Reports are beginning to circulate about requirements to collect personal information for use in manual contact tracing. As many people have noted, manual contact tracing will require privacy trade offs. The question is how big a trade off and what do we get in exchange. 1/
What we get is a lot. As @EmilyGurley3---who is leading an online training at Johns Hopkins for contact tracers (great idea!)---has put it, "Contact tracers are in part detective, part therapist and part social worker.” washingtonpost.com/health/2020/05… 2/
Thousands of trained contact tracers, with access to rapid testing and backed (when needed) by quarantine authority, would make a big difference in containing coronavirus according to just about every expert I've read or talked to. 3/
To better understand privacy attitudes toward contact tracing apps, we surveyed subjects (total n=200) on two dates in early April. seclab.cs.washington.edu/wp-content/upl… (PDF) I thought some of the preliminary results were telling. 1/
Even with a hypothetical guarantee of "perfect" privacy, ~72% of participants said they were at least "somewhat likely" to download a contact tracing app. That number dropped significantly as we introduced the possibility of imperfect privacy. 2/
It mattered to participants who was behind the effort (Google, UN, etc.) and whether data was to be shared with government. There was a notable dearth of trust in the government to limit what I would characterize as secondary use or mission creep. 3/
I argue caution & humility when bringing tech to bear on the pandemic. For example, I discuss the early success but ultimate breakdown of Google Flu Trends between 2009 and 2013.
I note that digital contact tracing apps, even if well-architected from a privacy and security perspective, could wind up doing more harm than good and even empower malicious actors (a point I don't hear discussed much).
I have to say I'm really proud of @uw right now. It would be hard to enumerate all the ways this giant public research university and its staff, students, and faculty are helping, but they include developing & deploying Covid-19 tests (@UWVirology) 1/
Debunking misinformation (@katestarbird@CT_Bergstrom), providing context for emergency powers (Hugh Spitzer @UWSchoolofLaw), assessing the efficacy of containment measures (Elizabeth Halloran @UWBiostat), and so much more. 2/
Not to mention the leadership displayed by our alumni @GovInslee (@uw) and @MayorJenny (@UWSchoolofLaw) in responding to the pandemic and communicating with residents here and throughout the country. 3/
Apps that purport to track people infected with COVID-19 are a terrible idea imo for several reasons. Here are five: 1. In areas of low adoption, they will give people a false sense of security and could interfere with critical social distancing measures.
2. In areas of high adoption, coronapps will cause panic---especially if the data is visualized in such a way (e.g., heat maps) that overemphasizes relative densities.
3. The privacy concerns are considerable. To say that there are no privacy concerns because the data is anonymized and encrypted is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of privacy harms, which are often structural in nature or experienced subjectively.
When I was investigating allegations of police misconduct in New York, the NYPD rolled out Tasers. But they only let "white shirts" (sergeants and lieutenants) have them at first, because only experienced officers had the situational awareness to know when to use them.
Even so the police routinely used Tasers on "EDPs"---the name the NYPD used at the time for the mentally ill. Later Taser (now Axon) would specifically warn *not* to use Tasers on people showing signs of mental illness.