effects on NI/EU trade patterns in goods will be caught.
Examples: a UK corporation tax discount benefitting companies active in the goods sector in NI. A Covid-19 loan guarantee scheme applying to all UK businesses.
On subsidy control, note that the solution apparently proposed by the EU is pretty much along the lines suggested by numerous U.K. lawyers expert in the field as a landing place between the legitimate concerns of the EU and the current UK government’s antipathy to “alignment”.
There are some differences between those proposals: but the basic structure of each of them is along the lines apparently now proposed by the EU. The current UK government should now bite the bullet and accept this sensible way forward.