Thread by @Topcenterorg

#Expertopinion | Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan

@MMuradov3: The Second Karabakh war ended with the 10 November trilateral agreement, which stipulates deployment of 1,960 Russian peacekeeping troops within bigger part of ex-NKAO and Lachin corridor. (1/15)

This clause, which means the appearance of the Russian militaries in legitimate capacity on Azerbaijani territory for the first time since 1992 (excl. the staff of the Gabala radar station closed in 2012, which did not represent a major political issue for Azerbaijan)... (2/15)

...has received a mixed reaction in Azerbaijan which has long been taking a principled position on the presence of foreign troops. However, there has hardly been any better option right now, mainly for the following reasons. (3/15)

First, the presence of some kind of armed peacekeepers has been inevitable anyway, and Azerbaijan, which has carefully built an image of a reliable partner playing by the rules, would not have risked being widely accused of ethnic cleansing. (4/15)

Even in case of hypothetical liberation of all occupied lands by force, Armenia would`ve hardly accepted any peace deal without similar mission and could`ve made resettlement and infrastructure development of the areas nearly impossible by constant armed provocations. (5/15)

So, a mediated ceasefire with international guarantees for the Armenian community of Karabakh was the only viable outcome, but the question remains- whether there were opportunities other than Russia? (6/15)

For many years, it was supposed that such a mission would be organized and deployed by 3 Minsk Group co-chair countries. After the meeting with Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the American side made an extremely vague proposal of “Scandinavian peacekeepers”. (7/15)

Neither of them was realistic, however. A peacekeeping mission in the area of such a bitter and prolonged conflict must rely on a considerable base of power and willingness to use it, as well as the readiness to get in quite muddy waters. (8/15)

Western countries had not been ready to mobilize such power either for want of motivation or for unwillingness to interfere and challenge Russia in Caucasus. That’s why Macron, despite his statements, has done virtually nothing to impact the events on the ground. (9/15)

At the same time, the recent problems in the EU-Turkey relations has made Moscow a more comfortable partner for President Erdogan in the South Caucasus than Brussels, thoroughly limiting the European opportunities to influence the parties to the conflict. (10/15)

Secondly, the uncooperative position taken by Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in recent years has also made other options unfortunately untenable. Although both parties had earlier expressed concerns about the possibility of a peacekeeping mission deployment... (11/15)

... for Yerevan it had been one of the pretexts to prolong the status-quo and avoid substantive negotiations. Earlier on, the option of a lighter, Kosovo-style international police mission for the future of Nagorno-Karabakh had been discussed... (12/15)

...but it would have been possible only if Armenia had voluntarily agreed to return the 7 adjacent regions to Azerbaijan without preconditions and agree on a compromise on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. (13/15)

However, the Armenian Parliament and wider political community consistently denied this option even after bitter defeats on the battlefield during the latest war and did not engage in substantive talks upon humanitarian truce agreements reached 3 times during 44 days. (14/15)

This stance made the urgent deployment of Russian peacekeepers the only available option to secure a comprehensive ceasefire and withdrawal of Armenian troops. (15/15)

#longthread #NagornoKarabakh