The Biden team will have to counter continuing questions about US commitment and credibility.
Many in Asia believe that American engagement and influence is declining. In particular, they worry that Washington is looking inward and increasingly adopting America First logic.
But China is in even worse shape internationally; the Communist Party is winning a race to the bottom.
Xi Jinping is unpopular, and unlike Donald Trump, he's not going anywhere soon.
So Joe Biden will have at least a short "window of opportunity" to make some headway in Asia.
Yet shifting alignments in Asia will pose a real challenge.
Washington will have to reengage with ASEAN and others without appearing to downgrade the Quad.
In other words, the United States needs to put Asia back at the heart of its Indo-Pacific strategy.
The Biden team comes in with some real advantages, but they will have to answer three tough questions:
First, can the United States devote more attention to Asia given that most Americans' immediate priority is addressing our serious problems here at home?
Second, can the United States craft a positive regional trade and investment strategy?
Trump's attacks made trade more, not less, popular. But that doesn't mean a revised Trans-Pacific Partnership deal would sail through Congress. Still, Washington can't beat RCEP with nothing.
Third, can the United States deter China and reassure regional allies and partners with flat or falling defense resources?
The Biden team has some innovative ideas, but it will be hard to argue that Washington can "do more with less" if Beijing continues "doing more with more."
What does this all mean? The Biden team will have a critical window of opportunity in Asia. But it will have to draw on the pivot's lessons without being circumscribed by them.
My new piece @WarOnTheRocks analyzes the White House's China strategy.
I've heard five critiques: 1) Too confrontation for admin critics 2) Too restrained for CCP critics 3) Too transactional for allies 4) Too values-based for Trump 5) Too late to matter
I want to begin by acknowledging that this is a carefully crafted strategy. It deserves serious debate.
Unfortunately, the administration remains "badly fractured intellectually" on China policy. The authors were saddled with several basic contradictions. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
First, the strategy rejects the "responsible stakeholder" approach and relies on sticks (not carrots) to “compel Beijing to cease or reduce" harmful actions.
But National Security Advisor O'Brien just said "China is not going to change its behavior." So what's the ultimate goal?
First, some good news: More Southeast Asian experts think the Indo-Pacific is a viable concept for regional order this year than last (28% in 2020 vs 17% in 2019). In this regard, the administration has made progress in the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. (2/9)
But the number of Southeast Asian experts who say that the level of U.S. engagement has decreased significantly has doubled since last year. In fact, it has roughly tripled in Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand. (3/9)
Act 1: Today, U.S. released an Indo-Pacific update that begins, “President Donald J. Trump has made U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region a top priority of his Administration.”